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Date Correspondence
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Name of Correspondent: Paul Nitze

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) (B) (C)

Subject: Paper entitled "Kuwait, the United States, and the Soviet Union"

ROUTE TO:
Office/Agency (Staff Name)
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ACTION
Action Code
ORIGINATOR 90 09 06
Referral Note: 1
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DISPOSITION
Tracking Date
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Type of Response Code
C 90 09 07

Completion Date
YY/MM/DD

ACTION CODES:
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C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure
I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:
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B - Non-Special Referral
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Reviewed - December 9/7/90
The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein produced a common vote of censure by all five of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Only a few years ago, such unanimity on such an issue would have been unthinkable; a resolution satisfactory to the United States would have drawn a veto from the USSR.

But collaboration between the U.S. and the USSR on world affairs is, as yet, thin and uncertain. The bases for common action need to be stronger and less burdened by mutual ideological and strategic nuclear concerns before strong bonds of international cooperation can be built between us.

But where else can we look for decisive assistance? In the event the President had not acted promptly to lead the international community in condemning Iraq's sudden and unprovoked takeover of Kuwait and by our prompt movement of forces into Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein's momentum might have been unstoppable.

But there is enormous danger in the current U.S. position. The United States should now move from a position of leadership to one of support for a coalition of powers upholding the
principles of the United Nations' Charter. The core of that coalition should be the great powers who are entrusted with the power of veto in the United Nations' Security Council. The two most important of those are the United States and the USSR. Without both of them in support of the common actions being taken, the coalition would not have the unity of will and the physical resources both to defend Saudi Arabia and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. With the passage of time, Saddam Hussein's opportunities for exploiting Arab grassroot resentment against the United States, Israel, and the rich oil-producing kingdoms and sheikdoms can be expected to grow, and the interests of those who have initially supported United States' policies to become more complex and divided.

President Bush would be wise to accept Brzezinski's distinction between supporting the defense of Saudi Arabia from invasion and forcing the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait. On the latter issue, it would be prudent for the President to play for time. But if he does so, what use should he make of the time thus gained? I believe he should try radically to improve the bases for US/USSR collaboration.

I cannot imagine that any Soviet strategist would find a radical, strong and more unified muslim world to the south of the USSR a desirable development; too much of their population is muslim and the importance of that group relative to the Russian
ethnic group is growing. During the frequent discussions Mr. Gorbachev used to have with Secretary of State George Shultz and his team, Gorbachev frequently emphasized the common US/USSR interest in not encouraging the growth of a strong Muslim force in the Middle East and South Asia with potentially divisive appeal to the growing Muslim minority in the USSR.

The dedication of much of Soviet leadership to the past tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology has significantly eroded. But strategic nuclear concerns remain a continuing barrier on both sides to a positive evolution in the political relations between the U.S. and the USSR. Prompt and radical forward movement in the START negotiations could be the key to transforming the Kuwait crisis into a door to a more favorable future.

A new and more ambitious approach to START is needed—one that would greatly reduce U.S. vulnerability to strategic attack, while simultaneously increasing Soviet confidence that the U.S. could not possibly gain from initiating a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

Such a new approach could have the following elements:

a) Over an agreed period of time, both sides would phase out and destroy all of their land-based MIRVed
missiles.

b) Concurrently, both sides would agree to reduce the aggregate number of warheads on permitted strategic nuclear systems to no more than 5000.

c) The actual warheads on each side would be limited to those permitted by the agreement.

Certain ancillary provisions would be necessary to assure the durability of the agreement.

The resulting strategic nuclear balance would be one in which all elements on both sides would be either highly survivable or at least not worth the cost to attack. The resulting reduction in incentives to attack would produce a more stable strategic environment for both sides.

If the Soviets agree to the above arrangement it should be possible for us indefinitely to postpone most of our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program; the strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR should be so stable as to require SDI defenses only against tactical missiles, not long-range strategic missiles, such as we and the Soviet Union rely upon.

In the strategic nuclear field, the USSR will remain a
superpower into the indefinite future. Even after substantial stabilizing reductions, such as those in the suggested new approach, the United States and the Soviet Union would, between them, possess more than 80 percent of the world's strategic nuclear weapons. We and the Soviets would have a strong common interest that the stable, equal balance between us not be upset by uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear armaments in the hands of others. I believe this would correspond to the interests of France, the United Kingdom and China as well.

If the bases for cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR were assured, it also should be to the common interest of the great powers that the United Nations' Charter be implemented with their support in the manner the drafters of the Charter originally contemplated. The type of aggression exemplified by Saddam Hussein's surprise attack on Kuwait cannot be said to be consistent with the Charter. The principal members of the UN Security Council would have the unchallengeable collective power to make Saddam Hussein's position in Kuwait untenable. A United Nations' solution to this problem would be far more satisfactory than the United States carrying an excessive burden with inadequate support from others.

7/25/90
Revised 8/23/90
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS:
LET'S DEAL WITH THEM NOW

by Paul H. Nitze

The following paper is addressed to those specialists who are interested in the specifics of how a START 1/2 agreement, such as that outlined in "Kuwait, the United States, and the Soviet Union," might be implemented and the impact it would have on nuclear deterrence.

Such a new approach could have the following elements:

a) Over an agreed period of time, both sides would phase out and destroy all of their land-based MIRVed missiles. On the U.S. side, this would include the Peacekeeper (MX) missiles, and the Minuteman IIIs; on the Soviet side, it would include the SS-18s, -19s and -24s.

b) Concurrently, both sides would agree to reduce the aggregate number of warheads on permitted strategic nuclear systems to no more than 5000. This aggregate would include nuclear warheads on ground-based single warhead missiles, whether mobile or silo-based; nuclear warheads on sea-based missiles, whether ballistic or cruise; bombers carrying only gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) with a range less than 600 kilometers, which would count as one warhead per bomber as agreed in Reykjavik; and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by bombers, which would count as one warhead for each warhead carried.

c) The actual warheads on each side would be limited to those permitted by the agreement. Excess warheads would be corralled and eventually would be reprocessed.

Certain ancillary provisions would be necessary. The 1600 limit in the draft START treaty on the number of weapon carriers would be relaxed or eliminated to permit distribution of warheads
on a larger number of carriers to improve survivability. There would be a limit on the throwweight of single-warhead missiles at, say, 200 kilograms each to prevent the deployment of super-heavy warheads such as those thought to be planned for the SS-18 Mod 6; such warheads could have new and seriously destabilizing effects.

Were such an agreement to prove acceptable to the Soviets, each side would decide for itself what mix of warheads on what permitted systems would be most likely to meet its needs and thus how it wished initially to allocate its 5000 warheads.

An illustrative allocation for the U.S. is as follows:

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permitted Nuclear Warheads (NWHs)</th>
<th>5000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountable NWHs allocated as follows:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWHs on Submarine Launched Missiles (SLBMs)</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single NWHs on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWHs on Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCMs)</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers carrying only gravity bombs and SRAMs</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWHs on Sea-launched Cruise Missile (SLCMs)</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Half of the total NWHs is allocated to submarine-launched ballistic missiles because these systems, especially after deployment of the Trident II D-5 missile, provide the optimal combination of survivability and effectiveness. The number of single-warhead ICBMs assumes refurbishment of our current 450
Minuteman II ICBMs and deployment of 250 new, small ICBMs in either the road-mobile or multiple protective shelter mode. Air-based forces are assumed to consist of about 100 ALCM carriers with 10 ALCMs per bomber and 100 penetrating bombers without ALCMs. Finally, a SLCM force with a number of NWHs slightly below the currently planned 750 is retained.

Following historical preferences, the arsenal the Soviets could be expected to deploy under this set of limits would probably rely more heavily than ours on land-based systems—using the single-warhead, road-mobile SS-25 and either fixed SS-25s or a new single-warhead ICBM—and would include fewer SLBMs, ALCMs and SLCMs. But the characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet force as a whole would be roughly equivalent to those of our arsenal.

Why would the resulting strategic balance be more stable than the one that would result from the START I draft treaty? The survivability of the land-based forces would be significantly enhanced, while the redundancy and survivability produced by a mix of sea-based and air-based forces would be retained.

Under the START draft treaty, the U.S. would have to continue to rely heavily on multiple-warhead (MIRVed) ICBMs that are both vulnerable and lucrative targets for a Soviet attack. Because the draft treaty limits to 1600 the number of delivery
vehicles permitted to each side, while permitting a far larger number of warheads, MIRVs are virtually mandated. The method the U.S. contemplates using to increase the survivability of its powerful and highly MIRVed MX missiles--deployment in a rail garrison mode--would leave those missiles vulnerable to a short-warning attack.

The limits proposed herein would not only allow but would require the sides to reduce the concentration of warheads on ICBMs all the way down to one per missile. Smaller, single warhead missiles can be deployed in highly survivable modes, either the road-mobile Midgetman scheme or a multiple protective shelter array such as the carry-hard scheme. Even if deployed in fixed silos, these missiles would be uninviting targets, since the Soviets would need to expend at least two warheads to be confident of destroying each single-warhead missile.

As for the sea-based and air-based legs; their survivability results from the ability of submarines to avoid detection and of bombers to take off on warning, respectively. The deeper reductions proposed here would not reduce their ability to do so. The Navy projects no significant threat to our ballistic missile submarines well into the next century; this assessment is independent of whether we deploy the 20 or so submarines contemplated under today's U.S. START proposal or the one or two submarines fewer that would result from these deeper
cuts. Similarly, fewer bombers would not translate into a lower fraction escaping attack; in fact, by dispersing the lower number among a constant number of airfields, we could increase the fraction escaping.

The Soviets would reap similar advantage from this approach. In particular, they would no longer be relying on an SS-18 force that is highly vulnerable to a U.S. strike. Further, they would no longer be faced with the prospect of the dangerous countermeasures, such as launch-on-warning, that the U.S. has been forced to consider in response to the SS-18 threat.

The resulting strategic balance would thus be one in which all elements were either highly survivable or at least not worth the cost to attack. The resulting reduction in incentives to attack would produce a more stable strategic environment for both sides.

Would the U.S. arsenal be large enough to satisfy reasonable targeting requirements? I am convinced it would. Given the high degree of survivability afforded by this approach, and the higher alert rates that could be maintained for such a smaller force, it is reasonable to assume that at least two-thirds of our warheads would survive a first strike and be available for targeting. Of these it might be useful to have about 1000 available for a prompt counterforce strike, should the nature of the incoming
attack make that wise. The remaining warheads initially should be held in reserve to deter or respond to enemy attacks on "other military targets," including naval bases, air bases, communications centers, and command and control facilities, and, if necessary, on urban (countervalue) targets. From this group, an ultimate reserve might be retained to deter extensive Soviet attacks against countervalue targets. This reserve could be relied on to threaten the destruction of the full Soviet panoply of nuclear power plants with resultant widespread fallout many times that of Chernobyl. The suggested allocation of U.S. warheads is summarized in Table II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permitted Nuclear Warheads (NWHs)</th>
<th>5000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Available for Retaliation (2/3)</td>
<td>3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prompt Counterforce Strike</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Reserve</td>
<td>2333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To deter or counter continuing attacks</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimate reserve</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This distribution would thus allow the U.S. to threaten 1000 strategic military targets in a prompt response, 2000 other military or industrial targets to deter or to respond to possible Soviet attacks on such targets, and 333 nuclear power plants or other countervalue targets as an ultimate deterrent. Such a capability should provide us high confidence of deterring any rational Soviet leadership from conducting a strategic strike against the U.S. The Soviets could have similar confidence of deterring any U.S. attack.
In sum, the strategic balance resulting from an agreement along the lines here outlined would be more stable, while retaining sufficient U.S. capability to satisfy reasonable targeting requirements.

This brings me to the final key question: Would the Soviets agree to such an approach? It has been reported that the Bush administration explored with the Soviets the idea of a ban on MIRVed ICBMs in START but acquiesced when the Soviets replied that consideration of such a radical step should be deferred to START II negotiations. I believe the administration gave in too easily and did not offer a sufficiently comprehensive alternative to meet Soviet concerns.

For too long, we have been putting off truly far-reaching, stabilizing strategic arms reductions until the next negotiation. In SALT I, we agreed to strict ABM limits and an unbalanced interim accord on offensive forces on the basis of assurances that stabilizing, deep reductions in offensive forces would follow shortly from the next negotiation. Eighteen years later, we are still waiting. Who knows how long we would have to wait after agreeing to START I for a START II treaty?

The time is ripe now for the radical steps I propose. But there is no assurance that it will remain so for long, especially
given the lack of further concessions we could safely make after having worked out the many unagreed points in START I. This argues for making the effort to attain a truly stable solution now.

How do we convince the Soviets to change their minds? I would emphasize the benefits to them—the reduced threat to their forces, the enhanced survivability of their ICBMs, the smaller force structure they would be required to maintain, and the end of the tensions caused by their SS-18s. I would also emphasize the unique nature of the current political environment and the need to seize the opportunity to produce a truly safe world while that opportunity exists.

If the Soviets would agree to the above arrangement it should be possible for the United States indefinitely to postpone much of its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. The strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR should be so stable as to warrant defenses only against tactical nuclear missiles, not against long-range nuclear missiles, such as those upon which the U.S. and the USSR rely.