THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 07, 1992

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE NORMAN F. LENT

SUBJECT: PROVIDES VIEWS, AS THE REPUBLICAN MEMBERS
OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS, ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE
HEARING ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROUTE TO:</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICE/AGENCY</td>
<td>(STAFF NAME)</td>
<td>ACT CODE YY/MM/DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICK CALIO</td>
<td></td>
<td>ORG 92/05/07 NC A 920604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RL 92/06/10 BS A 920613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSLT</td>
<td></td>
<td>RL 92/06/10 C 1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 DOD</td>
<td></td>
<td>RL 92/06/10 C 1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 DOE</td>
<td></td>
<td>RL 92/06/10 C 1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 DOD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMMENTS: SEE ID 323770

LETTERS SENT TO ALL SIGNEES

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 3 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 ___ ___

MAIL

USER CODES: (A)___________ (B)___________ (C)___________

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION
* A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED
* C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
* D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED
* F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED
* I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
* R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
* S-FOR-SIGNATURE *
* X-INTERIM REPLY *

OUTGOING

CORRESPONDENCE:

TYPE RESP=INITIALS

CODE = A
COMPLETED = DATE OF
OUTGOING

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.
TO: LENT, NORMAN F
   ET AL

FROM: SCOWCROFT

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
            CO

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PERSONS: DINGELL, JOHN D

SUBJECT: THANKS FOR LTR & DOE POLICY RE IRAQI WEAPONS

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTRS

DUE DATE: 12 MAY 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF: 9204518

FILES: WH

NSCP:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NSC CHRON

RIEDEL

COMMENTS: ____________________________

DISPATCHED BY [signature] DATE 7/31 BY HAND  W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSNGB

DOC 5 OF 5

UNCLASSIFIED
### National Security Council
The White House

**PROOFED BY:** [Signature]

**LOG #** 3593

**URGENT NOT PROOFED:**

**BYPASSED WW DESK:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEQUENCE TO</th>
<th>HAS BEEN</th>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ken Hill</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bill Sittmann</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jon Howe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent Scowcroft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Sittmann</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Room</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Wing Desk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>JDA 7/31</td>
<td>7/31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC Secretariat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>7/31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**cc:** VP

**Skinner**

**Other**

Should be seen by: 

(Date/Time)

**COMMENTS**

[Handwritten comments]

**DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:**

[Handwritten dispatch instructions]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOC</th>
<th>ACTION OFFICER</th>
<th>CAO</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
<th>ACTION REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>HAASS</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>92050812</td>
<td>PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>002</td>
<td>ENERGY</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>92051120</td>
<td>FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>003</td>
<td>HAASS</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>92062317</td>
<td>RECD ENERGY DRAFT REPLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>004</td>
<td>SCOWCROFT</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>92062317</td>
<td>APPROPRIATE ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>92062318</td>
<td>FOR SIGNATURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>92073120</td>
<td>SCOWCROFT SGD LTR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>92073120</td>
<td>SCOWCROFT SGD LTRS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TO: LEARY

FROM: LAVIN, A

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
           CO

PERSONS: DINGELL, JOHN D

SUBJECT: DOE DRAFT RESPONSE TO CHMN DINGELL RE IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE DATE: 12 MAY 92

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF: 9204518

FILES: WH

NSCP:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

HAASS

FOR CONCURRENCE

GORDON

LAMPLEY

RIEDEL

FOR INFO

HOWE

SCOWCROFT

COMMENTS:

KL

ADD TO DINGELL PACKAGE

TO COWEN 6/23

DISPATCHED BY __________________ DATE ____________ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED
TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: DINGELL, JOHN D

KEYWORDS: IRAQ NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM REP DINGELL RE IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 12 MAY 92 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
HAASS

FOR CONCURRENCE
GORDON
LAMPLEY
RIEDEL

FOR INFO
HOWE
SCOWCROFT

COMMENTS: SEND TO ENERGY FOR DRAFT RESPONSE RETURN TO NSC N.L.T. 20 MAY 1992

DISPATCHED BY ___________________ DATE ___________ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED
Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter to the President of April 22, 1992, regarding the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

I understand you had an opportunity to speak directly with Secretary Watkins on this subject. I have been assured by Secretary Watkins that the record of events does not support any allegations regarding discriminatory treatment of U.S. government officials.

I can assure you that prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation remains a top Administration priority. Our efforts have borne fruit, but we need to do more. For that reason, the President recently issued a statement calling for strengthened efforts to thwart the spread of all weapons of mass destruction as well as the missiles that deliver them. As you will see from the enclosed fact sheets, those efforts include steps consistent with your call to devote the best possible talent to the problem.

We hope you will support our efforts to confront this daunting challenge in the years ahead.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman, Subcommittee on
  Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6116

Enclosures
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7-19-92

FOR BRUCE RIEDEL

Please update with announcement of non-proliferation initiative.

Thanks.

MIKE ANDRICOS
July 21, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BREN'T SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: BRUCE O. RIEDEL

SUBJECT: Replies to Congressman Dingell and Colleagues

The President has received two letters from members of the House Energy Committee concerning the Department of Energy's handling of the Iraq nuclear proliferation problem in 1989. Congressman Dingell wrote the President in April concerning allegations that the Department of Energy has punished employees who sought to warn about the Iraqi nuclear proliferation problem in 1989 but were ignored (Tab III). Dingell also argued that DOE failed to take adequate measures concerning proliferation and Iraq.

Four other members of the committee wrote the President in May to respond to the allegations raised by Congressman Dingell (Tab IV). They argued that DOE's behavior was entirely appropriate and that no DOE employees have been punished for their activities.

The Department of Energy has prepared the response at Tab I to Congressman Dingell which notes that Dingell and Secretary Watkins have subsequently discussed the issue directly and that you have received the Secretary's assurance that DOE employees have not been discriminated against.

Your reply to the other four Congressman (Tab II) notes your appreciation for their comments and attention to this matter. In both replies you note our continued efforts in this area, as reflected in the President's July 13 statement.

Concurrences by: Virginia Lampley, Dan Pomman, and Steve Rademaker

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tabs I and II.

Attachments

Tab I  Reply to Congressman Dingell
Tab II  Reply to Congressman Lent and Colleagues
Tab III Letter from Congressman Dingell
Tab IV  Letter from Congressmen Lent and Colleagues
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. LEARY
NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT FROM CHAIRMAN DINELL
RE IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

Attached is the draft response to Chairman Dingell, ID 9203593, per your request.

Ann Lavin
Director
Executive Secretariat

Attachment
Draft Response Letter to  
Congressman Dingell  
for NSC Final

The Honorable John D. Dingell  
Chairman, Subcommittee on  
Oversight and Investigations  
Committee on Energy and Commerce  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C.  20515-6116

Dear Chairman Dingell:

Thank you for your letter of April 22, 1992, regarding the Subcommittee on  
Oversight and Investigations hearing on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

I understand you had an opportunity to speak directly with Secretary Watkins  
on this subject. Subsequently, efforts undertaken by the Department of  
Energy's professional staff, as outlined in the Secretary's response letter,  
indicate a thorough examination and review of this issue. In particular, I  
have been assured by Secretary Watkins that the record of events does not  
support any allegations regarding discriminatory treatment of U.S. government  
officials.

I can assure you that the Department of Energy, under the stewardship of  
Admiral Watkins, has taken a leadership role in implementing U.S.  
nonproliferation policy. Continued vigilance in monitoring the spread of  
nuclear weapons remains a high priority on our national security agenda. With  
your leadership and cooperation, we hope to continue to build on progress  
already achieved.

Sincerely,
Dear Congressman Upton:

Thank you for your letter to the President of May 8, 1992 concerning the record of the Department of Energy in reviewing Iraq’s nuclear program in the period prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We appreciate your efforts to set the record straight on this issue.

Let me also assure you that we intend to remain seized with the nuclear proliferation problem both in Iraq and elsewhere.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Fred Upton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congressman Schaefer:

Thank you for your letter to the President of May 8, 1992 concerning the record of the Department of Energy in reviewing Iraq’s nuclear program in the period prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We appreciate your efforts to set the record straight on this issue.

Let me also assure you that we intend to remain seized with the nuclear proliferation problem both in Iraq and elsewhere.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Dan Schaefer
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congressman Lent:

Thank you for your letter to the President of May 8, 1992 concerning the record of the Department of Energy in reviewing Iraq’s nuclear program in the period prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We appreciate your efforts to set the record straight on this issue.

Let me also assure you that we intend to remain seized with the nuclear proliferation problem both in Iraq and elsewhere.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Norman F. Lent
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Commerce and Energy
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Endorse
Dear Congressman Bliley:

Thank you for your letter to the President of May 8, 1992 concerning the record of the Department of Energy in reviewing Iraq’s nuclear program in the period prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We appreciate your efforts to set the record straight on this issue.

Let me also assure you that we intend to remain seized with the nuclear proliferation problem both in Iraq and elsewhere.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.
Ranking Republican Member
Subcommittee on Commerce and Energy
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
June 10, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: BRUCE O. RIEDEL

SUBJECT: Replies to Congressman Dingell and Colleagues

The President has received two letters from members of the House Energy Committee concerning the Department of Energy’s handling of the Iraq nuclear proliferation problem in 1989. Congressman Dingell wrote the President in April concerning allegations that the Department of Energy has punished employees who sought to warn about the Iraqi nuclear proliferation problem in 1989 but were ignored (Tab III). Dingell also argued that DOE failed to take adequate measures concerning proliferation and Iraq.

Four other members of the committee wrote the President in May to respond to the allegations raised by Congressman Dingell (Tab IV). They argued that DOE’s behavior was entirely appropriate and that no DOE employees have been punished for their activities.

The Department of Energy has prepared the response at Tab I to Congressman Dingell which notes that Dingell and Secretary Watkins have subsequently discussed the issue directly and that you have received the Secretary’s assurance that DOE employees have not been discriminated against.

Your reply to the other four Congressman (Tab II) notes your appreciation for their comments and attention to this matter. In both replies you note that we appreciate the need to remain seized with the proliferation problem in Iraq and elsewhere.

Concurrences by: Virginia Wemple and San Poneman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tabs I and II.

Attachments
Tab I Reply to Congressman Dingell
Tab II Reply to Congressman Lent and Colleagues
Tab III Letter from Congressman Dingell
Tab IV Letter from Congressmen Lent and Colleagues
Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter to the President of April 22, 1992, regarding the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

I understand you had an opportunity to speak directly with Secretary Watkins on this subject. I have been assured by Secretary Watkins that the record of events does not support any allegations regarding discriminatory treatment of U.S. government officials.

I can assure you that the Department of Energy, under the stewardship of Admiral Watkins, has taken a leadership role in implementing U.S. nonproliferation policy. Continued vigilance in monitoring the spread of nuclear weapons remains a high priority on our national security agenda. With your cooperation, we hope to continue to build on progress already achieved.

Sincerely,

Pent Scowcroft

Enclosures

The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-6116
June 1, 1992

Dear Norm:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President, cosigned by three of your colleagues, regarding the role of the Department of Energy in helping to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation in Iraq.

We appreciate being advised of your perspective as members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. I have shared your comments with President Bush. In addition, I have provided copies of your letter to several of the President's other advisors in this matter for their review.

Thank you again for writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Nicholas E. Calio
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Norman F. Lent
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NEC:JHH:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Energy - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Defense - FYI
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ORM OPTICAL DISK NETWORK

ID# 326679

____ Hardcopy pages are in poor condition (too light or too dark).

____ Remainder of case not scanned.

____ Oversize attachment not scanned.

____ Report not scanned.

____ Enclosure(s) not scanned.

____ Proclamation not scanned.

____ Incoming letter(s) not scanned.

____ Proposal not scanned.

____ Statement not scanned.

____ Duplicate letters attached - not scanned.

____ Only table of contents scanned.

____ No incoming letter attached.

____ Only tracking sheet scanned.

____ Photo(s) not scanned.

____ Bill not scanned.

____ Resolution not scanned.

____

Comments:

______________________________
______________________________
MEMORANDUM FOR: ANN LAVIN  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: PRESIDENT  
SOURCE: DINGELL, JOHN D  
DATE: 22 APR 92  

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM REP DINGELL RE IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM  

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY  

DUE DATE: 15 MAY 92  
COMMENT: PLEASE REPLY WITH DRAFT BY 15 MAY. RESPONSE IS URGENT. THANK YOU.  

FOR WILLIAM H. LEARY  
NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE
April 30, 1992

Dear John:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President expressing your belief that the Department of Energy could have prevented the flow of nuclear weapons technology to Iraq.

Please know that I have shared your comments with President Bush. In addition, I have provided copies of your letter to several of the President's other advisors in this matter for their review.

Thank you again for writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Nicholas E. Calio
Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable John D. Dingell
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NEC:JHH:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Energy - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Defense - FYI
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In a letter dated April 22, 1992, Chairman John Dingell of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce wrote you to characterize the results of a hearing held by the Subcommittee on April 24, 1991, on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. As the Republican Members of that Subcommittee who participated in the hearing, we wish to present our views about what that hearing revealed. While we commend Chairman Dingell for his interest in the role of the Department of Energy (DOE) in helping to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and share his concern that all agencies of government act to further the goal of nuclear nonproliferation, we do not share many of the conclusions reached in Chairman Dingell’s letter.

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S NONPROLIFERATION ACTION

The first conclusion with which we do not agree is that DOE failed to take appropriate action in March and April of 1989 to limit Iraq’s ability to acquire nuclear technology. In April 1989, certain persons at the Department of Energy’s Office of Classification and Technology Policy (OCTP) became convinced that the pattern of acquisitions and attempted acquisitions by Iraqi companies indicated a strong likelihood that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapons program. These individuals, whose diligence and dedication we commend, recommended to their superiors within DOE’s Office of Defense Programs that Energy Secretary James Watkins contact Secretary of State James Baker and bring the suspected Iraqi program to the attention of the National Security Council (NSC). However, at the time that these individuals were making these recommendations, Secretary Watkins had already been informed, in a classified intelligence briefing, of the Iraqi acquisition program and that it probably indicated the presence of a nuclear weapons program.

Other officials at DOE, most notably persons in the Office of Intelligence, did not agree with the recommendation of the OCTP officials that Secretary Watkins contact Secretary Baker and bring the issue to the attention of the NSC. These persons did not disagree with the conclusion that Iraq was probably pursuing a nuclear weapons program, but they believed that the export restrictions in place were adequate to prevent the Iraqis from acquiring the type
of technology necessary to support a nuclear weapons program. These officials, whose diligence and dedication we also commend, also believed that the characterization of the Iraqi program made by the OCTP officials overstated the state of development of the Iraqi program. Ultimately, an Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs made a decision not to send the OCTP recommendation to the Secretary. The Office of Defense Programs did, however, allocate increased analytical resources within DOE to examine the Iraqi program.

By the time of the Subcommittee's hearing in April 1991, the relations between the United States and Iraq had changed dramatically, and we all knew considerably more about the Iraqi program than anyone had known in April 1989. Today, in 1992, as a result of the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, we know even more. It is tempting to look back at 1989 through the perspective of 1991 and 1992 and conclude that DOE failed to do enough in 1989 to prevent Iraq from developing its nuclear weapons program. While many people in a number of agencies, in this government, in other governments, and in international organizations now realize that more could have been done, we think that a few points need to be made about the decisions made within DOE in April 1989.

The most important observation is that no witness identified any items of equipment or other forms of technology that Iraq acquired between April 1989, and the time that full-blown economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, that materially advanced the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. In fact, it was during this time that the Customs Service ran a very successful "sting" operation involving capacitors that Iraq attempted to acquire illegally. No NSC-level action was necessary for Customs to carry out this sting operation and we have no reason to believe that NSC-level action would have helped Customs in doing so.

We made another pertinent observation at the Subcommittee hearing: even two years later, with considerably more information about the Iraqi weapons program, there were still disagreements about the characterization of the Iraqi program made by the OCTP officials. Representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and even a former DOE employee who had favored sending the OCTP recommendation to the Secretary, testified that the OCTP description of the Iraqi program did not reflect the judgment of the intelligence community, either in 1989, or even in 1991. Thus, the hearing showed that the DOE officials that reviewed the recommendation and declined to pass it on to the Secretary had a substantive basis for doing so. Moreover, even though the OCTP characterization had correctly concluded that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, it missed the fact that the Iraqi program was relying very heavily on electromagnetic separation of isotopes for the purpose of enriching uranium.

Thus, we do not share Chairman Dingell's conclusion that "the DOE blundered a unique opportunity to curtail the flow of sensitive nuclear weapons technology to Iraq at a time when it could have made a significant difference." Reasonable persons examined ambiguous information about a program that a tyrannical government was doing everything it could to hide, and reached different conclusions about how best to react to it. Both suggested courses of actions were reasonable in light of what was known in 1989, and we believe that criticism
of DOE officials for the course of action that they took is simply the improved judgment that hindsight always gives.

THE PORTLAND SYMPOSIUM

Another conclusion stated in Chairman Dingell's letter with which we disagree is that DOE may have actually facilitated the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology by Iraq. In the late summer of 1989, DOE cosponsored a symposium on conventional explosives in Portland, Oregon, that drew attendees from around the world, including Iraq and other nations that are suspected of trying to acquire nuclear weapons technology. While, in retrospect, informing Iraq about any aspect of explosives seems unwise, there are legitimate commercial blasting operations that can profit from explosives technology. Moreover, presentations by Iraqi scientists at such a convention, even if screened by Iraqi government officials, might reveal what type of explosives research they were pursuing and provide insight into the probable state of an Iraqi nuclear weapons effort.

All of the material submitted by any person acting on behalf of DOE, or a DOE contractor, was screened and declassified before presentation at the Portland symposium. At the hearing, we heard of no information presented at the conference that could have furthered the Iraqi nuclear weapons program; and, in fact, some of the materials presented had been published in the open literature. While Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs Richard Claytor did remark that the conference was the "place to be" for potential proliferants, we understand that he said this while looking at a list of the nations represented by the attendees, not because of the subject matter presented at the conference. We have also heard, after the hearing, that information contained in French or Chinese presentations at the conference might have had nuclear weapons utility; this observation is more a commentary on the difficulty of restraining proliferation when the technology to precisely control explosives is becoming more and more attainable.

We understand that DOE has decided against cosponsoring another explosives symposium. In light of the events since the last such symposium, this decision seems wise to us. But asserting that cosponsoring the Portland explosives symposium in 1989 had the effect of materially assisting the Iraqi nuclear weapons effort seems to us difficult to sustain on the basis of the available evidence and an example of seeing events that occurred in 1989 through the prism of subsequent events.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PERSONNEL ACTIONS

The final conclusion of Chairman Dingell's letter with which we disagree is that the OCTP persons who recommended NSC-level activities on the Iraqi program have suffered for their actions. Our hearing included a very detailed review of the personnel files of those persons. While some of those persons have unquestionably been unhappy with their ratings and bonuses, we are satisfied that other factors in those persons' job performances are more than adequate to explain the ratings and bonuses that they received. We saw no evidence that the actions taken by OCTP personnel have been held against them by others in DOE.
CONCLUSION

Like the disagreements that occurred between DOE personnel in April of 1989, our disagreements with the conclusions set forth in Chairman Dingell’s letter reflect the differing points of view among reasonable individuals. We want you to have the benefit of all points of view with respect to the government’s goal of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. We look forward to working with you, with the Administration, with Chairman Dingell, and with our other colleagues in the Congress on this very important objective.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Bliley
Ranking Republican Member
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Norman F. Lent
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce

Dan Schaefer
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Fred Upton
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

cc: The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

The Honorable David L. Boren
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Frank H. Murkowski
Ranking Republican Member
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Senate

The Honorable John Glenn
Chairman
Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. Senate
The Honorable William V. Roth
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable William S. Broomfield
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Dave McCurdy
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Bud Shuster
Ranking Republican Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable James D. Watkins,
Admiral, USN, Retired
Secretary of Energy
Hardcopy pages are in poor condition (too light or too dark).

Remainder of case not scanned.

Oversize attachment not scanned.

Report not scanned.

Enclosure(s) not scanned.

Proclamation not scanned.

Incoming letter(s) not scanned.

Proposal not scanned.

Statement not scanned.

Duplicate letters attached - not scanned.

Only table of contents scanned.

No incoming letter attached.

Only tracking sheet scanned.

Photo(s) not scanned.

Bill not scanned.

Comments:
A few weeks ago President Boris Yeltsin and I agreed to the most far-reaching reductions in nuclear weaponry since the dawn of the atomic age. Yet even as our own arsenals diminish, the spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests and world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt into war, these weapons could have devastating consequences.

That is why this Administration has fought so hard to stem the proliferation of these terrible weapons. We look back with pride on a solid record of accomplishment. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown. The Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group have broadened their membership and expanded their controls against trade useful to the development of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. We have toughened our nonproliferation export controls, and other nations have followed suit. We have seen remarkable progress in building and strengthening regional arms control arrangements in Latin America, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East.

Yet we need to do more. The demand for these weapons persists and new suppliers of key technologies are emerging. Export controls alone cannot create an airtight seal against proliferation. In an era of advancing technology and trade liberalization, we need to employ the full range of political, security, intelligence, and other tools at our disposal.

Therefore, I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our nonproliferation efforts in the years ahead, and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

While these steps will strengthen the barriers against proliferation, success will require hard work and, at times, hard choices. The United States, however, is committed to take a leading role in the international effort to thwart the spread of technologies and weapons that cast a cloud over our future.
FACT SHEET ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

Noting that "the potential spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests," the President today announced a comprehensive initiative to bolster American efforts to stem the spread of these capabilities and to discourage any use of such weapons. The initiative seeks to integrate new and existing policies in an overall framework to guide U.S. nonproliferation policy in the years ahead.

Guiding Principles

First, the United States will build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.

Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula.

Third, U.S. nonproliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while continuing to show leadership on critical issues.

Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue through the entire range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, regional security, export controls, and other tools available.

Policy Objectives

Nuclear Materials

- Nuclear materials production. The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative. The United States will seek further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production or acquisition of weapons-useable nuclear materials in South Asia, the Korean
Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of proliferation.

**Multilateral Actions**

-- **Compliance with international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will take into account other countries' performance on key international nonproliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology transfer relationships, and will consult with friends and allies on similar approaches.

-- **Enforcement of international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will consult with friends and allies on international actions to be taken against serious violations of nonproliferation norms, e.g., the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction or key weapon facilities, violation of safeguards agreements, or confirmed use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Actions could include United Nations Security Council embargoes or inspections, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons, extradition agreements, or immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation.

-- **Support for special inspections and weapon destruction.** The United States will examine, in consultation with friends and allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to support special inspection regimes where necessary and to help states destroy existing weapon stockpiles.

-- **Harmonization of export controls.** The United States will promote harmonized nonproliferation export control lists and enforcement, including an agreement among suppliers not to undercut one another's export restraint decisions.

**Regional Efforts**

-- **Targeted Approaches.** The United States will continue to focus special efforts on the dangers of proliferation in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and on the Korean peninsula, including efforts to achieve confidence-building measures, inspection regimes, and other economic, political, and security-related measures.

-- **Former Soviet Union.** The United States will continue to work with authorities from Russia and the other new states toward the following objectives:

-- Implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, when opened for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention.
--- Effective internal accounting and physical protection against theft or diversion of nuclear-related materials and equipment.

--- Effective export controls on chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile technologies consistent with existing multilateral regimes, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials.

--- Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads, and effective controls over nuclear-weapon material.

--- Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavors.

--- Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Global Norms

--- Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States reaffirms its commitment to see a CWC concluded this year, and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories.

--- NPT and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993.

--- International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States will work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and will support needed increases in the safeguards budget.

--- Biological Weapons Convention. The United States will continue to urge universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and increased support for the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 Review conference.

--- Missile Technology Control Regime. The United States reiterates the call of the MTCR Partners for all governments to adopt the MTCR Guidelines as part of their national policy.
Nonproliferation Center. The Intelligence Community, including the newly-created Nonproliferation Center, will increase support to international nonproliferation regimes and seek to enlarge the pool of experienced, well-trained experts committed to the nonproliferation mission.
FACT SHEET ON EXISTING NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past year, China, South Africa, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other new parties brought NPT membership to 149. France will soon be a party. In the START Protocol signed in Lisbon, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to join the NPT as nonnuclear weapon states.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA confirmed its right to conduct "special inspections" at undeclared nuclear facilities. Argentina and Brazil reversed longstanding positions to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. After years of delay, North Korea finally complied with its NPT obligations to ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement and accept IAEA inspections.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In April 1992, the 27 NSG members agreed to extend nuclear export controls to dual-use items, and to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR expanded its membership to 22, updated its export control list, and agreed to extend its focus to any missile intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction. China, Argentina, and Israel have pledged to observe the MTCR guidelines.

Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). Under EPCI, the U.S. expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified chemical weapon (CW) precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing assistance to chemical or biological weapon or missile programs.

Strengthened national export controls. Several suppliers have strengthened their domestic export control laws and enforcement mechanisms. Several countries have adopted laws or regulations similar to our EPCI, which restrict assistance by their citizens to nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programs.

Australia Group. The Australia Group expanded its membership to 22 nations, and followed the U.S. lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as CW-related dual-use equipment. The Group has just adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.
Middle East Arms Control Initiative. In May 1991, the President launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. In October, the five agreed to observe guidelines of restraint in conventional transfers and to information exchange. In May 1992, the five agreed to interim guidelines for exports related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the Middle East peace process, 23 delegations (including Israel and 12 Arab states) gathered in Washington in May 1992 to discuss regional security and arms control.

United Nations. The UN Special Commission and the IAEA have carried out 39 inspections in Iraq, identified and begun to destroy tens of thousands of chemical munitions, destroyed missile-production equipment and over 150 missiles, revealed an extensive nuclear weapons program, and oversaw destruction of nuclear weapon-related facilities.

Latin America. In addition to adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards, Argentina and Brazil joined with Chile to ban chemical and biological weapons in their countries.
Dear Congressman Upton:

Thank you for your letter to the President of May 8, 1992, concerning the record of the Department of Energy in reviewing Iraq's nuclear program in the period prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We appreciate your efforts to set the record straight on this issue.

Let me also assure you that we intend to remain seized with the nuclear proliferation problem both in Iraq and elsewhere, as you will see from the enclosed material on the President's July 13 nonproliferation statement.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Fred Upton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Enclosures
A few weeks ago President Boris Yeltsin and I agreed to the most far-reaching reductions in nuclear weaponry since the dawn of the atomic age. Yet even as our own arsenals diminish, the spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests and world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt into war, these weapons could have devastating consequences.

That is why this Administration has fought so hard to stem the proliferation of these terrible weapons. We look back with pride on a solid record of accomplishment. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown. The Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group have broadened their membership and expanded their controls against trade useful to the development of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. We have toughened our nonproliferation export controls, and other nations have followed suit. We have seen remarkable progress in building and strengthening regional arms control arrangements in Latin America, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East.

Yet we need to do more. The demand for these weapons persists and new suppliers of key technologies are emerging. Export controls alone cannot create an airtight seal against proliferation. In an era of advancing technology and trade liberalization, we need to employ the full range of political, security, intelligence, and other tools at our disposal.

Therefore, I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our nonproliferation efforts in the years ahead, and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

While these steps will strengthen the barriers against proliferation, success will require hard work and, at times, hard choices. The United States, however, is committed to take a leading role in the international effort to thwart the spread of technologies and weapons that cast a cloud over our future.
FACT SHEET ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

Noting that "the potential spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests," the President today announced a comprehensive initiative to bolster American efforts to stem the spread of these capabilities and to discourage any use of such weapons. The initiative seeks to integrate new and existing policies in an overall framework to guide U.S. nonproliferation policy in the years ahead.

Guiding Principles

First, the United States will build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.

Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula.

Third, U.S. nonproliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while continuing to show leadership on critical issues.

Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue through the entire range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, regional security, export controls, and other tools available.

Policy Objectives

Nuclear Materials

-- Nuclear materials production. The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative. The United States will seek further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in South Asia, the Korean
Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of proliferation.

**Multilateral Actions**

---

**Compliance with international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will take into account other countries' performance on key international nonproliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology transfer relationships, and will consult with friends and allies on similar approaches.

---

**Enforcement of international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will consult with friends and allies on international actions to be taken against serious violations of nonproliferation norms, e.g., the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction or key weapon facilities, violation of safeguards agreements, or confirmed use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Actions could include United Nations Security Council embargoes or inspections, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons, extradition agreements, or immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation.

---

**Support for special inspections and weapon destruction.** The United States will examine, in consultation with friends and allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to support special inspection regimes where necessary and to help states destroy existing weapon stockpiles.

---

**Harmonization of export controls.** The United States will promote harmonized nonproliferation export control lists and enforcement, including an agreement among suppliers not to undercut one another's export restraint decisions.

**Regional Efforts**

---

**Targeted Approaches.** The United States will continue to focus special efforts on the dangers of proliferation in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and on the Korean peninsula, including efforts to achieve confidence-building measures, inspection regimes, and other economic, political, and security-related measures.

---

**Former Soviet Union.** The United States will continue to work with authorities from Russia and the other new states toward the following objectives:

---

Implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, when opened for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention.
-- Effective internal accounting and physical protection against theft or diversion of nuclear-related materials and equipment.

-- Effective export controls on chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile technologies consistent with existing multilateral regimes, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials.

-- Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads, and effective controls over nuclear-weapon material.

-- Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavors.

-- Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Global Norms

-- Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States reaffirms its commitment to see a CWC concluded this year, and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories.

-- NPT and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993.

-- International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States will work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and will support needed increases in the safeguards budget.

-- Biological Weapons Convention. The United States will continue to urge universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and increased support for the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 Review conference.

-- Missile Technology Control Regime. The United States reiterates the call of the MTCR Partners for all governments to adopt the MTCR Guidelines as part of their national policy.
Intelligence

Nonproliferation Center. The Intelligence Community, including the newly-created Nonproliferation Center, will increase support to international nonproliferation regimes and seek to enlarge the pool of experienced, well-trained experts committed to the nonproliferation mission.
FACT SHEET ON EXISTING NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past year, China, South Africa, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other new parties brought NPT membership to 149. France will soon be a party. In the START Protocol signed in Lisbon, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to join the NPT as nonnuclear weapon states.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA confirmed its right to conduct "special inspections" at undeclared nuclear facilities. Argentina and Brazil reversed longstanding positions to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. After years of delay, North Korea finally complied with its NPT obligations to ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement and accept IAEA inspections.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In April 1992, the 27 NSG members agreed to extend nuclear export controls to dual-use items, and to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR expanded its membership to 22, updated its export control list, and agreed to extend its focus to any missile intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction. China, Argentina, and Israel have pledged to observe the MTCR guidelines.

Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). Under EPCI, the U.S. expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified chemical weapon (CW) precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing assistance to chemical or biological weapon or missile programs.

Strengthened national export controls. Several suppliers have strengthened their domestic export control laws and enforcement mechanisms. Several countries have adopted laws or regulations similar to our EPCI, which restrict assistance by their citizens to nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programs.

Australia Group. The Australia Group expanded its membership to 22 nations, and followed the U.S. lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as CW-related dual-use equipment. The Group has just adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.
Middle East Arms Control Initiative. In May 1991, the President launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. In October, the five agreed to observe guidelines of restraint in conventional transfers and to information exchange. In May 1992, the five agreed to interim guidelines for exports related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the Middle East peace process, 23 delegations (including Israel and 12 Arab states) gathered in Washington in May 1992 to discuss regional security and arms control.

United Nations. The UN Special Commission and the IAEA have carried out 39 inspections in Iraq, identified and begun to destroy tens of thousands of chemical munitions, destroyed missile-production equipment and over 150 missiles, revealed an extensive nuclear weapons program, and oversaw destruction of nuclear weapon-related facilities.

Latin America. In addition to adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards, Argentina and Brazil joined with Chile to ban chemical and biological weapons in their countries.
Dear Congressman Schaefer:

Thank you for your letter to the President of May 8, 1992, concerning the record of the Department of Energy in reviewing Iraq's nuclear program in the period prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We appreciate your efforts to set the record straight on this issue.

Let me also assure you that we intend to remain seized with the nuclear proliferation problem both in Iraq and elsewhere, as you will see from the enclosed material on the President's July 13 nonproliferation statement.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Dan Schaefer  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Enclosures
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Kennebunkport, Maine)

For Immediate Release  July 13, 1992

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

A few weeks ago President Boris Yeltsin and I agreed to the most far-reaching reductions in nuclear weaponry since the dawn of the atomic age. Yet even as our own arsenals diminish, the spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests and world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt into war, these weapons could have devastating consequences.

That is why this Administration has fought so hard to stem the proliferation of these terrible weapons. We look back with pride on a solid record of accomplishment. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown. The Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group have broadened their membership and expanded their controls against trade useful to the development of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. We have toughened our nonproliferation export controls, and other nations have followed suit. We have seen remarkable progress in building and strengthening regional arms control arrangements in Latin America, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East.

Yet we need to do more. The demand for these weapons persists and new suppliers of key technologies are emerging. Export controls alone cannot create an airtight seal against proliferation. In an era of advancing technology and trade liberalization, we need to employ the full range of political, security, intelligence, and other tools at our disposal.

Therefore, I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our nonproliferation efforts in the years ahead, and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

While these steps will strengthen the barriers against proliferation, success will require hard work and, at times, hard choices. The United States, however, is committed to take a leading role in the international effort to thwart the spread of technologies and weapons that cast a cloud over our future.
FACT SHEET ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

Noting that "the potential spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests," the President today announced a comprehensive initiative to bolster American efforts to stem the spread of these capabilities and to discourage any use of such weapons. The initiative seeks to integrate new and existing policies in an overall framework to guide U.S. nonproliferation policy in the years ahead.

Guiding Principles

First, the United States will build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.

Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula.

Third, U.S. nonproliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while continuing to show leadership on critical issues.

Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue through the entire range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, regional security, export controls, and other tools available.

Policy Objectives

Nuclear Materials

-- Nuclear materials production. The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative. The United States will seek further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in South Asia, the Korean
Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of proliferation.

Multilateral Actions

-- **Compliance with international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will take into account other countries' performance on key international nonproliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology transfer relationships, and will consult with friends and allies on similar approaches.

-- **Enforcement of international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will consult with friends and allies on international actions to be taken against serious violations of nonproliferation norms, e.g., the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction or key weapon facilities, violation of safeguards agreements, or confirmed use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Actions could include United Nations Security Council embargoes or inspections, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons, extradition agreements, or immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation.

-- **Support for special inspections and weapon destruction.** The United States will examine, in consultation with friends and allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to support special inspection regimes where necessary and to help states destroy existing weapon stockpiles.

-- **Harmonization of export controls.** The United States will promote harmonized nonproliferation export control lists and enforcement, including an agreement among suppliers not to undercut one another's export restraint decisions.

Regional Efforts

-- **Targeted Approaches.** The United States will continue to focus special efforts on the dangers of proliferation in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and on the Korean peninsula, including efforts to achieve confidence-building measures, inspection regimes, and other economic, political, and security-related measures.

-- **Former Soviet Union.** The United States will continue to work with authorities from Russia and the other new states toward the following objectives:

-- Implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, when opened for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Effective internal accounting and physical protection against theft or diversion of nuclear-related materials and equipment.

Effective export controls on chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile technologies consistent with existing multilateral regimes, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials.

Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads, and effective controls over nuclear-weapon material.

Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavors.

Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Global Norms

Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States reaffirms its commitment to see a CWC concluded this year, and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories.

NPT and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993.

International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States will work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and will support needed increases in the safeguards budget.

Biological Weapons Convention. The United States will continue to urge universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and increased support for the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 Review conference.

Missile Technology Control Regime. The United States reiterates the call of the MTCR Partners for all governments to adopt the MTCR Guidelines as part of their national policy.
Intelligence

Nonproliferation Center. The Intelligence Community, including the newly-created Nonproliferation Center, will increase support to international nonproliferation regimes and seek to enlarge the pool of experienced, well-trained experts committed to the nonproliferation mission.
FACT SHEET ON EXISTING NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past year, China, South Africa, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other new parties brought NPT membership to 149. France will soon be a party. In the START Protocol signed in Lisbon, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to join the NPT as nonnuclear weapon states.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA confirmed its right to conduct "special inspections" at undeclared nuclear facilities. Argentina and Brazil reversed longstanding positions to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. After years of delay, North Korea finally complied with its NPT obligations to ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement and accept IAEA inspections.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In April 1992, the 27 NSG members agreed to extend nuclear export controls to dual-use items, and to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR expanded its membership to 22, updated its export control list, and agreed to extend its focus to any missile intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction. China, Argentina, and Israel have pledged to observe the MTCR guidelines.

Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). Under EPCI, the U.S. expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified chemical weapon (CW) precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing assistance to chemical or biological weapon or missile programs.

Strengthened national export controls. Several suppliers have strengthened their domestic export control laws and enforcement mechanisms. Several countries have adopted laws or regulations similar to our EPCI, which restrict assistance by their citizens to nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programs.

Australia Group. The Australia Group expanded its membership to 22 nations, and followed the U.S. lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as CW-related dual-use equipment. The Group has just adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.
Middle East Arms Control Initiative. In May 1991, the President launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. In October, the five agreed to observe guidelines of restraint in conventional transfers and to information exchange. In May 1992, the five agreed to interim guidelines for exports related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the Middle East peace process, 23 delegations (including Israel and 12 Arab states) gathered in Washington in May 1992 to discuss regional security and arms control.

United Nations. The UN Special Commission and the IAEA have carried out 39 inspections in Iraq, identified and begun to destroy tens of thousands of chemical munitions, destroyed missile-production equipment and over 150 missiles, revealed an extensive nuclear weapons program, and oversaw destruction of nuclear weapon-related facilities.

Latin America. In addition to adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards, Argentina and Brazil joined with Chile to ban chemical and biological weapons in their countries.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1992

Dear Congressman Bliley:

Thank you for your letter to the President of May 8, 1992, concerning the record of the Department of Energy in reviewing Iraq’s nuclear program in the period prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We appreciate your efforts to set the record straight on this issue.

Let me also assure you that we intend to remain seized with the nuclear proliferation problem both in Iraq and elsewhere, as you will see from the enclosed material on the President’s July 13 nonproliferation statement.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Thomas J. Bliley, Jr.
Ranking Republican Member
Subcommittee on Commerce and Energy
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Enclosures
A few weeks ago President Boris Yeltsin and I agreed to the most far-reaching reductions in nuclear weaponry since the dawn of the atomic age. Yet even as our own arsenals diminish, the spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests and world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt into war, these weapons could have devastating consequences.

That is why this Administration has fought so hard to stem the proliferation of these terrible weapons. We look back with pride on a solid record of accomplishment. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown. The Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group have broadened their membership and expanded their controls against trade useful to the development of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. We have toughened our nonproliferation export controls, and other nations have followed suit. We have seen remarkable progress in building and strengthening regional arms control arrangements in Latin America, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East.

Yet we need to do more. The demand for these weapons persists and new suppliers of key technologies are emerging. Export controls alone cannot create an airtight seal against proliferation. In an era of advancing technology and trade liberalization, we need to employ the full range of political, security, intelligence, and other tools at our disposal.

Therefore, I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our nonproliferation efforts in the years ahead, and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

While these steps will strengthen the barriers against proliferation, success will require hard work and, at times, hard choices. The United States, however, is committed to take a leading role in the international effort to thwart the spread of technologies and weapons that cast a cloud over our future.
FACT SHEET ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

Noting that "the potential spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests," the President today announced a comprehensive initiative to bolster American efforts to stem the spread of these capabilities and to discourage any use of such weapons. The initiative seeks to integrate new and existing policies in an overall framework to guide U.S. nonproliferation policy in the years ahead.

Guiding Principles

First, the United States will build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.

Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula.

Third, U.S. nonproliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while continuing to show leadership on critical issues.

Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue through the entire range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, regional security, export controls, and other tools available.

Policy Objectives

Nuclear Materials

-- Nuclear materials production. The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative. The United States will seek further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in South Asia, the Korean
Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of proliferation.

**Multilateral Actions**

---

**Compliance with international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will take into account other countries' performance on key international nonproliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology transfer relationships, and will consult with friends and allies on similar approaches.

---

**Enforcement of international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will consult with friends and allies on international actions to be taken against serious violations of nonproliferation norms, e.g., the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction or key weapon facilities, violation of safeguards agreements, or confirmed use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Actions could include United Nations Security Council embargoes or inspections, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons, extradition agreements, or immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation.

---

**Support for special inspections and weapon destruction.** The United States will examine, in consultation with friends and allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to support special inspection regimes where necessary and to help states destroy existing weapon stockpiles.

---

**Harmonization of export controls.** The United States will promote harmonized nonproliferation export control lists and enforcement, including an agreement among suppliers not to undercut one another's export restraint decisions.

**Regional Efforts**

---

**Targeted Approaches.** The United States will continue to focus special efforts on the dangers of proliferation in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and on the Korean peninsula, including efforts to achieve confidence-building measures, inspection regimes, and other economic, political, and security-related measures.

---

**Former Soviet Union.** The United States will continue to work with authorities from Russia and the other new states toward the following objectives:

---

**Implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, when opened for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention.**
Effective internal accounting and physical protection against theft or diversion of nuclear-related materials and equipment.

Effective export controls on chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile technologies consistent with existing multilateral regimes, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials.

Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads, and effective controls over nuclear-weapon material.

Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavors.

Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Global Norms

Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States reaffirms its commitment to see a CWC concluded this year, and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories.

NPT and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993.

International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States will work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and will support needed increases in the safeguards budget.

Biological Weapons Convention. The United States will continue to urge universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and increased support for the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 Review conference.

Missile Technology Control Regime. The United States reiterates the call of the MTNR Partners for all governments to adopt the MTNR Guidelines as part of their national policy.
Intelligence

Nonproliferation Center. The Intelligence Community, including the newly-created Nonproliferation Center, will increase support to international nonproliferation regimes and seek to enlarge the pool of experienced, well-trained experts committed to the nonproliferation mission.
FACT SHEET ON EXISTING NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past year, China, South Africa, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other new parties brought NPT membership to 149. France will soon be a party. In the START Protocol signed in Lisbon, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA confirmed its right to conduct "special inspections" at undeclared nuclear facilities. Argentina and Brazil reversed longstanding positions to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. After years of delay, North Korea finally complied with its NPT obligations to ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement and accept IAEA inspections.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In April 1992, the 27 NSG members agreed to extend nuclear export controls to dual-use items, and to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR expanded its membership to 22, updated its export control list, and agreed to extend its focus to any missile intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction. China, Argentina, and Israel have pledged to observe the MTCR guidelines.

Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). Under EPCI, the U.S. expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified chemical weapon (CW) precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing assistance to chemical or biological weapon or missile programs.

Strengthened national export controls. Several suppliers have strengthened their domestic export control laws and enforcement mechanisms. Several countries have adopted laws or regulations similar to our EPCI, which restrict assistance by their citizens to nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programs.

Australia Group. The Australia Group expanded its membership to 22 nations, and followed the U.S. lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as CW-related dual-use equipment. The Group has just adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.
Middle East Arms Control Initiative. In May 1991, the President launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. In October, the five agreed to observe guidelines of restraint in conventional transfers and to information exchange. In May 1992, the five agreed to interim guidelines for exports related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the Middle East peace process, 23 delegations (including Israel and 12 Arab states) gathered in Washington in May 1992 to discuss regional security and arms control.

United Nations. The UN Special Commission and the IAEA have carried out 39 inspections in Iraq, identified and begun to destroy tens of thousands of chemical munitions, destroyed missile-production equipment and over 150 missiles, revealed an extensive nuclear weapons program, and oversaw destruction of nuclear weapon-related facilities.

Latin America. In addition to adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards, Argentina and Brazil joined with Chile to ban chemical and biological weapons in their countries.
Dear Congressman Lent:

Thank you for your letter to the President of May 8, 1992, concerning the record of the Department of Energy in reviewing Iraq’s nuclear program in the period prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We appreciate your efforts to set the record straight on this issue.

Let me also assure you that we intend to remain seized with the nuclear proliferation problem both in Iraq and elsewhere, as you will see from the enclosed material on the President’s July 13 nonproliferation statement.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Norman F. Lent
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Commerce and Energy
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Enclosures
A few weeks ago President Boris Yeltsin and I agreed to the most far-reaching reductions in nuclear weaponry since the dawn of the atomic age. Yet even as our own arsenals diminish, the spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests and world peace. In a world in which regional tensions may unpredictably erupt into war, these weapons could have devastating consequences.

That is why this Administration has fought so hard to stem the proliferation of these terrible weapons. We look back with pride on a solid record of accomplishment. Membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown. The Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group have broadened their membership and expanded their controls against trade useful to the development of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. We have toughened our nonproliferation export controls, and other nations have followed suit. We have seen remarkable progress in building and strengthening regional arms control arrangements in Latin America, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East.

Yet we need to do more. The demand for these weapons persists and new suppliers of key technologies are emerging. Export controls alone cannot create an airtight seal against proliferation. In an era of advancing technology and trade liberalization, we need to employ the full range of political, security, intelligence, and other tools at our disposal.

Therefore, I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our nonproliferation efforts in the years ahead, and directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

While these steps will strengthen the barriers against proliferation, success will require hard work and, at times, hard choices. The United States, however, is committed to take a leading role in the international effort to thwart the spread of technologies and weapons that cast a cloud over our future.
FACT SHEET ON NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE

Noting that "the potential spread of the capability to produce or acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them constitutes a growing threat to U.S. national security interests," the President today announced a comprehensive initiative to bolster American efforts to stem the spread of these capabilities and to discourage any use of such weapons. The initiative seeks to integrate new and existing policies in an overall framework to guide U.S. nonproliferation policy in the years ahead.

Guiding Principles

First, the United States will build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.

Second, the United States will focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula.

Third, U.S. nonproliferation policy will seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while continuing to show leadership on critical issues.

Fourth, the United States will address the proliferation issue through the entire range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, regional security, export controls, and other tools available.

Policy Objectives

Nuclear Materials

--- Nuclear materials production. The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions, such as those proposed in the May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative. The United States will seek further multilateral support for concrete measures to discourage production or acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in South Asia, the Korean
Peninsula, or other areas where they would increase the risk of proliferation.

**Multilateral Actions**

--- **Compliance with international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will take into account other countries' performance on key international nonproliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology transfer relationships, and will consult with friends and allies on similar approaches.

--- **Enforcement of international nonproliferation norms.** The United States will consult with friends and allies on international actions to be taken against serious violations of nonproliferation norms, e.g., the transfer of any weapon of mass destruction or key weapon facilities, violation of safeguards agreements, or confirmed use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Actions could include United Nations Security Council embargoes or inspections, extradition agreements, or immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation.

--- **Support for special inspections and weapon destruction.** The United States will examine, in consultation with friends and allies, establishment of multilateral funding efforts to support special inspection regimes where necessary and to help states destroy existing weapon stockpiles.

--- **Harmonization of export controls.** The United States will promote harmonized nonproliferation export control lists and enforcement, including an agreement among suppliers not to undercut one another's export restraint decisions.

**Regional Efforts**

--- **Targeted Approaches.** The United States will continue to focus special efforts on the dangers of proliferation in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and on the Korean peninsula, including efforts to achieve confidence-building measures, inspection regimes, and other economic, political, and security-related measures.

--- **Former Soviet Union.** The United States will continue to work with authorities from Russia and the other new states toward the following objectives:

--- Implementation of all relevant international agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and, when opened for signature, the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Effective internal accounting and physical protection against theft or diversion of nuclear-related materials and equipment.

Effective export controls on chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile technologies consistent with existing multilateral regimes, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as education of exporters and customs and enforcement officials.

Safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads, and effective controls over nuclear-weapon material.

Creation of opportunities for weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their talents to peaceful endeavors.

Consideration of requests for assistance in dismantling or destroying Russian biological weapons facilities or in converting these facilities to production of vaccines and other pharmaceutical products, provided Russia is in full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Global Norms

Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States reaffirms its commitment to see a CWC concluded this year, and calls on all nations to commit to become original signatories.

NPT and Tlatelolco. The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by 1993.

International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States will work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and will support needed increases in the safeguards budget.

Biological Weapons Convention. The United States will continue to urge universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and increased support for the confidence-building measures agreed by the parties at the 1991 Review conference.

Missile Technology Control Regime. The United States reiterates the call of the MTTCR Partners for all governments to adopt the MTTR Guidelines as part of their national policy.
Nonproliferation Center. The Intelligence Community, including the newly-created Nonproliferation Center, will increase support to international nonproliferation regimes and seek to enlarge the pool of experienced, well-trained experts committed to the nonproliferation mission.
FACT SHEET ON EXISTING NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past year, China, South Africa, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and other new parties brought NPT membership to 149. France will soon be a party. In the START Protocol signed in Lisbon, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to join the NPT as nonnuclear weapon states.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA confirmed its right to conduct "special inspections" at undeclared nuclear facilities. Argentina and Brazil reversed longstanding positions to adopt full-scope IAEA safeguards. After years of delay, North Korea finally complied with its NPT obligations to ratify an IAEA safeguards agreement and accept IAEA inspections.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In April 1992, the 27 NSG members agreed to extend nuclear export controls to dual-use items, and to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR expanded its membership to 22, updated its export control list, and agreed to extend its focus to any missile intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction. China, Argentina, and Israel have pledged to observe the MTCR guidelines.

Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). Under EPCI, the U.S. expanded its export controls to cover all 50 identified chemical weapon (CW) precursors, dual-use equipment relevant to chemical and biological weapons production, whole chemical plants, and knowing assistance to chemical or biological weapon or missile programs.

Strengthened national export controls. Several suppliers have strengthened their domestic export control laws and enforcement mechanisms. Several countries have adopted laws or regulations similar to our EPCI, which restrict assistance by their citizens to nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programs.

Australia Group. The Australia Group expanded its membership to 22 nations, and followed the U.S. lead in EPCI by expanding its export controls to cover the 50 chemical weapon precursors as well as CW-related dual-use equipment. The Group has just adopted a multilateral control list of biological organisms, toxins, and equipment.
Middle East Arms Control Initiative. In May 1991, the President launched a process among the five leading conventional arms suppliers: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. In October, the five agreed to observe guidelines of restraint in conventional transfers and to information exchange. In May 1992, the five agreed to interim guidelines for exports related to weapons of mass destruction. Under the Middle East peace process, 23 delegations (including Israel and 12 Arab states) gathered in Washington in May 1992 to discuss regional security and arms control.

United Nations. The UN Special Commission and the IAEA have carried out 39 inspections in Iraq, identified and begun to destroy tens of thousands of chemical munitions, destroyed missile-production equipment and over 150 missiles, revealed an extensive nuclear weapons program, and oversaw destruction of nuclear weapon-related facilities.

Latin America. In addition to adopting full-scope IAEA safeguards, Argentina and Brazil joined with Chile to ban chemical and biological weapons in their countries.
INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 07, 1992

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE NORMAN F. LENT

SUBJECT: PROVIDES VIEWS, AS THE REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE HEARING ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROUTE TO:</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DISPOSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICE/AGENCY</td>
<td>STAFF NAME</td>
<td>ACT CODE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICK CALIO</td>
<td>REFERRAL NOTE:</td>
<td>ORG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIST</td>
<td>REFERRAL NOTE:</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 DOS</td>
<td>REFERRAL NOTE:</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 DOE</td>
<td>REFERRAL NOTE:</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 DOC</td>
<td>REFERRAL NOTE:</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMMENTS: SEE ID 323770

LETTERS SENT TO ALL SIGNEES

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 3 MEDIA:L

INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240

MAIL USER CODES: (A) ______ (B) ______ (C) ______

******************************************************************************

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION CODES:</th>
<th>DISPOSITION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION</td>
<td>A-ANSWERED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*C-COMMENT/RECOM</td>
<td>B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*D-DRAFT RESPONSE</td>
<td>C-COMPLETED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET</td>
<td>S-SUSPENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*S-FOR-SIGNATURE *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*X-INTERIM REPLY *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OUTGOING CODES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>OF SIGNER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMPLETED = DATE OF OUTGOING

******************************************************************************

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590

KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.
June 1, 1992

Dear Norm:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President, cosigned by three of your colleagues, regarding the role of the Department of Energy in helping to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation in Iraq.

We appreciate being advised of your perspective as members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. I have shared your comments with President Bush. In addition, I have provided copies of your letter to several of the President's other advisors in this matter for their review.

Thank you again for writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Nicholas E. Calio
Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Norman F. Lent
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NEC:JHH:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Energy - FYI
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of Defense - FYI
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In a letter dated April 22, 1992, Chairman John Dingell of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce wrote you to characterize the results of a hearing held by the Subcommittee on April 24, 1991, on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. As the Republican Members of that Subcommittee who participated in the hearing, we wish to present our views about what that hearing revealed. While we commend Chairman Dingell for his interest in the role of the Department of Energy (DOE) in helping to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and share his concern that all agencies of government act further the goal of nuclear nonproliferation, we do not share many of the conclusions reached in Chairman Dingell's letter.

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NONPROLIFERATION ACTION

The first conclusion with which we do not agree is that DOE failed to take appropriate action in March and April of 1989 to limit Iraq’s ability to acquire nuclear technology. In April 1989, certain persons at the Department of Energy’s Office of Classification and Technology Policy (OCTP) became convinced that the pattern of acquisitions and attempted acquisitions by Iraqi companies indicated a strong likelihood that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapons program. These individuals, whose diligence and dedication we commend, recommended to their superiors within DOE’s Office of Defense Programs that Energy Secretary James Watkins contact Secretary of State James Baker and bring the suspected Iraqi program to the attention of the National Security Council (NSC). However, at the time that these individuals were making these recommendations, Secretary Watkins had already been informed, in a classified intelligence briefing, of the Iraqi acquisition program and that it probably indicated the presence of a nuclear weapons program.

Other officials at DOE, most notably persons in the Office of Intelligence, did not agree with the recommendation of the OCTP officials that Secretary Watkins contact Secretary Baker and bring the issue to the attention of the NSC. These persons did not disagree with the conclusion that Iraq was probably pursuing a nuclear weapons program, but they believed that the export restrictions in place were adequate to prevent the Iraqis from acquiring the type
of technology necessary to support a nuclear weapons program. These officials, whose diligence and dedication we also commend, also believed that the characterization of the Iraqi program made by the OCTP officials overstated the state of development of the Iraqi program. Ultimately, an Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs made a decision not to send the OCTP recommendation to the Secretary. The Office of Defense Programs did, however, allocate increased analytical resources within DOE to examine the Iraqi program.

By the time of the Subcommittee's hearing in April 1991, the relations between the United States and Iraq had changed dramatically, and we all knew considerably more about the Iraqi program than anyone had known in April 1989. Today, in 1992, as a result of the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, we know even more. It is tempting to look back at 1989 through the perspective of 1991 and 1992 and conclude that DOE failed to do enough in 1989 to prevent Iraq from developing its nuclear weapons program. While many people in a number of agencies, in this government, in other governments, and in international organizations now realize that more could have been done, we think that a few points need to be made about the decisions made within DOE in April 1989.

The most important observation is that no witness identified any items of equipment or other forms of technology that Iraq acquired between April 1989, and the time that full-blown economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, that materially advanced the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. In fact, it was during this time that the Customs Service ran a very successful "sting" operation involving capacitors that Iraq attempted to acquire illegally. No NSC-level action was necessary for Customs to carry out this sting operation and we have no reason to believe that NSC-level action would have helped Customs in doing so.

We made another pertinent observation at the Subcommittee hearing: even two years later, with considerably more information about the Iraqi weapons program, there were still disagreements about the characterization of the Iraqi program made by the OCTP officials. Representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and even a former DOE employee who had favored sending the OCTP recommendation to the Secretary, testified that the OCTP description of the Iraqi program did not reflect the judgment of the intelligence community, either in 1989, or even in 1991. Thus, the hearing showed that the DOE officials that reviewed the recommendation and declined to pass it on to the Secretary had a substantive basis for doing so. Moreover, even though the OCTP characterization had correctly concluded that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, it missed the fact that the Iraqi program was relying very heavily on electromagnetic separation of isotopes for the purpose of enriching uranium.

Thus, we do not share Chairman Dingell's conclusion that "the DOE blundered a unique opportunity to curtail the flow of sensitive nuclear weapons technology to Iraq at a time when it could have made a significant difference." Reasonable persons examined ambiguous information about a program that a tyrannical government was doing everything it could to hide, and reached different conclusions about how best to react to it. Both suggested courses of actions were reasonable in light of what was known in 1989, and we believe that criticism
of DOE officials for the course of action that they took is simply the improved judgment that hindsight always gives.

THE PORTLAND SYMPOSIUM

Another conclusion stated in Chairman Dingell's letter with which we disagree is that DOE may have actually facilitated the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology by Iraq. In the late summer of 1989, DOE cosponsored a symposium on conventional explosives in Portland, Oregon, that drew attendees from around the world, including Iraq and other nations that are suspected of trying to acquire nuclear weapons technology. While, in retrospect, informing Iraq about any aspect of explosives seems unwise, there are legitimate commercial blasting operations that can profit from explosives technology. Moreover, presentations by Iraqi scientists at such a convention, even if screened by Iraqi government officials, might reveal what type of explosives research they were pursuing and provide insight into the probable state of an Iraqi nuclear weapons effort.

All of the material submitted by any person acting on behalf of DOE, or a DOE contractor, was screened and declassified before presentation at the Portland symposium. At the hearing, we heard of no information presented at the conference that could have furthered the Iraqi nuclear weapons program; and, in fact, some of the materials presented had been published in the open literature. While Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs Richard Claytor did remark that the conference was the "place to be" for potential proliferants, we understand that he said this while looking at a list of the nations represented by the attendees, not because of the subject matter presented at the conference. We have also heard, after the hearing, that information contained in French or Chinese presentations at the conference might have had nuclear weapons utility; this observation is more a commentary on the difficulty of restraining proliferation when the technology to precisely control explosives is becoming more and more attainable.

We understand that DOE has decided against cosponsoring another explosives symposium. In light of the events since the last such symposium, this decision seems wise to us. But asserting that cosponsoring the Portland explosives symposium in 1989 had the effect of materially assisting the Iraqi nuclear weapons effort seems to us difficult to sustain on the basis of the available evidence and an example of seeing events that occurred in 1989 through the prism of subsequent events.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PERSONNEL ACTIONS

The final conclusion of Chairman Dingell's letter with which we disagree is that the OCTP persons who recommended NSC-level activities on the Iraqi program have suffered for their actions. Our hearing included a very detailed review of the personnel files of those persons. While some of those persons have unquestionably been unhappy with their ratings and bonuses, we are satisfied that other factors in those persons' job performances are more than adequate to explain the ratings and bonuses that they received. We saw no evidence that the actions taken by OCTP personnel have been held against them by others in DOE.
CONCLUSION

Like the disagreements that occurred between DOE personnel in April of 1989, our disagreements with the conclusions set forth in Chairman Dingell's letter reflect the differing points of view among reasonable individuals. We want you to have the benefit of all points of view with respect to the government's goal of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. We look forward to working with you, with the Administration, with Chairman Dingell, and with our other colleagues in the Congress on this very important objective.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Bliley
Ranking Republican Member
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Norman F. Lent
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce

Dan Schaefer
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Fred Upton
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

cc: The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

The Honorable David L. Boren
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Frank H. Murkowski
Ranking Republican Member
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Senate

The Honorable John Glenn
Chairman
Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. Senate
The Honorable William V. Roth
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Senate

The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable William S. Broomfield
Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Dave McCurdy
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Bud Shuster
Ranking Republican Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable James D. Watkins,
Admiral, USN, Retired
Secretary of Energy