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Contact: Jennifer J. White

(202) 466-0515

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THE
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POLICY

PRESS RELEASE
For Immediate Release

**TIME'S UP: SADDAM'S BREACH OF U.N. CEASE-FIRE
JUSTIFIES CONCERTED ACTION TO END HIS MISRULE**

(Washington, D.C.): The cease-fire resolution agreed to by Saddam Hussein on 3 April 1991 stipulates that Iraq *must* declare, surrender or otherwise destroy all its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles by 25 July 1991. **That day having arrived and there being clear evidence that Baghdad has *not* complied with this requirement, it is time for civilized nations -- led by the United States -- to take the actions required to bring Iraq into conformity with its obligations.**

As a practical matter -- in the face of Saddam Hussein's obvious determination to persist in the development of such weapons of mass destruction, to prepare for their use and to lie about both his intentions and capabilities in these regards -- **there is only one hope for securing genuine Iraqi compliance with the terms of the cease-fire: an early end to the ruling clique's reign of terror.**

The Center for Security Policy has, from the moment nearly a year ago when Iraq invaded Kuwait, contended that this sort of *systemic* treatment of the problem was in order. While it has welcomed the *symptomatic* relief (belatedly) provided by U.S. initiatives which accomplished the liberation of Kuwait, offered sanctuary to the Kurds and interrupted at least a portion of the Iraqi nuclear program, the Center has remained convinced that -- in the absence of an end to Baathist tyranny -- the benefits from such actions would prove to be highly ephemeral.

The Center's position has been eloquently seconded by *The New Republic*, one of the nation's most thoughtful and influential journals. In this week's lead editorial entitled "Staying There" (a copy of which is attached), the magazine concluded:

"The termination of Baath rule should...become a stated goal of U.S. policy -- and if Iraq is fragmented in the process, the stability of the region will not suffer unduly. If Saddam does not scrupulously honor a deadline for surrendering every ounce of uranium, along with everything else covered by the cease-fire, we should enforce its terms against the violator, rather than his unfortunate subjects. **Until the butcher of Baghdad is gone or buried the Gulf war cannot be won, despite all of Mr. Bush's triumphalist rhetoric.**"
(Emphasis added.)

The Center fully concurs with these sentiments and reiterates in this regard the recommendations made in its recent release entitled Wanted: Saddam Hussein, Dead or Alive (91-P 49, 12 June 1991):

"A bounty should be placed on Saddam Hussein -- a sizeable cash reward for anyone who can end the reign of terror he and his ruling clique are evidently determined to perpetuate indefinitely. In addition, all appropriate resources of the United States government should be devoted to removing him from power."

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JULY 29, 1991

STAYING THERE

The president's Independence Day radio address resounded with all the patriotic grandiloquence his speechwriting staff could muster. George Bush lavished accolades upon America's "sons and daughters [who] stood watch on the desert and seas of the Gulf, bearing witness by their presence to the vision that compelled us." He plucked the same, worn Churchillian chords in speeches to flag-waving throngs in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Marshallfield, Missouri. But the spectacle of Mr. Bush's glory-basking, set against the background of the renewed depredations of a resurgent Saddam Hussein, is a bit much to stomach. What's happened in Iraq since our grand "victory" isn't a bit of rain at a Fourth of July picnic; it's a deluge, washing the guests, the food, and the marching band out to sea.

The notion that the administration's war council knew what it was doing when Mr. Bush ended the war after 100 hours has lost any credibility it might previously have had. At first some believed (though not we) that continued sanctions and internal resistance would finish the job of replacing Saddam's regime with a more palatable form of government. But the administration's failure to come to the aid of Kurdish and Shiite rebel forces, after encouraging their rebellion, made clear that it was more concerned with preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq and a propitious "balance of power" in the region than getting rid of the dictator or protecting persecuted "minorities," one of which constitutes 65 percent of the population. Out-betrayed, inadequate, and soon-to-be prematurely withdrawn "safe havens" are a pathetic cover for our sorry abdication of responsibility following the war. The latest horrifying, unsurprising news is that Saddam perseveres in his efforts to build atom bombs.

In his January 27 press briefing, General Norman Schwarzkopf announced that Iraq's nuclear capability had been "neutralized." If that wasn't assurance enough, Iraq promised, as part of the April 3 cease-fire agreement, to hand over or destroy all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as its large ballistic missiles. Saddam seemed to comply, by handing over chemical and biological stocks, destroying some of the

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missiles and allowing the United Nations to inspect eight or eight pounds of enriched uranium registered under the nuclear non-proliferation agreement, of which Iraq is a signatory. But as the Pentagon learned from an electrical engineer who defected to U.S. forces in northern Iraq in May, Saddam was concealing as much as ninety additional pounds of weapons-grade enriched uranium, in violation of the truce agreement. According to this source and satellite intelligence, Saddam continues his nuclear program using homemade calutrons, an obsolete technology that has nonetheless brought him terrifyingly close to being able to produce two Nagasaki-type weapons.

Saddam wants nuclear bombs for one simple reason: revenge. Through nuclear blackmail, or actual genocide, he intends to reverse his humiliation at the hands of the United States. Both before and after the war, he swore that he had no nuclear program, had never had a nuclear program, had no interest in a nuclear program. When the president responded with an explicit threat of more bombing, Saddam acknowledged enriching uranium—but only one pound for peaceful purposes. He also admitted possessing the calutrons he promised did not exist—but only thirty of them. Saddam is, of course, still lying about what he has, in an attempt to preserve as much hardware and software as he can.



The U.N., charged with enforcing the terms of the cease-fire, has proved comically weak. After the United States tipped off U.N. inspectors about the location of the Iraqi uranium processing plants, the Iraqis played cat and mouse with them for two weeks, at one point firing automatic weapons over their heads to discourage photography of a convoy of illicit equipment. The U.N.'s only lever is to continue sanctions. As weapons go, economic sanctions are more cruel and less discriminate than any of the bombs we dropped on Baghdad. They may result in the deaths of thousands of Iraqi children, from starvation and disease, by the end of the summer, but are unlikely to make Saddam budge from his fortified and well-stocked underground bunker. Nor does the nuclear non-proliferation re-

gime, which failed to detect that Saddam was on the doorstep of becoming a nuclear power before the war, have any effective enforcement mechanism. It falls to the United States—if non-proliferation is to mean anything at all—to enforce the terms of the cease-fire. And if non-proliferation cannot be enforced on a country, then it has signed a treaty and been humiliated in war, that is largely meaningless.

Mr. Bush has sought to make Saddam comply by means of belligerent rhetoric. His threat of force may be effective in getting Saddam temporarily to turn over what uranium and enriching equipment he has. But even then the problem, as Thomas Friedman of *The New York Times* recently put it, "is not his capabilities but his intentions." Even if the United States were to bomb Iraq's nuclear sites (and Saddam successfully disguised many of them in the Gulf war), there would still be the problem of Saddam's potential. It is not as hard to build weapons of mass destruction as it used to be. Saddam was able to mine uranium ore and enrich it without imported equipment. If not for the war, it is likely he would now have a bomb, according to Leonard Spector of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who until recently remained a skeptic about the state of Iraq's nuclear development. It now appears that not even the Israelis knew how close Saddam was to building a bomb. Despite the war, he may be able to build one yet.

This predicament, it should be noted, is no one's fault but Mr. Bush's. It was clear almost from the moment he ended the war that we were leaving a job unfinished. Some of the consequences of this mistake cannot be undone. It is, however, no less imperative to finish the war. This doesn't mean occupying Iraq, but it does mean deposing Saddam Hussein. Whether this is accomplished by U.S.-supported internal rebellion, smart bombs, or an assassination squad matters little. If Bush feels constrained by the executive order that bans the murder of foreign leaders, he can issue another executive order to permit it, just this once. It ought to be possible to get rid of Saddam without a full-scale military invasion. The termination of Baath rule should, in any case, become a stated goal of U.S. policy—and if Iraq is fragmented in the process, the stability of the region will not suffer unduly. If Saddam does not scrupulously honor a deadline for surrendering every ounce of uranium, along with everything else covered by the cease-fire, we should enforce its terms against the violator, rather than his unfortunate subjects. Until the butcher of Baghdad is gone or buried, the Gulf war cannot be won, despite all of Mr. Bush's triumphalist rhetoric.

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