

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

ID# 261254

CO072

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 09, 1991

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. PAUL LEVENTHAL

SUBJECT: FORWARDS A COPY OF HIS QUOTE ON IRAQ'S
NUCLEAR CAPACITY IN A NEWS ARTICLE

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
JOHN SUNUNU		ORG	91/08/09	<u>NAN</u>	<u>C 91/08/19</u>
	REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
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TC

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

CS MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                       *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *           OF SIGNER  *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *           CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *           OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                       *
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
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KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

J.

261254



NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE

1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444

8/7/91

Dear John -

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

Please note quote on
jump page of this Knight Ridder
story -

Best wishes,

Pat Smith

JILLET, France — Bush and French President Mitterrand warned Hussein on Sunday that military action against Iraq would be taken if he does not fully disclose his nuclear weapons technology to the United Nations.

Readers did not say that a nuclear strike against Iraq was imminent but they left the clear impression that Hussein should not test their patience.

State Department officials welcomed the French endorsement of possible military action since they hope it would be conducted by American, French and British forces — with the French providing much of the air



Associated Press

AT RAMBOUILLET: President Bush, French President Francois Mitterrand stroll in park Sunday.

U.S. officials now admit tracking Iraqi material may be impossible

July 15, 1991 Miami Herald

By **OWEN ULLMANN** and **MARK THOMPSON**
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Barely four months ago, the Bush administration was crowing that it had destroyed Iraq's capacity to build a nuclear bomb. "I'm confident in saying it'll be a long time before Saddam Hussein has nuclear capability," Defense Secretary Dick Cheney proclaimed on March 19.

Now, an embarrassed administration is being forced to admit it was wrong.

Not only did Iraq's capability to make an atomic

weapon survive intensive aerial bombardment during the Persian Gulf War, but new evidence indicates Iraq has been conducting a secret nuclear program that poses an even greater threat today than before the war.

Recent disclosures from the Iraqi government, an Iraqi defector, international inspectors and U.S. intelligence suggest Iraq may be only months away from making two to four crude bombs, each with the

Prime Minister John Major has been supportive of possible military action, but Mitterrand — who had been hesitant, an official said. "This was the official said."

Following the lead by Bush and Mitterrand, as the two met here Sunday before the start of the London Economic Summit, between leading industrial

overnight from Kennebunkport, Maine, Bush stopped at his official summer residence in Paris for about two

PLEASE SEE BUSH, 8A

PLEASE SEE POLICY, 8A

Brazil's homemade 'clunkers' delay nation's entrance into computer age

By **SAM DILLON**
Herald Staff Writer

RIO DE JANEIRO — Brazilian President Fernando Collor, staring at the video display of a made-in-Brazil computer, said it all as he waited for a response from the hesitant machine:

"Clunkers!" he cried in exasperation. "You have to wait 10 minutes for an answer? These computers are just clunkers!"

Seventeen years after Brazil banned foreign-made computers in an effort to create a homegrown electronics industry, Brazilians have grown impatient with a protectionist policy that has kept foreign-made computers out of the hands of consumers and retarded the country's technological development.

The policy has proved a boon to Miami computer dealers, who

■ POLICY A BOON FOR MIAMI, 9A

advertise in Brazilian newspapers and sell thousands of computers a year to Brazilian tourists, who pay high import taxes at home to bring them in, or to professional smugglers, who don't bother to pay the taxes, but find an eager market waiting back home.

Collor, whose exclamation last fall at a computer demonstration at the presidential palace merely dramatized the popular mood, has prom-

ised sweeping change. And Jose Goldemberg, Collor's secretary of science and technology, pledged in an interview that a law recently voted in Congress will open Brazil's market to foreign competition, resulting in cheaper, better computers and improved industrial technology.

Yet critics say that Collor's attempt to yank Brazil into the computer age has so far been more image than substance.

The law, which must still be voted on by the Senate, falls short of ending the country's technological isolation, and the congressional battle that produced it demonstrated anew that Brazil's economic nationalists have by no means given up the fight.

The attempt to liberalize the com-



PLEASE SEE BRAZIL, 9A

Western leaders are enter-
mmit with differences of
over the request.
many and France have been
pathetic to direct economic

assistance, but the United States,
Japan and Canada are backing limited
technical assistance that would

allow the Soviets to tap into interna-
tional lending institutions for advice.
The differences were apparent

Sunday as Bush stopped in France
on his way here to discuss summit
issues with President Francois Mit-

Nuclear threat from Iraq may be hard to eliminate

POLICY, FROM 1A

force of 20 thousand tons of TNT —
about the same as the bomb dropped
on Nagasaki in World War II.

"We are learning now from a variety
of intelligence sources things we
didn't know when we did the target
planning for the war about elements
of their nuclear capability," Pentagon
spokesman Pete Williams said
last week.

Most troubling aspect

The most troubling aspect about
the latest discoveries for the Bush
administration is that the U.S. military
no longer is boasting about
being able to destroy Iraq's weapons
program in another bombing raid.

To the contrary, U.S. officials
concede that it would be exceed-
ingly difficult — perhaps impossible
— to track down nuclear materials
and equipment that Iraq may have
buried.

"Our best hope is that they keep
everything buried so they can't do
anything with it," said a White
House official, who did not want to
be identified. "We're watching them
like a hawk. If they move it, they
lose it."

"It's just like finding a needle in a
haystack," said one Pentagon official.
"Finding Scuds was a piece of
cake compared to this," he added,
referring to the frantic wartime
search to hunt down and destroy
Iraq's crude ballistic missiles.

Plans for attack

The difficulty of the task has not
stopped Bush from ordering the
Pentagon to prepare plans for
another possible attack. But many of
the targets military officials say
they have selected include non-nu-
clear military installations, such as
command and control centers,
whose destruction would not
directly affect nuclear weapons
development.

As a result, the administration is
hoping that the combined pressures
exerted by the presence of U.N.
inspectors in Iraq, continuation of
an international trade embargo and the
threat of resuming the war will per-
suade Hussein to disclose the full

extent of his nuclear program.

Under the cease-fire accord Iraq
accepted in April, all of Iraq's
nuclear weapons capability and
other weapons of mass destruction
must be eliminated.

Nuclear capability eliminated?

On Jan. 26, 10 days after the war
began, the Pentagon claimed it had
eliminated Iraq's capability to pro-
duce nuclear weapons.

This assessment was based on the
destruction of two Iraqi nuclear
research reactors and support facili-
ties. The reactors had been pow-
ered by 88 pounds of highly
enriched, weapons-grade uranium
Iraq had obtained legally from
France and the Soviet Union.

Although the uranium was being
used under safeguards established
by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), the Bush adminis-
tration had feared before the war
that Iraqi officials might seize the
uranium from the reactors and
quickly convert it into one or two
crude bombs that could be moved
around on a flatbed truck or a boat.

President Bush voiced this con-
cern during a visit with U.S. troops
in Saudi Arabia last Thanksgiving,
when he declared that experts who
were predicting Iraq was still sev-
eral years away from obtaining a
bomb were underestimating the
threat.

President criticized

Bush came under harsh criticism
for the comments from scientists
who charged that he was exaggerat-
ing the threat as a pretext for
launching a war.

But Paul Levanthal, president of
the Nuclear Control Institute, which
seeks to limit the spread of nuclear
weapons, contends, "Bush took a
bum rap."

After the war, Iraq removed
about two-thirds of the uranium and
stored it under IAEA supervision;
Iraq claims the remaining third was
buried in the rubble of the reactors.

Even before the fighting began,
however, the administration was
picking up indications that Iraq
might have a covert nuclear weap-
ons program apart from the reac-

CHANGING VIEW

The administration's evolving
view of the Iraqi nuclear threat:

■ **Jan. 26:** "We believe that
their capability to produce nuclear
weapons has been 100 percent
destroyed."

— Lt. Col. Mike Scott, Penta-
gon briefer, Saudi Arabia

■ **Feb. 13:**
"His capacity
to produce
nuclear
weapons has
been
destroyed."

— Defense
Secretary
Dick Cheney

■ **Feb. 22:**
"We've elimi-
nated his
nuclear and
biological
production capabilities."

— Cheney

■ **March 19:** "We have
destroyed his capability to pro-
duce a nuclear weapon anytime in
the near future, for perhaps even a
decade, without outside assis-
tance. . . . I'm confident in saying
it'll be a long time before Saddam
Hussein has nuclear capability."

— Cheney

■ **June 4:** Reporter: "Are you
confident, still, that the coalition
campaign to take out the nuclear
facilities, research facilities, was



Cheney

total and complete?"

Pentagon spokesman Bob Hall:
"I don't think we've ever main-
tained that it was total or com-
plete."

■ **June 11:** Reporter: "Is it con-
ceivable as far as the Pentagon
sees it that a facility still exists?
You said throughout the war that
we completely wiped out all
nuclear, biological and chemical
facilities."

Pentagon spokesman Pete Wil-
liams: "No, we never said that.
That's not an accurate character-
ization of the way we described
the extent of the damage."

■ **June 13:** "We can't be in a
position, never have been in a
position, to say we know with
absolute certainty that we got 100
percent of it, because you simply
can't know what you don't know.
We believe we dealt with every-
thing that was on our target list."

— Williams

■ **July 9:** "After the war, we
learned of additional elements of
Iraq's nuclear capability from a
variety of intelligence sources. . . .
We are learning now from a variety
of intelligence sources things
we didn't know when we did the
target planning for the war about
elements of their nuclear capabil-
ity."

— Williams

tors, but the Pentagon did not take
the hints seriously as it drew up its
list of nuclear targets to be bombed
last December.

Radioactive traces on clothes

The tip-off came from examina-
tions of radioactive traces found on
the clothing of hostages held at an
Iraqi nuclear research center. The
particles bore the unmistakable sig-
nature of a calutron, a World War
II-era device used to enrich ura-
nium.

About early May, the administra-
tion abruptly changed its mind about
Iraq's nuclear capability after an
Iraqi nuclear scientist who defected
to U.S. forces in northern Iraq dis-
closed that Iraqi officials were con-
ducting a secret nuclear weapons
program.

The defector said the Iraqis had
created about 90 pounds of weap-
ons-grade uranium that was
enriched using calutrons at a secret
facility that escaped allied bombing.

Suspicious confirmed

The defector's story confirmed
the earlier suspicions and was bol-
stered by subsequent information.
That prompted the administration
to go public in late June with allega-
tions that Iraq was still engaged in
nuclear weapons research.

Iraq denied the charge, but would
not let U.N. observers inspect a mil-
itary base where the calutrons were
believed stored.

Last week, after repeated threats
of military strikes from the Bush
administration, the Iraqis admitted
they had 30 calutrons (of which only
eight allegedly are still functional)
and had produced one pound of
slightly enriched uranium.

Iraq also admitted that it was
developing two other, more
advanced methods for enriching
uranium, and allowed the U.N.
inspectors to check their facilities.

But U.S. and U.N. officials believe
Iraq continues to hide the full scope
of its nuclear program.