

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

00 072

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 05, 1991

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ALBERT GORE JR.

SUBJECT: OFFERS SUGGESTIONS TO HELP THE PRESIDENT
DEAL WITH THE INSURRECTION IN IRAQ AND THE
KURDISH AND SHIITE SITUATION

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)		ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE		ORG	91/04/05	Fm A910409LJ	
NSCS/REFERRAL NOTE: _____		R	910419LJ		/ /
99DOS REFERRAL NOTE: _____		I	91/04/18LJ	C	/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____			/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____			/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____			/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: INCOMING REC'D FROM HENRY PLASTER, APR 4 91,
FOR TRACKING

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1210 _____
MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                       *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *           OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *           CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                       *
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102878
RECEIVED: 18 APR 91 09

226456
C0072

TO: GORE JR, ALBERT

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 13 JUN 91
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
UN

PERSIAN GULF
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO GORE LTR

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 22 APR 91

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CHARLES
HAASS
LAMPLEY
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

RC 13

DATE

4/14

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSRCB

DOC

3 OF

3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9102878

DOC ACTION OFFICER

002 SCOWCROFT
002 CHARLES
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 91042918 FOR SIGNATURE
Z 91051618 FOR FURTHER ACTION
X 91061409 SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9102878
RECEIVED: 18 APR 91 09

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: GORE JR, ALBERT

DOC DATE: 03 APR 91
SOURCE REF: 226456

KEYWORDS: IRAQ
UN

PERSIAN GULF
CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE INSURRECTION IN IRAQ

ACTION:

DUE DATE: 22 APR 91

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HAASS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
HAASS

FOR CONCURRENCE
CHARLES
DYKE
LAMPLEY
ROSTOW

FOR INFO
HAYDEN
PILLING
WELCH
WORKING

COMMENTS: _____

BDM 6/13/91

DISPATCHED BY _____

DATE _____

BY HAND _____

W/ATTCH _____

OPENED BY: NSRCB

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DOC

1 OF

1

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1991

al
Dear Senator Gore:

Thank you for your letter to the President of April 3, 1991 about the situation inside Iraq, and for your kind words on the UN ceasefire resolution. We share your concern about the Iraqi government's brutal use of force against its political opponents, particularly the Kurdish and other innocent civilians.

Our decision to shoot down Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft was taken as a military precaution to protect coalition forces operating inside Iraq. Shooting down Iraqi helicopters might have marginally impeded Iraqi government operations to quash the rebellion, but would not have changed the ultimate outcome. Further military intervention by the coalition to support Iraq's political opposition risked embroiling us either in a protracted civil war or in long-term political administration of Iraq until a successor government could be chosen. This clearly was never an objective of the coalition. We do agree, however, that the Iraqi people would be better off under new leadership, and that this can best be achieved by keeping the pressure on the Iraqi government through the stringent imposition of sanctions.

The international relief effort assembled under the mandate of UNSC resolution 688 has successfully attended to the humanitarian and security needs of nearly 500,000 Kurds who fled Iraqi brutality. Operation Provide Comfort, the largest U.S. relief effort mounted in modern military history, has included a commitment of over \$200 million for these refugees and the deployment of nearly 12,000 U.S. military personnel to carry out the operation in conjunction with our coalition partners. The success of a major objective of this operation was realized this month when the last refugee camp in Turkey was vacated as the refugees voluntarily returned home.

These relief operations will soon be turned over to the United Nations and other international relief organizations who will assure the continued delivery of assistance to and the security of the Kurds who have now returned home from Turkey. The Administration will continue to provide material assistance through the UN. To deter Iraqi military action against these operations following coalition troop withdrawals, we intend to convey a strong warning to Iraq about the consequences of

interfering in these operations and violating the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding concluded in April by the Iraqi government and the UN Secretary General's Executive Delegate.

Thank you again for writing on this matter of mutual concern.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 25, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: ~~SANDRA~~ SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Gore on Iraq

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is a response to Senator Gore's letter to the President on the situation inside Iraq (Tab II).

Ginny Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Gore at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Response to Senator Gore
Tab II Letter from Senator Gore

April 9, 1991

Dear Al:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President regarding the insurrection in Iraq.

We appreciate being apprised of your plan which would assist the Kurdish people in Iraq through the U.N. Security Council and strict enforcement of the cease-fire. Please know that I have shared your comments with President Bush. Additionally, I have taken the liberty of providing your remarks to the President's national security and foreign policy advisors so that they, too, are aware of your suggestions.

Thank you again for your interest in writing.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FDM:TSB:

bcc: w/ copy of inc to NSC - for Direct Response
bcc: w/ copy of inc to Dept. of State - FYI

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 3, 1991

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Let me begin by congratulating you on the terms of the U.N. cease-fire resolution. It's tough and it represents a precedent of historical proportions for the United Nations and for the idea of collective security. Having said this, however, I want to urge you to change the course of American policy for dealing with the insurrection and its aftermath in Iraq. Our policy in the Gulf should not be mortgaged to the success of tyranny in Iraq, but we are coming painfully close to that position. Of course, if I thought there were no alternative but to become deeply engaged in Iraq's internal struggle and to protract our military stay in the region, I would support your approach. In my opinion, however, there are certain things we should do not only because they are right, but especially because they are also feasible.

Specifically:

1. We should enforce the cease-fire strictly. Permission to fly Iraqi helicopters was not granted for the purpose of suppressing a rebellion: it was granted explicitly for administrative necessity. Now that we understand Iraq's real intent, we should stop this abuse. Many lives can still be saved if Iraq is forbidden to use these powerful weapons against people completely unable to defend themselves.

2. We should support the French effort to focus the Security Council on the plight of Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'ite population, and we should also mobilize support to provide aid to refugees. I hope and trust also that the coalition already recognizes a responsibility not to forcibly repatriate any refugees who have fled into the portion of Iraq we now control.

3. In the longer term, we should be using such leverage as we have to advance the day not just when Saddam Hussein is out of power, but when there exists in Iraq a government that grants reasonable consideration to all its peoples and which no longer rules by terror. Until that time, I would hope it would be your explicit policy to inform Iraq that the US will be adamant about imposing sanctions in a very severe manner.

I believe that the approach outlined above would not impede our planned drawdown of forces in the region. On the contrary, it might well be part of the insurance that we want against ever having to bring them back again. Above all, it would keep our policy and our principles in alignment. You asked the country to accept that Iraq's conquest of Kuwait was not just an intra-Arab affair but a matter of global consequence. Saddam Hussein's external behavior is of a piece with the internal character of his regime. As you would not have the world repeat the mistake that was made at Munich, I ask you to change your policy so that we do not replicate other situations in which Great Powers ignored the fate of peoples who rose up for their freedom, especially at a juncture when we have immense leverage to influence the outcome.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Al Gore". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "A" and a long, sweeping underline.

Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senator

BS - Response to Sen Gore

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WEA LOG # 2878
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG WEA AIO _____

[Handwritten initials]

- Ken Hill
- Bill Sittmann
- Bob Gates
- Brent Scowcroft
- Bill Sittmann
- Situation Room
- West Wing Desk
- NSC Secretariat

91 MAY 22 P 6 . 27

RECEIVED

SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>1</u>	<u>KJ</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
<u>3</u>	<u>S</u>	
<u>4</u>	<u>APNSA Has Seen</u>	
<u>5</u>	<u>PM 4/13</u>	<u>D</u>
<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
<u>6A</u>	<u>Room</u>	

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

COMMENTS

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

BS / Response to Sen Gore on Iraq

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WFA LOG # 2878
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<i>WFA</i> Ken Hill	<u>1</u>		<u>A</u>
Bill Sittmann	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Bill Sittmann			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
<u>Charles</u>	<u>6</u>		<u>FFA</u> <u>see Tab I</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other _____
Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS

01 APR 02 08:15

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

RECEIVED
NSC SECRETARIAT

91 APR 29 6:12

CONFIDENTIAL

NO.	DATE	FROM	TO	REMARKS
1	4/29/91	NSC	SECRETARIAT	RECEIVED
2	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED
3	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED
4	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED
5	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED
6	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED
7	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED
8	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED
9	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED
10	4/29/91	SECRETARIAT	NSC	RECEIVED

SECRETARIAT