NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW - 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Review of US-Soviet Relations (S)

Our post-World War II policies toward the Soviet Union have been extraordinarily successful. Containment is being vindicated, as the peoples of the world reject the outmoded dogma of Marxism-Leninism in a search for prosperity and freedom. The trends in US-Soviet relations are, in large part, favorable to us. It would be unwise thoughtlessly to abandon policies that have brought us this far. (S)

Even so, remarkable changes are taking place in the Soviet Union and in Soviet foreign policy. It is therefore necessary to undertake a comprehensive forward-looking review of the US-Soviet relationship, and clearly articulate our long term objectives and strategy. What kind of relationship do we wish to see in the year 2000? We may be standing at the door of a new era in our relationship with the USSR, with potential for significantly reducing military forces and resolving longstanding international disputes. Yet the USSR remains an adversary with awesome military power whose interests conflict in important ways with our own. The Soviet Union already presents a new and complicated political challenge to us in Europe and elsewhere. My own sense is that the Soviet challenge may be even greater than before because it is more varied. (S)

At the same time, the Soviet Union is passing through a period of internal change, the outcome of which cannot be known even to the
leadership. The pressures of a failing system at home and frustrated policies abroad have caused the Soviet leadership, at least for now, to experiment with new political and economic approaches domestically, to make important concessions and withdrawals abroad, and to present a more benign, but in some ways more challenging, face to the world. [S]

These circumstances, and their likely continuation during my Administration, offer the opportunity to make progress toward resolution of other international problems, to enhance international and strategic stability, and to promote the cause of democracy. There may be opportunities to encourage further positive change in the Soviet Union itself, including the institutionalization of greater pluralism, observance of human rights and constructive cooperation on international problems. [S]

Accordingly, I direct the National Security Council to prepare a comprehensive review of US-Soviet relations. The review should formulate long term US objectives in this relationship (through the end of the century) and offer a strategy for the achievement of these objectives. The review should be ready for NSC consideration by 15 March 1989. Differences of view or recommendation among agencies should be clearly noted in the paper. Work on this review should take account of, and be closely coordinated with, similar reviews dealing with U.S. national strategy and force structure. [S]

The review should address the following issues:

(1) **Policy Objectives of Soviet Internal and External Policy:** This section should examine the evolution of Soviet domestic and foreign policy objectives since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev. This section should address current and anticipated Soviet objectives in military policy, arms control negotiations, and public diplomacy. Gorbachev and others say they seek to change the decades-old premises of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Should we take this seriously? If so, what are the odds of their success? Would such an effort survive Gorbachev? What are the broad internal and external goals of Soviet leadership in the short term (3-5 years)? Do they have longer term (10 years) objectives? What relationship does the Soviet leadership perceive between internal and external policy objectives?

(2) **Assessment of Soviet Internal Situation:** This section should evaluate the present domestic situation in the Soviet Union. How far has domestic reform, both politically and economically, progressed? What are the prospects for
further economic reform and how successful are such reforms likely to be? What are the implications of failure -- of a lack of success in improving economic performance? Likewise, what are the prospects for further political reforms? What are the implications of the rollback of selected economic reforms and of new restrictions on Glasnost? What would constitute "success" for Gorbachev in both economic and political terms? In examining the major domestic problems and challenges that reform is likely to encounter in the short and long term, this section should consider the possibility of the failure of economic and political reform and its impact on Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Separately, this section should consider the impact on both Soviet domestic and foreign policy if Gorbachev were to be removed from office.

This section should be intentionally broad in scope, paying particular attention to the following issues: the Soviet economy, especially its ability to produce high-technology goods for both civilian and military use; the nationalities problem in all its possible variants, including the possibility of serious disturbances in ethnic regions; the indigenous human rights movement; and the degree of resistance to change and potential focus of active opposition within the Party, the bureaucracy, the military and security sectors and the society as a whole. This section should include with an evaluation of the objectives outlined in Section 1. Finally, how will the US-Soviet relationship be affected by developments in Eastern Europe?

(3) **Assessment of Soviet Foreign and Military Policy:** This section should evaluate the degree of change in Soviet foreign and military policy since the accession of Gorbachev in relation to the United States, Western countries, and the Third World. Soviet intelligence activity and policy in the arms control and public diplomacy spheres should be included. To what degree has the Soviet leadership been successful and unsuccessful in pursuit of its external objectives? Other conditions being equal, what are the prospects for Soviet attainment of the external objectives outlined in Section 1? For example, at what point might the Soviets feel compelled to intervene in Eastern Europe to suppress uncontrolled reformist movements and how might this impact on East-West relations more generally? How will the US-Soviet relationship be affected by developments in Eastern Europe?

(4) **U.S. Policy Objectives in Relation to the Soviet Union:** Within the context of Soviet objectives and behavior, what
should be the long range goals of U.S. foreign and security policy toward the Soviet Union? Is it in the U.S. interest to "help" the Soviet leadership in the attainment of some of its internal or external objectives? What are the potential dangers and benefits to U.S. national security interests in a negative or affirmative response? The section should examine public, congressional and Allied perceptions of this issue.

(5) Sources of U.S. Leverage over Soviet Policy: This section should examine the sources of U.S. leverage to attain the objectives noted in Section 4 and analyze the pros and cons as well as relative importance of each. What conditions, criteria, or demands should the US attach to any assistance? Would such "help" be of sufficient value as to induce the USSR to pay a political price? With Soviet ideology, political thinking, and military doctrine in a state of flux, this section should examine opportunities for the U.S. to influence developments in these areas and the strengths and weaknesses of any approach designed to affect Soviet concepts, debates and actions. (For example, how much opportunity exists to affect Soviet debates and condition Soviet attitudes on concepts like "balance of interests," "defensive defense" and "reasonable sufficiency?") Attention should in particular be directed toward unilateral and multilateral military-security and economic policy, negotiating initiatives, public diplomacy and scientific and cultural relations. An evaluation should be given of the overall likely impact of U.S. policy in influencing Soviet domestic and international behavior.

(6) Recommended Policies for Short and Long Term: The concluding section should outline recommended objectives for the United States in the next 3-5 and 10 years, focusing in particular on a strategy (and new or modified policies) aimed at the achievement of our long range objectives. The recommendations may in some cases be contingent upon specific Soviet actions or developments which would warrant shifts in U.S. policy. The section should examine the compatibility of policy recommendations with the policies of other major Western countries and recommend what, if any, actions are required to enhance the coordination of Western policy toward the Soviet Union. Finally, how can the U.S. get out in front of the USSR in making proposals to affect the relationship? Should such efforts constitute a major policy initiative?