

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1992

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 65

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Organizing to Manage On-site Inspections Under  
the CFE Treaty (U)

This directive defines organizational structures and responsibilities to implement the on-site inspection provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the policy structure for providing guidance on matters involving on-site inspections. This directive complements National Security Directive 41, which expanded the mission of the On-site Inspection Agency (OSIA). (S)

Planning to implement this directive should begin immediately so that the United States is fully prepared to conduct appropriate monitoring of the CFE activities of successor states to the former Soviet Union and East European CFE participants as soon as the Treaty enters into force. (S)

Background (U)

On-site inspections carried out under the CFE Treaty will make an important contribution to U.S. verification. Unlike existing bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union, however, the CFE Treaty will involve inspections by our NATO Allies which, collectively, will greatly exceed the number conducted by the United States alone. It is imperative, therefore, that we organize not only to take maximum advantage of U.S. inspection rights but also to ensure, to the

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degree possible, that CFE inspections conducted by other NATO nations contribute to effective verification. One of our objectives is to use CFE implementation to help achieve our goal of expanding the political function of NATO. (C)

Policy Guidance (U)

The Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) will provide overall policy guidance on matters involving on-site inspections. The PCC will also provide guidance to U.S. inspection teams and U.S. representatives to NATO verification coordinating mechanisms. Any disputes with other CFE Treaty Parties about matters involving on-site inspections will be promptly reported to Washington for attention by the PCC. The PCC will develop U.S. public affairs guidance on matters involving on-site inspections. (U)

U.S. policy is to exercise the full spectrum of monitoring and inspection rights under the CFE Treaty. U.S. inspection teams will exercise these rights consistent with general and specific policy guidance. We will encourage NATO Allies to do the same. Proposed exceptions to this policy will be resolved by the PCC.

(C)

DoD Responsibilities (U)

The Department of Defense will be responsible for developing and implementing plans and procedures consistent with the CFE Treaty and PCC guidance (1) for the receipt of inspection teams, host nation and U.S. escort teams at U.S. forces installations, facilities, exercise activities or equipment locations and (2) for the conduct of inspections of U.S. forces at those locations. (U)

OSIA will develop detailed inspection procedures for the conduct of inspections consistent with overall policy guidance developed by the Arms Control PCC. OSIA will be responsible for overall leadership, management and support of U.S. CFE inspection teams and escort activities, including transportation, linguists, communications, training and counterintelligence. (U)

OSIA will be responsible for the makeup of all inspection and escort teams. A Team Leader, appointed by OSIA, shall lead each team of U.S. inspectors and shall have final authority over the team and in all dealings with counterparts from other Treaty countries. The Team Leader shall ensure that proper security procedures are followed to minimize the risk of unauthorized foreign access to information of intelligence or counterintelligence value. OSIA may augment the U.S. team of inspectors with personnel from other agencies as appropriate. In the case of U.S. participation in multi-national inspections under NATO auspices, OSIA will designate the U.S. team leaders and/or members, and will work with the Department of State to arrange such U.S. participation, including coordination with U.S.

representatives to the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee. (S)

OSIA will be responsible for all escort activities related to non-U.S. inspections of U.S. facilities under the CFE Treaty, with support from U.S. military and diplomatic organizations in Europe. OSIA will designate the senior U.S. representative responsible for the U.S. escorts, for all dealings with non-U.S. inspection teams, and with escorts from the European countries where U.S. CFE-related facilities are located. The OSIA escort team leader will be informed of all security and counter-intelligence information which affects the escort mission. (S)

DCI Responsibilities (S)

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), through his Treaty Monitoring Center, will develop for PCC approval a comprehensive monitoring strategy and plan designed to accomplish CFE verification objectives. The DCI will be responsible for preparing all-source monitoring reports and integrating the results of on-site inspections with all-source intelligence and the information provided by other Treaty signatories. For this purpose, the DCI will receive guidance from the Arms Control PCC to formulate tasking for collection and analysis by the Intelligence Community. The DCI will coordinate the targeting requirements for all-source collection to monitor the CFE Treaty

[REDACTED] (S)

1.5 (c)

The DCI shall be responsible for recommending U.S. inspection

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[REDACTED]

In this connection, an annual inspection plan will be developed and approved by the Arms Control PCC. Appropriate elements of this plan will be coordinated with allies through the Department of State. However, on-site inspections will not be the only source of information essential for verification of the CFE Treaty. Data from on-site inspections should be integrated with information from other sources to ensure complete and accurate monitoring reports. Such data and integrated reports will provide a basis for policy decisions on compliance by Treaty parties with the CFE Treaty provisions. (S)

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1.5 (c)

The ultimate customer for the on-site inspection data and for other all-source intelligence and analysis is the Arms Control PCC. The DCI will ensure that, consistent with his responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, on-site inspection data and other all-source intelligence and information are analyzed and integrated, and that both data and analysis are disseminated promptly to all PCC members. (S)

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The United States will conduct only a portion of the inspections allotted to NATO under the CFE Treaty. In order to enhance the overall effectiveness of the NATO inspection effort the DCI will seek to provide appropriate U.S. intelligence support to the on-site inspection activities of our NATO Allies and arrange for the exchange of intelligence information acquired during U.S. and Allied inspections. (S)

A U.S. goal is to expand our participation in CFE inspections through the shared use of the limited number of inspections available to NATO. The DCI and the Department of State will arrange and coordinate as appropriate with OSIA any bilateral exchanges of CFE inspectors with other nations. (S)

*C. B.*

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