NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 58

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Convention Initiative (U)

The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf brought into play once again the threat of chemical weapons (CW). It demonstrated in the most graphic terms that unscrupulous regimes can and will threaten entire populations with these weapons of terror as long as we permit them to exist. The circumstances of that conflict renew and reinforce my conviction, shared by responsible leaders around the world, that chemical weapons must be banned. Our best hope for getting us firmly on the path to that goal is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) under negotiation in Geneva.

(S)

The United States is the only country that can provide the leadership necessary to achieve an early conclusion to a CWC that serves our interests. Accordingly, I have decided that the U.S. will take new initiatives to accelerate the negotiations in Geneva, and to provide stronger incentives to states to follow the American lead by committing themselves to becoming parties to an effective Convention and to carrying out its requirements strictly. (C)

SECRET
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I therefore direct that the following actions be taken:

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- The United States will call for the resolution of all major outstanding issues by the end of 1991 and the completion of the CWC within twelve months. *(G)*

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- To help reach these goals and to demonstrate our determination to do everything possible to bring the CWC talks to a successful conclusion soon, the United States will propose that the CW ad hoc committee of the CD stay in continuous session in Geneva at the ambassadorial level, with delegations reinforced as necessary. *(C)*

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- In support of these goals, the United States will propose that the CD Foreign Ministers meet at an appropriate time to conclude any remaining issues that cannot otherwise be resolved. *(C)*

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- The U.S. will publicly reaffirm that it intends to become an original party to the CWC. In addition, the U.S. will forebear the right of retaliation with CW for any reason against any state, effective when the CWC enters into force. At the CD negotiations, the United States delegation will propose a provision in the CWC prohibiting the use of CW for any reason. The U.S. will also call upon all states publicly to commit to becoming original parties, to declare their CW stocks, and to forebear the use of CW for any reason when the CWC enters into force. *(S)*

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- The United States will commit itself to the unconditional destruction of all CW stocks and former production facilities within ten years of entry into force of the CWC, and will publicly announce this new position. We will call upon all states to follow our lead and to begin the destruction of their CW stocks and production facilities as soon as possible. We will propose provisions for the CWC that require all parties to begin the unconditional destruction of their CW stocks and production facilities as soon as the CWC enters into force, and to complete their elimination within ten years of that date. *(S)*

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- The U.S. will offer to provide practical destruction assistance to parties to the CWC that have CW located on their territory. The U.S. will:

  - Make available technical advice and assistance (e.g., blueprints, technical advice, visits to U.S. destruction facilities). *(C)*
  
  - Create a Task Force comprised of U.S. government agency and private industry representatives to develop proposals on how the U.S. can advise and assist states in CW destruction. *(C)*
Propose the creation of a CD Working Group on CW destruction and offer to provide U.S. experts to it.

-- The U.S. will reiterate U.S. unilateral policy on export controls on appropriate chemicals and related technology and call on all states to enact similar controls. (C)

-- There must be a wide-spread recognition that, aside from the significant intrinsic benefits that will flow to all parties from a total ban on CW, there will be tangible benefits for those states that join the Convention and enhance its strength, and specific penalties for those states that fail to support it in the most fundamental and important way by not joining it. To make that difference meaningful, the United States will propose provisions for the CWC that require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with states that do not become parties within a reasonable time after entry into force. (S)

-- The United States will reaffirm our current position that there should be sanctions against those states that violate the CWC and especially severe sanctions against any state that initiates the use of CW. (C)

-- The United States will reaffirm our commitment to a strong and forthright verification regime. We will offer additional concrete proposals to address the central issue of inspecting suspect sites, and we will call on the CD to adopt our approach. (C)

-- By May 14, 1991, the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee will develop instructions to our representatives to the CD that are based on this NSD. (C)

This National Security Directive supersedes NSD-24. (C)

[Signature]