July 18, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Organizing to Manage On-site Verification of Nuclear Testing (U)

This directive defines organizational structures and responsibilities to implement the on-site monitoring and inspection provisions of the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and defines the policy structure for making compliance judgments. This directive complements National Security Directive 41 which expanded the mission of the On-site Inspection Agency (OSIA). (C)

Background (U)

Verification protocols to the TTBT and PNET provide for on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements, in-country seismic measurements, and on-site inspection procedures for certain U.S. and Soviet nuclear explosions. Once the treaties come into force, and depending on the nature of the Soviet test program, the U.S. may require the frequent, relatively long-term, presence of U.S. personnel at the Soviet nuclear test site. Given U.S. nuclear testing requirements, frequent and relatively long-term presence of Soviet personnel at the Nevada Test Site is likely. There is also the prospect of U.S. inspectors at remote seismic stations in the Soviet Union and Soviet inspectors at seismic stations in...
the U.S. Depending on the future of the Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions program, U.S. inspectors may be required at other remote locations in the Soviet Union. (U)

Monitoring of nuclear tests is not a cooperative venture, but is rather part of an inherently adversarial process of verification. U.S. inspectors must obtain the necessary technical information to allow the United States to make independent judgments of Soviet compliance with the 150 kt yield threshold of the TTBT and PNET, while not taking any action during monitoring which could prejudice U.S. rights or compliance judgments. (U)

Soviet monitoring of U.S. tests at the Nevada Test Site presents a complex situation with conflicting requirements among test operations, statutory responsibilities, and U.S. treaty obligations. Successful implementation of the treaty -- granting the Soviets the access allowed by the treaty while protecting classified information and minimizing interference in the U.S. test program -- will require careful and close cooperation among U.S. agencies. (U)

Responsibilities (U)

The On-site Inspection Agency (OSIA) will be responsible for overall management and support of in-country nuclear test monitoring in the U.S. and USSR, including scheduling, transportation, linguistic, communications, escort, housing, ___(C)___

A Team Leader/senior U.S. representative, appointed by OSIA shall lead each team of U.S. inspectors sent to the Soviet Union and shall have final authority over the team and in all dealings with the Soviet counterparts. The Department of Energy will provide the technical/operations members of the team to conduct CORRTEX and the other on-site inspection activities permitted by the treaties, augmented by DOD as appropriate. The Department of Defense will provide the technical/operations members of the team for tests involving "hydro-plus" and for in-country seismic measurements, augmented by DOE as appropriate. OSIA may augment the U.S. team of inspectors with personnel from other agencies as appropriate. (C)

DOE (for CORRTEX) and DOD (for hydro-plus and seismic) shall designate a chief of technical operations for each event who will also participate on the U.S.-USSR Coordinating Group established by the treaties. The chiefs of technical operations will operate under the overall direction of the Team Leader.

Funding for inspection and monitoring activities and required equipment will be addressed by the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). (C)

TOP SECRET

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To help maintain effective coordination between OSIA and DOE, a senior DOE representative will be assigned to OSIA. (U)

OSIA will be responsible for all activities related to Soviet monitoring of U.S. tests at designated seismic stations and will designate the U.S. representative who will be responsible for the U.S. escorts and for all dealings with the Soviet inspection team. (U)

OSIA will be responsible for all escort activities related to the Soviet monitoring of tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and will appoint a Team Leader who will have overall responsibility for dealing with the Soviet inspection team. At NTS, DOE will oversee technical operations and advise the U.S. Team Leader at the U.S.-USSR Coordinating Group. DOE will retain responsibility for testing operations, matters of safety, safeguarding classified information, and public affairs on the Nevada Test Site. (S)

For tests subject to the TTBT verification protocol that are conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency, the division of responsibilities between DOE and DNA will parallel the responsibilities of the DOE test controller and the DNA test director for the nuclear device and the conduct of the experiments. (S)

Intelligence Functions (U)
2. Ensure that U.S. commitments are met so that the Soviet Union can conduct the appropriate monitoring specified by the TTBT and PNET. (U)

Policy Guidance (U)

The Arms Control PCC will provide overall policy guidance for implementation of the verification protocols to the TTBT and PNET and will also provide instructions to the U.S. inspection teams. The PCC will develop U.S. compliance judgments and will provide public affairs guidance on implementation and compliance. (C)

There will be a single United States delegation to the consultative commissions established for the TTBT and the PNET. I will appoint the U.S. Commissioner. (U)

Communications between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning monitoring activities shall be through normal diplomatic channels except as specifically provided for in the treaties. Any future nuclear testing negotiations shall be kept separate from all aspects of monitoring existing treaties. (C)

Any disputes with the Soviet Union about implementing treaty provisions or questions about proper procedure will be promptly reported to Washington for attention by the Arms Control PCC.
Technical monitoring of the explosive yield, while the most important determinant, is not the only factor to be considered in making compliance judgments. Therefore, no member of any monitoring team shall offer, either to the Soviets or to the public, any judgment about Soviet compliance. (C)

Implementation (U)

Planning to implement this directive should begin immediately so that the United States may be fully prepared to conduct appropriate monitoring of Soviet nuclear tests, and to support appropriate Soviet monitoring of U.S. nuclear tests, as soon as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty enter into force. (U)