NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 36

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: United States Arms Control Policy (U)

At our December Malta meeting, President Gorbachev and I agreed to intensify our mutual efforts to reach agreement on a series of outstanding arms control issues. The following decisions are designed to pursue that objective in a manner that leads to arms control agreements which enhance our national security and strengthen international stability. (U)

1. ALCMs

The following provisions should be treated as part of a package that the U.S. could accept to resolve the ALCM issue. (U)

a. Counting Rules. The U.S. may propose a "differential attribution" approach for counting ALCMs on heavy bombers. Under this approach, B-52H and B-1B bombers equipped for ALCMs would count at 10 ALCMs each. The Blackjack would count at 8 ALCMs each. The Bear-H would count at 6-8 ALCMs each. (U)

b. Maximum Loading. The U.S. may offer a limit on the maximum number of ALCMs for which a heavy bomber may be equipped, not to exceed twice the number attributed to it under the counting rules described in para 1.a above. As an alternative, the U.S. may offer to set such a maximum limit at 20 ALCMs. Provisions related to the maximum number of...
ALCMs for which heavy bombers are equipped should be incorporated into the START Treaty as legally binding obligations that would be verified by measures to be agreed, to include short-notice on-site inspection of ALCM-carrying bombers.

c. **Ban on Aircraft Conversion.** The U.S. may offer a provision to ban the conversion of aircraft originally constructed as an aircraft other than a bomber into an ALCM-carrying heavy bomber.

d. **Ban on Multiple-Warhead ALCMs.** The U.S. may offer a provision to ban multiple-warhead nuclear ALCMs.

e. **ALCM Distinguishability.** The U.S. requires that future non-nuclear ALCMs not be subject to the numerical limits in START. To achieve this objective, the U.S. may offer the following measures to help distinguish between future nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs.

1. ALCM-carrying heavy bombers, non-ALCM heavy bombers, and former (i.e., non-nuclear) heavy bombers would each be based at geographically separated bases.

2. All nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs above the range threshold for START-accountable ALCMs would have external differences that are visible to NTM, in addition to differences (e.g., shape, diameter, attachment point spacing) that are visible to on-site inspection.

3. For all nuclear ALCMs above the range threshold, the sides would exchange information with respect to these external differences and would exhibit the ALCMs in a way that confirms the information and distinguishing features.

4. For all non-nuclear ALCMs above the range threshold, the U.S. may agree to exchange information with respect to these external differences and exhibit the non-nuclear ALCMs in a way that confirms the information and distinguishing features, provided this information exchange is not treated as part of the data MOU in START.

5. The sides would permit access to designated weapons storage areas at all non-ALCM heavy bomber bases and former heavy bomber bases for the purpose of selecting a small number of non-nuclear ALCMs (if any are present) and confirming (e.g., with a radiation detector) that they are, in fact, non-nuclear. Other parts of these airbases, other strategic nuclear airbases, and
all tactical airbases would be excluded from such inspections. 

(6) The sides would permit inspections of non-ALCM heavy bombers of a type that have been flight tested with nuclear ALCMs above the START range threshold (e.g., B-1B) to confirm that they are not equipped to carry such ALCMs. Non-ALCM heavy bombers of types that have not been flight-tested with nuclear ALCMs above the START range threshold (e.g., B-2) would not be subject to inspection for this purpose. 

(7) The sides would permit inspections of former heavy bombers (e.g., B-52G) to confirm that they satisfy the requirements for conversion to former heavy bombers.

f. Range Threshold. The U.S. may accept a range threshold of 1000 km for START-accountable ALCMs.

g. Former Heavy Bombers. The U.S. requires a continuing right to convert heavy bombers to "former heavy bombers" that would not be counted within the 1600/6000 START aggregates, subject to an agreed numerical limit on such converted heavy bombers between 100 and 115.

h. Other ALCM Issues. The U.S. position on other ALCM issues remains unchanged.

2. Non-Deployed Ballistic Missiles

a. The U.S. should continue to press its current position on measures and constraints related to non-deployed ballistic missiles, except as modified below.

b. The U.S. should propose the establishment of numerical limits on the inventory of non-deployed mobile ICBMs. The U.S. no longer should seek numerical limits on the inventory of non-deployed missiles for other types of ICBMs and SLBMs limited under START. For these purposes, a mobile ICBM is a type of ICBM that has been flight-tested from a mobile launcher.

c. The U.S. should propose limits of 300-500 non-deployed mobile ICBMs and 1500 warheads that would be attributed to those ICBMs under START RV counting rules.
3. **Ban on Data Denial**

a. The U.S. requires that a START Treaty include an effective ban on the denial of telemetric data during flights of ICBMs and SLBMs limited under START. The provisions to implement such a ban would also apply to Space Launch Vehicles that have been converted from ICBMs or SLBMs limited under START. The U.S. should seek to implement an early agreement on START data denial provisions. In the event that data denial provisions enter into force prior to entry into force of the START Treaty, the START JCIC should serve as the compliance forum for data denial.

To achieve these objectives, the U.S. should propose the following measures, based on strict reciprocity.

b. The U.S. should propose that the sides undertake a positive obligation to broadcast telemetry from ICBMs and SLBMs limited under START in a receivable form. To that end, the U.S. may offer to:

   1. ban low-power transmission and directional beaming of telemetry signals;
   2. exchange data on the frequency and method of modulation used to transmit telemetry;
   3. exchange "bit maps" to aid in verifying that the telemetry is not encrypted;
   4. subject to conditions to be mutually agreed, exchange tapes of the entire telemetry data stream from a particular flight.

c. The U.S. may offer to exchange data on each flight of an ICBM or SLBM limited under START, as follows:

1. acceleration as a function of time, from launch through burn-up of the post-boost vehicle; acceleration data on RVs would not be included. (The Arms Control PCC will develop recommendations about the precision of data and time interval between successive data that may be provided.);

2. the time of boost-stage separations and RV separations;
(3) demonstrated throw-weight;
(4) demonstrated range;
(5) identification of specific telemetry channels that transmit data on RV release commands, actual RV separations, and booster stage separations.

d. START provisions on data denial would not apply to a category of missiles, "Strategic R&D Boosters", which includes any launch vehicle that uses the accountable stage of a type of ICBM or SLBM no longer deployed. START provisions on data denial also would not apply to cruise missiles.

e. For a specified number of years, two flight-tests per year of the Minuteman II and SS-13 would be excluded from the ban on encapsulation.

f. In addition to the exemption of Minuteman II and SS-13, the U.S. may offer to permit the encapsulation of RV data made during the plasma phase of reentry on flights, as follows:

(1) no more than three flights of each future type of ICBM or SLBM, to be conducted prior to initial accountability of the type in START as a deployed missile;
(2) no more than three flights of a single existing type of ICBM or SLBM;
(3) telemetry would be broadcast from the same RV in which data is being encapsulated, including all measurements made prior to and subsequent to the plasma phase, and measurements made and recorded during the plasma phase;
(4) copies of tapes of encapsulated data would be exchanged for all flights conducted under this provision.

4. SLCMs

a. The U.S. may offer, on a reciprocal basis, a "declaration of policy" that would state the maximum size of our SLCM inventory in each of the next three years. These mutual declarations would encompass all nuclear SLCMs,
regardless of mission or range. Such declarations would be updated annually, on a reciprocal basis. The U.S. may additionally offer that declarations of the maximum size of the SLCM inventory for a given year not be increased in subsequent declarations. (9)

b. The U.S. also may offer to exchange information, on a reciprocal basis, about plans related to the size of its nuclear SLCM inventory for two years beyond those included in the "declaration of policy." Such plans could be changed at any time. Information concerning changes in plans would be provided as part of the annual update. (9)

c. The U.S. may agree to informal discussions about SLCM verification for the purpose of explaining to the Soviets the reasons why we are convinced that all of the proposed approaches to SLCM verification are ineffective, unworkable, or both. (9)

5. Other START Issues

US positions related to mobile ICBM sublimits, Backfire, and SS-18s are unchanged. (9)

6. Defense and Space

a. The U.S. should seek Soviet reconfirmation of its position that conclusion of a START Treaty is not contingent on the resolution of issues covered in the Defense and Space negotiations. (9)

b. The U.S. should reject any Soviet proposals that would constitute U.S. agreement to the Soviet position that they are free to withdraw from the START Treaty if, in their judgment, the ABM Treaty has been violated. (9)

7. Krasnoyarsk

a. The U.S. should confirm Soviet plans to dismantle completely the Krasnoyarsk radar that they have acknowledged violates the ABM Treaty. We should make clear that such dismantling entails the complete removal of both the transmitter and receiver buildings. We do not require that the building foundations be destroyed or demolished. (9)

b. The U.S. will not postpone completion of a START Treaty that is otherwise ready to be signed, provided that the Soviets have fully accepted our understanding concerning the
requirements related to the elimination of the Krasnoyarsk violation, and that they have made reasonable progress on the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

8. Thule and Fylingdales

With the agreement of the Danish and British governments respectively, the U.S. may invite the Soviets to visit the radars at Thule and Fylingdales. Such an invitation is contingent on Soviet agreement to permit us to visit two similar Soviet radars. The invitation should be extended in such a way that makes clear that it is in no way related to Soviet actions concerning Krasnoyarsk.