NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE
  THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
  THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
  THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
  THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
  THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
  THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
  THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
  THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
  THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
  THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
  THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
  THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons Arms Control Initiatives (S)

There is an increasingly urgent need to achieve a global ban on chemical weapon (CW) production as well as use. The United States not only faces the continuing threat posed by the Soviet CW capability, but also confronts a growing danger to its own security and to regional stability as a result of the spiraling proliferation of CW capabilities among Third World states. The growing willingness of Third World nations to use CW adds to the urgency, and serves to underscore the costs of delay in fashioning an effective response to this problem. (U)

I have determined that the United States must take new initiatives in the area of CW nonproliferation and arms control to accelerate agreement on, and implementation of, a global ban on the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons and agents. These initiatives will build on the progress already made in negotiations on the chemical weapons convention in the
Conference on Disarmament, supplemented by our bilateral discussions and prospective CW Memorandum of Understanding with the Soviets. (2)

Verification of such a ban has been and will remain a daunting challenge. We must and will make every effort to improve our verification capabilities in this area. I have concluded, however, that the dangers of CW proliferation in the period are so serious that we must proceed with bold steps toward a global ban. We may, as a result, need to rely increasingly on our conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter threats of CW use against the United States or its forward-based forces by states that do not participate in the chemical weapons ban or that violate its provisions. (8)

I therefore direct that the following actions be taken:

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The United States will reaffirm its commitment to reach a multilateral agreement for a global ban on chemical weapons, and its support for the total elimination of chemical weapons and agents within ten years of the convention's entry into force. (8)

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The United States will commit itself to very substantial reductions in its chemical weapons stockpile (down to 500 agent tons) within eight years after entry into force of the chemical weapons convention, provided the Soviet Union is one of the parties. The United States will commit itself to the total elimination of its CW stockpile within ten years after entry into force of the chemical weapons convention, provided all CW-capable states have become party to the CW convention by year eight, or within two years of the time when all CW-capable states do become parties, whichever is later. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, will provide recommendations to me not later than September 30, 1989, on how best to define this standard of "all CW-capable states." The Secretary of Defense will report to me by November 15, 1989, on a plan to accomplish the CW destruction required by these commitments. (8)

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While negotiations in the chemical weapons convention continue, the United States will reduce its CW stockpile to less than 20 percent of its current level (e.g., down to 5000 agent tons), provided the Soviet Union agrees to reduce its CW stockpile to the same level under mutually agreed terms, including suitable provisions for the inspection of
the CW destruction process. Not later than October 31, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will develop alternatives for review by me and the National Security Council on the specific provisions the United States should seek in such a bilateral agreement, including a plan for step-by-step development and implementation of a verification regime.

--The residual stockpiles that would result from the bilateral or multilateral agreement should be modernized by the continued development and deployment of binary weapons. The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will report to me by November 15, 1989, on plans for modernizing such a significantly reduced stockpile in ways that substantially increase the percentage of the stockpile devoted to filled munitions, and ensure that air-delivered weapons are included.

--Not later than November 15, 1989, the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will provide recommendations to me and the National Security Council for any changes that may be required in our strategy of deterrence (including declaratory policy), force structure, or force deployments as a result of the reduced availability of retaliatory CW capabilities.

--The current U.S. "anywhere, anytime" approach to CW verification should be reviewed with a view to taking better account of the costs and limitations, as well as the effectiveness and benefits, of such highly intrusive inspection regimes. Approaches analogous to U.S. proposals in START for suspect-site inspection with right of refusal should be analyzed as part of this review. Not later than November 15, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will develop and evaluate alternatives to the current U.S. CW verification proposals for review by me and the National Security Council.

--The U.S. Government will expand its research and development efforts to improve its capabilities for verifying compliance with a global ban. Not later than November 15, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will report to me and the National Security Council on plans for doing so.
The current U.S. position on sanctions against CW use should be reviewed and expanded to include consideration of: (a) whether to propose sanctions against treaty violations other than use and, if so, what kind of "demonstration of violation" should be required; (b) what kinds of sanctions would be most appropriate and effective for each type of violation; and (c) what kinds of sanctions could usefully be applied unilaterally by the United States, or multilaterally outside the framework of the CW convention, or before that agreement enters into force. Not later than November 15, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will report to me and the National Security Council on the results of its review of CW sanctions. (C)

Possible approaches to increase unilateral and multilateral export controls on "dangerous chemicals," and on technologies and equipment for the production of chemical agents and weapons, should be reviewed. Potential positive and negative incentives to discourage states from constructing "dual use" chemical facilities should be included as part of this study. Not later than December 1, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should report to me and the National Security Council on the results of this review. (C)