September 20, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 22

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: United States Policy on Nuclear Testing
Arm Control (U)

Based on the review of the U.S. position on nuclear testing negotiations and an assessment of the negotiations to date with the Soviet Union, this memorandum provides my decisions on the principles that will guide further negotiations. (U)

The highest U.S. priority in the area of nuclear testing arms control is to achieve agreement on verification improvements to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) so that both treaties will be effectively verifiable. I intend to ask the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification if such agreement can be reached. (U)

With respect to specific issues related to the TTBT verification protocol:

-- The United States negotiator is authorized to agree to include both seismic and on-site inspection elements in the verification protocol.

1.5 (s)
The United States shall seek a 35 kt trigger level above which on-site inspection procedures would apply and a 50 kt trigger level for seismic procedures. (8)

If required to secure an agreement that meets our requirements for effective verification, the U.S. negotiator may agree to a 50 kt trigger level for on-site inspection and a 75 kt trigger level for seismic procedures. (8)

The United States will maintain its current position.

Final agreement to a TTBTP verification protocol that includes seismic and on-site inspections elements will require agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the numerous outstanding technical and implementation details of each element of the protocol. (8)