

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Telecon	Re: Telecon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (3 pp.)	5/28/92	(b)(1)	S

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files  
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**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

**Document Partially Declassified**  
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 By SES (NLGB) on 7/20/11

<b>Date Closed:</b> 1/29/2009	<b>OA/ID Number:</b> 91109-008
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<b>AR Disposition:</b>	<b>MR Disposition:</b> Released in Part
<b>AR Disposition Date:</b>	<b>MR Disposition Date:</b> 3/1/2011

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.


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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands  
Interpreter: No  
Notetaker: Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME: May 28, 1992, 7:58-8:11 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Ruud, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Fine and you, George? (U)

The President: I am calling on the situation in Sarajevo. As you know we haven't been out front on this, but now we are very concerned. It sounds like the same is true for the EC from reading my morning papers on your meeting. I talked to Yeltsin and Major briefly yesterday. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, we discussed this yesterday. People here are much more motivated than a few months ago. The most important change is that France finally came to the conclusion that it cannot go on like this, despite France's historic ties to Sarajevo. Germany has always been willing to be active but faces the constitutional limits. Italy has made a very strong appeal to the European Council to be more active. John Major was the most hesitant. I think they, a bit like the U.S., consider it a problem of the continent. We came to the common position that we should organize our humanitarian aid and that we want the Security Council of the UN to do the most to give the possibility of action. Of course, this would be working with the U.S. I think Jim Baker's statement before the (EC) Council met made clear that the U.S. would not stand by. Then as you have heard, Mitterrand went to Bosnia. This was motivated by pressures from his population. He could no longer be seen as not doing anything. (S)

The President: We think we have got to act now. We have the feeling that we should take this into the UN and get a resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means and of course tying this only to the humanitarian assistance situation.

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2009-0650-MR  
SCS 3/1/11

John Major is very hesitant and worried about a situation like Dien Bien Phu. We would be willing to do all possible on the air side -- airlift support, open the airport and if needed provide air cover. I wanted to get a sense of how forward-leaning you are. (§)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Very much. Mitterrand did not want to get involved precisely because of the Dien Bien Phu example, but he was under a lot of pressure from his people. He'd received thousands of letters and felt he had to act. Major was hesitant, but with a lot of pressure from Italy and Germany and from us -- you know we're usually aligned with Britain -- so Major moved a little. All of this was influenced a little by a report from Lord Carrington. He concluded that it was impossible to come to any serious result with Milosevich. This had an impact with the U.K. The problem now is to do this the right way. (§)

The President: The next step is to go to the U.N. I am reluctant to put U.S. troops in. I don't think the parties want us to do so. But we have an enormous ability to support in the air transport area and to provide air cover, if needed. We also have a carrier tank force in the Mediterranean. But the first step is to act in the U.N., and I think Boutros Ghali is taking the same line on this. (§)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Plus, George, this can have a good effect by showing the U.S. and Europe acting together. (b)(1)

(b)(1) (b)(1) It will be good to have the U.S. defending the same idea as Europe, and maybe we can involve NATO in some way. (§)

The President: Yes, Jim Baker was thinking of perhaps coming to Europe. I do not know if it will happen for this, but perhaps for a GATT Ministerial. We'd like to try to do something on GATT before Munich. If he does, maybe he can meet on this, too. Are there any changes on GATT? (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, Major and Kohl were active on this in Lisbon. Things changed a little for the good. Delors is taking a more positive attitude with the British and Germans, and the situation with the French is a bit more relaxed now that Maastricht is through parliament and their farmers are a bit quieter. Delors is still hesitating. (b)(1)

(b)(1) But Jim Baker, who seems to be taking the lead now, is so close that it is not impossible to find agreement. So we should take advantage of the opportunity of Jim being in Europe. Maybe if an agreement was reached and the conclusion reported to governments, people wouldn't say "no". But Delors is still hesitant. (§)

The President: You have been wonderful and I know people think we have been tough. But we want an agreement. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Lubbers: The problem has been on both sides. I'd say the chances of agreement are still less than 50 percent, something like 40 percent. But with luck and courage, it could happen, especially if we can get people (the Commission) to act with the authority they already have and then report back. (Ø)

The President: Many Thanks. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: All best wishes. (U)

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