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<td>04. Memcon</td>
<td>Re: Luncheon with King Hussein [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (7 pp.)</td>
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon with King Hussein (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jonathan T. Howe, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning
Ed Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Roger Harrison, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan

King Hussein
Prime Minister Zayd Bin Shaker
Adnan Abu Odeh, Chief of the Royal Court
Prince Talal Ibu Mohamed, Military Aide to His Majesty
Kamal Abu Jabir, Foreign Minister
Basil Jardaneh, Minister of Finance
Hussein Hammami, Jordanian Ambassador

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 12, 1992, 12:00 - 1:05 p.m. EST
The Residence

The President and King Hussein met for lunch at the Residence at 12:00.

The President: His Majesty and I go back a long time. I am delighted to have him here. We have a genuine friendship. As I said, I want to look forward. I am glad to see the Prime Minister. Let me begin by asking Secretary Baker to discuss the peace process. (U)

Secretary Baker: You’ve seen the testimony I’ve given. Without Jordan there is no peace process. Right now we are still facing the question of venue. We are hoping that the Arab delegations will give us a list of ten sites. Our goal is to move the
bilateral closer to the region. Also, I told both the
Palestinians and the Syrians at the end of the last round that it
would be very counterproductive to place the bilateral on hold
pending the Israeli elections. The Arabs would make themselves
responsible for a suspension. I hope the idea has been
abandoned. I hope there will be another round of bilateral in
the first half of April. On the multilateral, Jordan's
participation is key. We may be making some progress here with
the Syrians. The Palestinians seem to understand they made a
mistake by not attending Moscow. The multilateral can promote
progress on the bilateral. We intend to hold five working
groups in early May. The Arabs do not give anything away by
participating. Overall, progress is slow but the parties are at
least engaging in substance. The Palestinians may have missed an
opportunity in the last round by tabling their own plan for
statehood and not engaging Israel's proposal. It was even more
counterproductive to give their plan to the PLO who made it
public at the UN. But overall we are not discouraged. We knew
it would be hard. But even Syria and Israel are talking about
what UN Resolution 242 means. (\)

President: Does Jordan have views on the process? (U)

King Hussein: As regards venue, we hoped for some progress
before it would be changed. It might be easier to have the talks
in or near the area however. We will present alternatives if you
still feel it would be helpful. We already suggested Iceland for
example. (\)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: Do you want negotiations to be
outside the United States? (U)

Secretary Baker: We have no strong views. The Syrians think we
want to change the venue so the patient would not die in our
hospital. (\)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: What people fear is that if the talks
are not here in Washington, it will lead to less U.S.
involvement. (\)

Secretary Baker: We have said all along that our involvement
will not be affected by the venue. We have not weighed in a lot
thus far because we want to save our chips for major substantive
issues. I told the Syrians that they want the U.S. involved but
they are not helping by not giving us a list of alternative
venues. (\)
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The President: I don't see why the place makes so much difference. (☞)

Secretary Baker: It doesn't. (U)

King Hussein: The place shouldn't make a difference. We will give you a list. (☞)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: It is reassuring to the Jordanian people to have the talks here. The U.S. is in the best position to influence people if they are here. Notice, I am not using the word "pressure". (☞)

Secretary Baker: It hasn't paid off yet. (U)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: The real question is Israeli motives. They don't accept the need to withdraw from territory. They say the Jordan River is their eastern boundary. (☞)

Secretary Baker: But the Palestinians say they must have a Palestinian State. My sense is each side is just staking out a maximal position. (☞)

King Hussein: We predict it will be slow going given the position of the current Israeli government. We see that Labor is prepared to talk to the Palestinians separately. The possibility of a Labor government in Israel has stimulated a dialogue between Jordan and the Palestinians. There is an ongoing dialogue about the objectives. We've come across this before in discussions on UN Resolution 242. We've stated the possibility of minimum order rectification if necessary. You know our position on Jerusalem which the U.S. has not accepted. In our view, the holy places in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth should have a special status. We want to clear up this point. We need to pull together. I'm faced with different Palestinian attitudes on the part of those inside and outside the territories. In 1972, we discussed three options: an independent state, federation with Jordan and confederation. We need to know what the future of Jerusalem and Palestine will be. (☞)

Regarding the multilaterals, we believe in them. The problems facing the region are not only those created by 1967. There are many claims from before then, from 1948. We need to figure out how to deal with the question of people. We need to deal with refugees as part of the equation. There are more than 300,000 who were essentially expelled from Kuwait. Without peace there is not enough room and not enough resources for all the people

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and their needs. There are many other issues as well. Jerusalem is an area of great confusion. Israel had part of Jerusalem before 1967; the Palestinians are determined to pursue the peace process. We are caught between opposing forces. (☞)

Secretary Baker: Jerusalem is obviously the hardest issue. The President spoke of settlements to you during the one-on-one. Regarding the participation of Diaspora Palestinians, I will only say it took us a long time to come up with an approach to this issue. For an interim arrangement, it makes sense for the Palestinians to be from the occupied territories. We see a difference when it comes to final status. At Moscow at the multilaterals, we told the Jordanians we would try to work something out regarding the Diaspora Palestinians and some working groups.

King Hussein: We went to Moscow as Jordanians and not as a joint delegation. Being with the Palestinians is difficult for us. For example, we were never responsible for Gaza. We are not responsible for the historical disaster of the Palestinians. But I see a positive change. Many of us in Jordan in the past looked to Egypt, Syria or the others. Now the majority of us realize we must rely on ourselves. Historically, Jordan was overruled by other Arabs regarding Palestinian issues. It is quite a lot to ask Jordan to carry the burden of Palestinians. (☞)

President: Changing the topic somewhat, is there a clear perception that a Labor government would be easier? Or do you think it would be better with Likud using the "only Nixon could go to China" parallel? (☞)

King Hussein: We have no strong feeling, one way or the other. (U)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: There is a general perception that Labor would be better. But Labor was in power in 1967 and it was Labor that started settlements. So there would not be overwhelming enthusiasm if they got back in. (☞)

The President: I ask the question precisely because of that history. I understand the Israeli need for security but Palestinians have their rights too. (☞)
King Hussein: We need to get the Israelis out of their fortress mentality. We need to build something positive. It is possible just as it proved to be in Europe. The people in the Middle East yearn for peace and security. (Ø)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: All the people of the area would benefit from peace. (U)

Secretary Baker: I saw an interesting statement out of Israel acknowledging that UN Resolution 242 means territory for peace but saying it was fulfilled when the Sinai was handed back. (Ø)

Mr. Ross: That is the standard Likud position - that territory for peace has been taken care of. It is not the Labor position. (Ø)

King Hussein: The problem though is Gaza and the West Bank. Likud's statements just poison the situation. (Ø)

Mr. Ross: In the last round with Jordan, the Israelis signed up for UN Resolution 242 in all its aspects. But each side is probing and fencing. Once we are out of the Israeli political cycle, we should learn more. People on all sides could be more willing to act if they have a better sense on where we are going. (Ø)

King Hussein: Informal discussions are fine. But we need to know how we will deal with the Palestinian issue. For us, UN Resolution 242's meaning is worked out in the Security Council Resolution; to try to reinterpret it would not be acceptable. We don't want to reopen a debate on what UN Resolution 242 means, but a quiet dialogue, by all means. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Abu Jabir: There may be more room with Labor to talk. But how much, God only knows. Likud is quite adamant. (Ø)

King Hussein: This will be the case prior to the Israeli election. We will have to keep the talks going for the long term. (Ø)

The President: We need to keep people engaged. (U)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: Is there any chance of progress before the election? (Ø)

Secretary Baker: It will be difficult. But this is not an argument against meeting. (Ø)
Prime Minister Bin Shaker: The Palestinians may not come, but Jordan would. But I worry about the reaction of our people if there is no progress. (C)

Secretary Baker: One thing that could be achieved if the Palestinians would come is that the two sides could put down in one column where they agree on a self-governing authority. The process has to start somewhere. The Palestinians tabled their plan and that was it and then they gave it to the UN via the PLO. Instead, they could start a real dialogue with the Israelis about the powers under the self-governing authority. (C)

Adnan Abu Odeh: The Palestinians and Jordan are trying to reach a new relationship. This could be important. We need to meet with the Palestinians and try to understand their objections to less than a Palestinian state. (C)

The President: Another subject is Qadhafi. From our perspective, it could come down to confrontation. Has there been any progress? (C)

Secretary Baker: None. (U)

The President: This may cause us problems in the Arab world but the case against the Libyans is rock solid. We need to get the UN resolution implemented. Qadhafi should cut his losses. I’ve been thinking of this and its impact on public opinion and the fundamentalist problem in the Arab world. (C)

King Hussein: This is a problem. (U)

The President: I am not suggesting you have any influence over Qadhafi, but then who does? We talked to President Mubarak about this. (C)

King Hussein: Are there not suggestions that the two people be sent out somewhere? (C)

The President: We will only accept the jurisdiction of the UK or the US. We are not just creating evidence here. To the contrary, it was originally thought the [censored] were behind this. (C)
Mr. Gates: We've had a very thorough investigation by both the CIA and FBI. We have evidence and we have witnesses. (\textit{\textsuperscript{2}})

King Hussein: We have no doubts. (U)

Pleasantries exchanged as lunch ended.