

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs (Notetaker)  
Ralph Johnson, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs  
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister  
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.  
Frank Elbe, Director of the Foreign Minister's Office  
Perry Notbohm, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: October 3, 1991, 4:00 - 4:30 pm  
AND PLACE: Oval Office/Roosevelt Room

The President: How is everything going, Hans-Dietrich? (U)

Foreign Minister Genscher: In the end, I am confident we will be able to achieve European Economic and Monetary Union and also European Political Union. (S)

The President: I wanted to mention one thing that is a very high priority for me. I am very worried about the Uruguay Round. Can you give it a push, Hans-Dietrich? Is there anything that the United States should be doing on our side that we are not doing? We have to get progress in the GATT negotiations or else we are going to end up with trade blocks and trade barriers. I know this is bad for the United States, and I assume you think it's bad for Germany as well. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Yes, Mr. President, I agree. This is crucial. We will do what we can. We will use all of our influence. I know that you understand that it is not up to us; it is a matter for the 12. But it is not even easy for us. (S)

The President: It's not easy for anybody; it won't be any easier for us than it is for you. But the lesser developed countries are counting on a GATT agreement. We have to keep after the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 12958,  
AS AMENDED 8/21/09  
2000-0429 F 110

French. I realize that Mitterrand has problems with his farmers. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: We all have farmers. (U)

The President: Tell me about it. I've heard however that we are slightly more optimistic. Is this true Brent? (S)

General Scowcroft: Well, we heard the Chancellor indicate his strong commitment, and we've also heard that Mr. Dunkel is going to advance a proposal for compromise. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: On this day of celebration of German reunification, I want to express our deep gratitude, Mr. President, for everything that the United States has done for Germany over the many years and also what you did during our 2+4 negotiations. Your stance will never be forgotten. I left Eastern Germany in 1952. I have with me people from my hometown of Halle. We are all grateful. (S)

The President: You have been very generous in your remarks about America's role and about what this Administration has done. We are very pleased to have helped. I have been touched by what you have said. (S)

What is your latest thinking on the Soviet Union? (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Gorbachev and Yeltsin agree that they must try to keep a majority of the Republics together. But, I am afraid that their agreement might not go much beyond that. Yeltsin believes that the Union should be just a kind of coordination mechanism. My own view is that the Union ought to provide a common foreign, defense, and economic policy. But, I have my doubts as to whether or not the Republics will agree to this. (S)

One thing we can do in the face of all of this difficulty is to give the Soviets some kind of a framework for continuing to participate in Europe and also to prevent the Balkanization of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. We should emphasize the role of CFE in this regard. For the Central and East Europeans, the EC can do a lot. Germany is advocating a much more forthcoming stance on the part of the EC. We recommend full associate membership and then full membership, but we have to convince our partners. (S)

We are facing the third historic challenge since the end of the second World War. The first was after Europe was destroyed, the United States made the decision to stay in Europe through the Marshall Plan. This was a most decisive moment. Second, when the Soviets pursued relentlessly the arms race and tried to split the U.S. from Western Europe with missiles aimed at Western Europe but not at the United States, we stuck together and went forward with the double-track decision. This was the second decisive moment. Third, we now have to decide how to help

Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We cannot let them fail. ~~(S)~~

The President: We are reasonably pleased with the initial Soviet response on our arms control initiatives. You could help by urging them to meet our challenge. We continue to watch for the possibilities of the Yeltsin/Gorbachev rivalry. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Genscher: Your nuclear initiatives are historic. You have provided a basis for new peace order in Europe based on cooperative security. Yeltsin is in favor of eliminating these weapons. He and others are very concerned about proliferation and with good reason. Thank God, there are no nuclear weapons in Yugoslavia or you could imagine what an acute situation we would have there. ~~(S)~~

The President: We are worried about Yugoslavia. Scowcroft and Eagleburger are suppose to be our two leading experts in the United States Government, and they don't know what to do. ~~(S)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Scowcroft thinks we ought to bring back Tito.

The President: It doesn't look like a ceasefire will hold. We want to be supportive of you. We aren't doing much ourselves. What else can be done? ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Genscher: Lord Carrington will try again for ceasefire and for new political negotiations. We need to offer negotiations looking toward independence for these republics in order to give them the possibility of leaving, we ought to offer them the right to leave but only if they accept the responsibility to protect minority rights. I have encouraged them in this direction. With such a possibility open to them they might hold off on unilateral action to achieve their independence. We have to be given hope of reaching independence through negotiations. There is a strong public opinion in favor of slipping in Croatia and Germany. You have many Croats and Serbs living in Germany. ~~(S)~~

The President: Do they live peacefully? (U)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Yes, they do. Which goes to show that the real problem in Yugoslavia is not between Serbs and Croats but between their leaders who are causing all of these historic hatreds to resurface. ~~(S)~~

-- End of Conversation --