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<tr>
<td>07. Memcon</td>
<td>Re: Three-on-Three Meeting with President Mikhail Gorbachev</td>
<td>7/31/91</td>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
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<td>[FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (8 pp.)</td>
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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Meetings Files
Subseries: Memcons/Telcons Files
WHORM Cat.: 
File Location: Memcons/Telcons (January - December) 1991 [3]

Date Closed: 8/4/2009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #: 
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AR Case #: 
AR Disposition: 
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Appeal Case #: 
Appeal Disposition: 
Disposition Date:  
MR Case #: 10-0533-MR(501)
MR Disposition: Released in Part
MR Disposition Date: 5/17/2011

Restriction Codes

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2294(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a](5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
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Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By [Signature] on 9/16/13
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Three-on-Three Meeting With President Mikahil Gorbachev

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Foreign Affairs Advisor

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 31, 1991, 10:55am - 2:55pm
Novo-Ogarevo, USSR

President Gorbachev: I want to welcome you in this very Russian setting. This is a landmark -- where the Russian spirit resides. (Kohl said he felt he was in a Cathedral) (U)

The President: What shall we talk about? (U)

President Gorbachev: Jim and Alexander have had discussions. Perhaps we should hear from them. Let me refer again to my basic theme. While there have been big gains in politics in recent years, there are problems still to which we must give attention. Our relationship now allows us to channel these problems in desirable directions. The things which have worked in our relationship should be developed. (ześ)

Also, we are still developing new approaches and new concepts of strategic stability. In the past strategic stability used to relate only to military aspects of [the relationship]. Now it should be different. This is a new situation. We no longer think in terms of power relationship and confrontation, which gives us a broadened perspective. Looking especially at Europe, there is considerable stability, and we should keep this in mind. Both ethnic and religious elements are newly important. (ześ)

It is very important to stimulate the democratic nature of the changes taking place. Authoritarianism is gradually departing. Our actions are stimulating this movement. (ześ)

The President: Exactly. (U)

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
President Gorbachev: The question is how to keep these processes along the right lines, and not let them become dangerous. Some of these have far-reaching implications, and we should discuss [them]. We can't avoid seeing new centers of power developing. Europe is unifying. Nordic, Eastern Europe would like to enter it. If we don't combine this with the CSCE process, we will miss something important. If we don't, we will see a European center which will create problems for overall European integration. We need overall Europe which will let us solve many problems. (☞)

We have done good work together in Africa. We should think about what is next -- like South Africa. We shouldn't do separate things at cross purposes, but work together. Also we must bear in mind the factors of China and India. They are preparing initiatives with ????. They are ancient nations, seeking a breakthrough in ????. life(?). So far we both have had responsible attitudes towards China -- no China card. (☞)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Gorbachev: We will not allow any policy which would distort the strategic balance. We would welcome your China relations returning to normal. I was there during student problems. I was in the soup, but played it cool. I was sorry for what happened to Zhao Ziyang. He provided balance. I told ???. ??? PRC had entered a new road which would not be easy. The student response was generally negative. (☞)

Jiang Zemin (?) came here recently. He told me of a talk with Carter, who lectured him on human rights. He told Jimmy, "...we are lucky to be able to feed and clothe one billion people." Why raise this? Because China is special. (☞)

Another point. Baker recently went to ASEAN. Another symbol of the ???. The impressions of our people at that meeting were that many countries in the region are concerned over the economic expansion of Japan. [One hears terms like] Japanese Empire. They believe at the end the Japanese won't be content with simply economic power, but will want military power as well. It will continue to cooperate with the U.S. military, but take advantage of it for its own purposes. (☞)

But that's not all. The problems of resources, water resources, environment, population explosion. What is the role of our two countries in this changing world and how to build our relationship? (☞)

I conclude that our decisions about reform are correct. Tactically, I conclude we should ???. ? ???. to move into a period of stability. There will be no ideological constraints or dogma restricting me in how to move. Problems of our state and building the economy and top priority. U.S. leaders can be our judges. (☞)
[Gap- notetaker leaves for a moment]

The President: In this changing world, we feel comfortable with a strong, economically powerful, changed Soviet Union. We are more confident of your intentions and knowing how to get where you want to go than when we came. We are confident of your desire to be a useful participant in this changing world. Your intent to change, but without chaos, is something we are very comfortable with. (☞)

Your ??? ??? with Europe. We may have emerging problems with Europe, but will stay involved. We will stay with CSCE process. We tell Europe we want in on T.O., not just ????. (☞)

On Africa, any moves you make toward de Klerk would be good. Mandela is in a time warp, and the ANC is behind changes in the world. Mandela salutes Castro, Khadafi. If you can bring him into the real world -- that is all to the good. I am convinced de Klerk is trying to do real things and should be supported. (☞)

I, too, worry about S. Asia, also about keeping things on an even keel with the PRC. Feelings on Taiwan are still strong. We won't try to play the China Card. I will keep contact and try to help them move forward. We will barely succeed on MFN. (☞)

On India and China, I would hope the Soviet Union could work on India on nukes with respect to Pakistan. Pakistan has lied to us, but they have a point. India won't talk with them about it. (☞)

Secretary Baker: India is holding out on the 5-point initiative. (☞)

President Gorbachev: We can discuss specifics a little later. (☞)

The President: There is concern in Asia about Japanese imperialism. We haven't worried much about that yet. It would help if you could work out the northern territories. There is a lot of anti-Japanese feeling in the U.S. If you could engage with their economy, it would discourage militarism. (☞)

These are just a few points. But we are confident of your intentions. We see your problems in the way Yeltsin conducted himself at dinner last night. We want to interact on your reforms to be more helpful. (☞)

President Gorbachev: Our thinking goes basically in the same direction. How should we build our relationship from this
analysis? Let’s turn to specific areas and start with Alex and Jim. (2)

Secretary Baker: ASEAN worries not only about Japan, but China and India. I don’t have a sense the Japanese are interested in a military role. ASEAN sees our security relationship with Japan as a way to restrain them. Like U.S. forces in Europe constraining Germany. (2)

President Gorbachev: Let’s discuss the interaction in the Gulf, Middle East, and Arms Control and proliferation. With arms reductions, the pressure to sell arms abroad grows. Also Yugoslavia. (2)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: On the basis of the June 1990 communique we agreed the Defense and Space Talks would resume September 30. These talks would continue on the basis of the mandate of 1985. We agreed tentatively that arms control consultations should start in early October. (2)

President Gorbachev: We believe this is important because it lays down the next steps. (2)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: One small point in phasing down of Soviet heavy missiles. The U.S. wanted a statement offering that in a letter that has a legally binding effect. This is our intent. (2)

President Gorbachev: Did you discuss how to deal with other members of the nuclear club? Should our approach change? (2)

Secretary Baker: No. (U)

President Gorbachev: We should discuss at the foreign minister level or at consultations. (2)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: In other areas of arms control couldn’t we set a date for the resumption of nuclear testing talks? We wanted to wait for results of TTBT. We raised ?????? in E ???, but the U.S. insists it is first discussed within NATO. (2)

We discussed BW in light of the exchange of letters and agreed to meeting of experts. We would like a Soviet visit immediately following the meeting of experts. Also, would like the experts meeting before the US says it is possible. (2)

The President: These meetings are very important. We have a big difference on this and we must get to the bottom of it. This is the way to do it. (2)

President Gorbachev: We want total clarity and to be totally honest on this. When the U.S. experts come, let’s have the same group so we don’t have to start over again. (2)
General Scowcroft: We will make sure at least some will be the same. (S)

President Gorbachev: We would like the U.S. to ?? the date for our visit to the U.S. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: On arms control, the U.S. proposed two working groups -- deterrence and predictability to identify a possible U.S. and Soviet role. The second looks at aspects of proliferation, WMD and nuclear technology. (S)

President Gorbachev: I support it. (S)

The President: OK. (U)

Secretary Baker: Also importance of trying to conclude CW this year. We made new proposals on challenge inspections. Down only to this issue. One problem is to deal with your problems on CW destruction. (S)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We are closer to a convention on CW. U.S. has abandoned some of its positions. We will focus on challenge inspections. We wanted universal inspection rights, but are examining the U.S. proposal. (S)

President Gorbachev: I have approved the proposal on CW destruction and the Cabinet is discussing it. There is a problem on sites and dates by which this must be completed. We have a young democracy. Our "Greens" have forced us to close 1300 factories. One of these made parts for the whole country. So where to put it is a big problem. (S)

The President: We took ours to Johnston Island, and all hell broke loose. (S)

Secretary Baker: There are three other issues: We should conclude the Open Skies Agreement. We agreed to work bilaterally on this. (S)

Two, we need to complete the CFE Treaty by March of 1992 if possible, that being the date of the Helsinki Conference. (S)

Three, you have sent a summary letter leaving out the question of SS 23's in Eastern Europe, which is now a political issue. You have provided it in a very difficult way. (S)

President Gorbachev: OK. (U)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We have begun moving on Open Skies. Our positions are getting closer. We have received the NATO suggestions. We have prepared a response, which is awaiting Gorbachev's approval. (S)

Things are moving well on CFE 1A. (S)
We have prepared materials on the SS-23 and will provide it before you leave. (§)

President Gorbachev: What about the Middle East? (§)

Secretary Baker: This is an area you can point to as a partnership -- not just cooperation. We both have been working hard and that is the reason for the present possibilities. There are still many hurdles ahead. (§)

I just concluded a talk with Shamir. He seems to have accepted our approach. There will probably be qualifiers: Knesset approval, Palestinian representation, assurances from the U.S., a promise not to move the process into the UNSC. We -- as you probably know -- have been asked for assurances to Palestinians. We won't change our policy positions and we cannot. The President has asked me to go to Israel tomorrow to try to get Shamir to accept our proposal. (§)

President Gorbachev: Arafat sent me a letter. It has six points. (§)

Secretary Baker: We have been asked the same. Each side wants a guaranteed outcome. We can't do that. We have worked out a statement for the President. (§)

The President: Would you tell us how you see Arafat now? (§)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: I met with him two months ago. There are differences within the PLO Executive. It is true that Arafat's position is weaker, but without him the PLO won't take a position. (§)

Secretary Baker: To get Israel to the table we must agree on transition arrangements, that East Jerusalem won't be represented, and the PLO cannot sit at the table. They can call the shots, but from the background. (§)

We're building a number of links for the Palestinians to make obvious that they are not abandoning their claim to East Jerusalem. If Jerusalem gets up front, the peace process is dead. (§)

President Gorbachev: The press will try to draw us out and separate us. (§)

Secretary Baker: Correct. You can say you are engaged jointly on the peace process and won't be drawn out on Palestinian issues. (§)

President Gorbachev: We can say this paper is our position. The process will lead to a just and comprehensive peace. (§)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: Just a word on the conference itself. We the think the two presidents should issue the invitation. We are working on a text. It contains a framework.
for the conference. The conference should be opened by the two presidents. Venue: compromise place in Europe. (S)

Secretary Baker: Maybe Oslo. (U)

President Gorbachev: This day and issues could be a milestone. (U)

The President: I hope so. We worry about Israel’s response. (S)

President Gorbachev: Tell them we are preparing a resumption of diplomatic relations by the time the conference starts. (S)

Secretary Baker: Before? (§)

President Gorbachev: Maybe on the same day. They say that when you’re walking in Tel Aviv you think you’re in Moscow. (§)

Secretary Baker: It is important that the Palestinians not give Israel an excuse for not participating. We have to keep East Jerusalem out of the public debate. (S)

President Gorbachev: I understand. (U)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We’re trying for a joint statement on Yugoslavia. We haven’t made it yet. We think it would be easy based on the EC Foreign Ministers’ meeting -- territorial integrity and unity. (§)

Secretary Baker: Let me summarize. The EC has taken the lead and we are following. Van den Brock says the last 1/2 of the statement is a problem. The specific reference to territorial integrity and unity will split the EC because of differences developing within the EC. (S)

President Gorbachev: Especially between Germany and the rest. (§)

The President: We could issue the first half and in questions each could amplify. (§)

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh: We have supported territorial integrity. (§)
SECRET

Secretary Baker: But not alone. Both can say they stand behind Berlin, but avoid buzzwords -- territorial integrity and self-determination. Let's go with things we can agree on. (☞)

President Gorbachev: Let me make a general comment. I told ???? that dissolution of that state, even partially, could begin a chain reaction of great danger. There are so many territorial disputes around. Within the Soviet Union people didn't even notice our internal frontiers. As soon as nationalism appears, they claim borders going back to Alexander the Great. Byelorussia wants back the territory given to Lithuania when it joined the Soviet Union. If Lithuania goes, Klaipeda also. If it is all given back, what would remain? Eastern Estonia is settled mainly by Russians (Ukrainians also). As you can see I felt this topic in my skin. Also Poland, Bulgaria, Transylvania. (☞)

The President: Slovakia. (☞)

President Gorbachev: So we must keep the issue in ??????. Kohl asked me, what about self-determination? I said there is no contradiction. We have to keep self-determination within a country, in the constitutional framework. That is my attitude to the Baltics. Everything -- the economy, ?????, politics, ethnic is mixed. Therefore there must be a process to disentangle. Therefore in paragraph #2, the first phrase remains. (☞)

-- End of Conversation --