
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.


IRAQ

3. THE SYG SAID THE UN HAD "TECHNICAL" DIFFICULTIES IN SENDING IN UN POLICE OFFICERS UNDER RESOLUTION 687, AND THAT THE IRAQIS HAD REJECTED ANY UN POLICE PRESENCE ON THEIR TERRITORY. HE CONTINUED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED FOR...
THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF UN PERSONNEL IN IRAQ. HE SAID THAT THE US, UK AND FRANCE SHOULD SEEK AN EXPLICIT MANDATE FOR A UN POLICE FORCE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. THE PRESIDENT PAID TRIBUTE TO THE UN FOR ITS HISTORIC ROLE IN THE GULF CRISIS, NOTING THAT THE UN, BY ENHANCING ITS PEACEKEEPING FUNCTION, HAD ENHANCED THE ENTIRE ORGANIZATION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE US WANTS TO GET OUT OF NORTHERN IRAQ, THAT THE US WENT SOLELY OUT OF HUMANITARIAN CONCERN AND BECAUSE ONLY THE US COULD PUT FORTH THE EFFORT NEEDED. THE PRESIDENT VIEWED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE KURDS TO COME DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAINS AND BACK TO THEIR HOMES AS A POSITIVE SIGN. HE ADDED THAT WHILE THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAD NOT DONE EVERYTHING ASKED OF THEM, THEY SEEM TO BE BEHAVING THEMSELVES. THE PRESIDENT ASSERTED THAT NO NEW RESOLUTION IS NEEDED TO AUTHORIZE A UN POLICE PRESENCE, THAT SUCH A FORCE FALLS UNDER THE HUMANITARIAN MANDATE OF RESOLUTION 688. THE PRESIDENT, STRESSING THAT OUR ACTIONS WILL NOT BE DICTATED BY BAGHDAD, ADDED THAT WE WILL CONSIDER A NEW RESOLUTION, IF ONE BECOMES NECESSARY.

5. SECRETARY BAKER STRESSED THAT WE NEED TO BALANCE THE NEED TO ESTABLISH SECURITY AND PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AGAINST THE RISK OF A VETO OVER CONCERNS WITH INTERFERENCE IN IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE SYG REPLIED THAT SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN WOULD BE CONSULTING THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES WITH THE GOAL OF SEEING WHAT THE UN COULD ACCOMPLISH WITHIN THE MANDATES SET BY THE CURRENT RESOLUTIONS.

6. THE PRESIDENT TURNED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 687, OBSERVING THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE IRAQIS HAVE ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMPLIANCE. HE NOTED THAT ELIMINATING IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT THE US WOULD REMAIN VERY TOUGH ON SANCTIONS.

7. UN U/SYG SPIERS SAID THAT WHILE ANY CHANGE IN THE SANCTIONS REGIME COULD BE VETOED, THE SANCTIONS REGIME COULD DETERIORATE OVER TIME, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SEE A PROBLEM IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. UN CHEF DE CABINET DAYAL INTERJECTED THAT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON WMD TO IRAQ AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, MR. SPIERS ADDING THAT THE TASK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT SET BY RESOLUTION 687. SPIERS SPECULATED THAT ONE OTHER DIFFICULT PROBLEM WOULD BE SETTING THE PERCENTAGE OF IRAQ'S OIL REVENUES THAT WOULD GO TO THE
COMPENSATION FUND. THE SYG SAID HE COULD NOT RECOMMEND A PERCENTAGE UNTIL AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK. U/SYG FLEISCHAUER CLARIFIED THAT THE SYG WOULD ONLY SET A CEILING, AND THAT THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE WOULD DETERMINE THE EXACT PERCENTAGE.

EL SALVADOR


9. THE SYG AGREED THAT THE RECENT AGREEMENT REACHED IN MEXICO WAS IMPORTANT, AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AGREED WERE EXTREMELY HELPFUL. THE SYG PROTESTED THAT MANY VIEWED THE UN AS THE FMLN'S SPOKESMAN, WHEN THE UN WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO ACCURATELY CONVEY THE FMLN POSITION. THE SYG CONTINUED THAT U/SYG DE SOTO ENJOYED HIS COMPLETE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

10. DE SOTO ARGUED THAT THE TASK AHEAD WAS EXTREMELY COMPLEX, AND THAT THE FMLN HAD AGREED TO TAKE A NUMBER OF ITEMS OFF THE TABLE UNTIL THERE IS A CEASE-FIRE. IN ADDITION TO PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO PRESERVE THE MILITARY STATUS QUO, THE FMLN HAD RAISED THEIR DESIRE THAT THE PHASE AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE BE TREATED AS A TRANSITIONAL PHASE, DURING WHICH TIME THE SALVADORANS COULD BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO THE FMLN AS A POLITICAL PARTY. DE SOTO NOTED THAT HE WAS AWAITING THE GOES RESPONSE ON THIS POINT. DE SOTO EMPHASIZED THAT A TIME FRAME COULD NOT BE SET FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS; THE FMLN WOULD NOT ACCEPT A DEADLINE LIKE THAT ADVOCATED BY THE USG IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE UNSC ONUSAL RESOLUTION.

11. IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S QUESTION, DE SOTO
REPLIED THAT THE FMLN SOUGHT AN "OPEN, FLEXIBLE, DEMOCRATIC AND PLURALISTIC EL SALVADOR." HE CONTINUED THAT FMLN CONCERNS WITH THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES WERE ONE REASON THE FMLN INSISTED ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY BAKER, DE SOTO SAID THAT ONE REASON THE FMLN COULD NOT ACCEPT A FIXED DEADLINE IS THAT A DEADLINE WOULD IMPAIR THE ABILITY OF THE FMLN'S FIVE FACTIONS TO CONSULT FULLY ON POSITIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN THE SECRETARY Pressed DE SOTO ON THE URGENT NEED TO MOVE THE TALKS FORWARD RAPIDLY, DE SOTO OBSERVED THAT ANOTHER REASON THE FMLN WAS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT A DEADLINE IS THAT THEY FEARED BEING SET UP FOR THE BLAME IF THE TALKS FAIL. THE SYG CONCURRED WITH HIS DEPUTY THAT INTRA-FMLN RIVALRY POSED PROBLEMS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MEETING THEN ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH.

12. RESUMING THE CONVERSATION OVER LUNCH, THE SECRETARY OPENED BY ASKING THE TWO QUESTIONS. ONE, WOULD THE SYG MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE NEED FOR A CIVILIAN POLICE FORCE IN NORTHERN IRAQ. TWO, WOULD THE UN AT LEAST SET A TARGET DATE FOR THE SALVADORAN NEGOTIATIONS, BEARING IN MIND THAT IT WAS THE FMLN WHO FIRST PROPOSED A DEADLINE, IN MANAGUA. THE SYG DID NOT DIRECTLY RESPOND TO THE FIRST QUESTION, BUT WAS LARGELY POSITIVE. AS TO THE SECOND, DE SOTO OBSERVED THAT THE FMLN DID NOT WANT TO SET A DATE, ALTHOUGH HE HAD APPROACHED THEM REPEATEDLY ON THE MATTER.

13. THE SECRETARY ASKED IF THE UN HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE FMLN WHETHER THEY POSSESSED SA-16 SAM'S. DE SOTO RELATED THAT WHILE HE HAD NOT ASKED THE FMLN DIRECTLY, THE FMLN DENIED HAVING SUCH WEAPONS, CLAIMING THAT SA-16'S REQUIRE AN INFRASTRUCTURE BEYOND THAT OF A MOBILE GROUP LIKE THE FMLN. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT SA-16'S ARE SHOULDER-FIRED, AND THAT THE FMLN'S COMMENTS TO THE UN DO NOT SQUARE WITH OTHER INFORMATION.

BANGLADESH

14. THE SYG SAID HE HAD SENT THE HEAD OF UNDRO, MR. ESSAADI, TO BANGLADESH TO SURVEY THE SITUATION. THE SYG COMPLAINED THAT WHILE A NUMBER OF PLEDGES OF ASSISTANCE HAVE BEEN MADE, THE MONEY IS NOT FORTHCOMING. THE PRESIDENT ASSURED THE SYG THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD.

HUMAN RIGHTS - CUBA
15. THE PRESIDENT Praised the recent decision of the UN Human Rights Commission authorizing a special rapporteur on Cuba. He urged the SYG to make the appointment as soon as possible. De Soto said that it was important the rapporteur be someone acceptable to the Cubans, to facilitate his work. The SYG noted he was working on the appointment of the rapporteur, adding that he preferred quiet diplomacy, and found it more effective.

16. THE PRESIDENT, noting that Venezuelan President Perez saw signs of flexibility in Cuba that the U.S. did not, asked the SYG if there was any hope for democracy in Cuba while Castro remained in power. The SYG was not optimistic, comparing Castro to Saddam Hussein, to which the President added Kim Il Sung and Qaddafi.

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES

17. THE SYG said he supported and followed closely the Secretary's work in the Middle East, and would refrain from any duplication of effort. He mentioned his recent appointment of Swiss Ambassador to the US Brunner as his personal representative under Res 242, and that he refrained from going to the region himself and from asking Brunner to go.

18. THE SECRETARY observed that there was a clear need for UN involvement, and that at a minimum a UN observer should attend the international conference. The SYG said that the UN must have a substantive presence at the conference, not just an observer as at the 1967 Cairo talks.

LEBANON

19. THE SYG said the present situation in Lebanon was terrible and unacceptable. The President reiterated that the U.S. supported full implementation of the Taif accords, stressing that Syrian withdrawal from the Bekaa Valley by June 30 was key.

AFGHANISTAN

20. THE SYG said he favored letting the Afghans decide
THEIR OWN FUTURE, PERHAPS THROUGH ELECTIONS HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES. BAKER SAID THE STUMBLING BLOCK WAS THE SOVIET INABILITY TO PURSUE THE LIBERAL POLICY OF NEW THINKING. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS FOR THE SOVIET MILITARY TO AGREE TO A DATE FOR AN ARMS CUT-OFF, CONTINUED THE SECRETARY. GORBACHEV REALLY WANTED THE PROBLEM RESOLVED, SAID THE SECRETARY.

SOVIET UNION

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21. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SPOKE FAVORABLY OF SHEVARDNADZE, NOTING THAT PERHAPS SHEVARDNADZE COULD BECOME THE FIRST SYG FROM EASTERN EUROPE. THE SYG WAS ON THE OTHER HAND CRITICAL OF YELTSIN.

WESTERN SAHARA/PEACEKEEPING/BUDGET

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22. THE SYG SAID THAT THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED ON THE WESTERN SAHARA MADE HIM HOPEFUL THAT THE REFERENDUM COULD BE COMPLETED THIS YEAR. IO A/S BOLTON REQUESTED THAT THE SECRETARIAT STRIVE TO PROVIDE REALISTIC BUDGETS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, AND EXPLAINED THE STATUS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN TO PAY US ARREARAGES WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM. THE LUNCH ENDED AT 1:15 P.M.

23. THE SYG ALSO MET WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. YY