

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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| Document No. and Type | Subject/Title of Document | Date | Restriction | Class. |
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| 19. Telcon | Re: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on February 28, 1991 (3 pp.) | 2/28/91 | (b)(1) | C |

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RESTRICTION CODES

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
- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on February 28, 1991

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter: Ambassador Bandar bin Sultan
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 28, 1991; 6:58 - 7:19 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: I wanted to call to say how grateful the American people and I are to you, and for all your support. I was very happy to hear of the performance of your brave army. Today, I met with your Ambassador and I told him of our deep friendship. I hope that the enthusiasm of the Saudi people is as strong as that of the American people. We are solidly behind the coalition and all that it has done. I was simply calling to say thank you for the extraordinary cooperation and to congratulate you and your commanders and your soldiers in the field. (U)

King Fahd:



The President: I am grateful for those kind words but we still have work to do. I want to stay in very close touch as we move ahead to cement the military victory and move to the political front, so that Saudi Arabia and the United States remain as close together as we were during the battle. (U)

King Fahd: I can assure you that in Saudi Arabia and with our GCC partners, there is complete agreement that we must have total harmony in the next battle, the political one, so that we can have the same success. (U)

(b)(6)

The President: Permit me a question -- what are the chances of Saddam Hussein remaining in power or what are the chances of him being thrown out by his disillusioned people? (C)

King Fahd: Before this crisis, we knew that the Iraqi people did not support or want Saddam Hussein, but for fear of retribution could not open their mouths. Now, it is a different story and a different reality. This could induce something. (C)

The President: If there is anything the United States can do to have him pushed out, I'd be very interested to hear it. We have no fight with the Iraqi people but I don't see how we can have improved, comfortable relations if he is in power. (C)

King Fahd: That is a fact. I'm confident that the Iraqi people want to get rid of this man. I have hosted a large gathering of Iraqis from all sectors of life in Riyadh now -- all agree that they want to get rid of him. They are outside but they have their connections inside. We are working with them. (C)

The President: Please tell them that there is no bitterness in our hearts for the Iraqi people, we have no quarrel with them. We wish them well in returning Iraq to its people. (C)

King Fahd: Those people believe in their cause and in Iraq, and that it cannot progress with him in charge. All are agreed that Iraq must be rescued; the question is how and when. They represent various cross-sections of society. (C)

The President: There is another point. Your Ambassador came in today and there was some good TV coverage that I hope will be seen there; it was good for us and for Saudi Arabia. I asked him about Jordan, and how you feel. I know that there are great difficulties between you and Jordan, and between the United States and Jordan. We have had a long relationship with Jordan and you have had a long relationship with Jordan. I hope we can go back to a better relationship with a stable Jordan that will not cater to left wing radicals. I want to assure you I know of your country's feelings on this matter. I want to stay in close touch, since someday we will need to support the King or some replacement who is moderate and reasonable. But I want you to know that we will not rehabilitate him prematurely or do anything that will strain relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States on this matter. (C)

King Fahd: I appreciate this and I am watching the situation carefully, weighing all the options taking into account the internal and external situations there. I have ideas and I will share these with Secretary Baker. We are looking at this objectively and for our mutual interest. (C)

The President: I won't press on this open line, but please understand I have had a long and personal relationship with the King. I intend to work very closely with you on what we should do. (S)

King Fahd: I agree. I had the same thing. (S)

The President: Well, I just called to pay my respects. Thank you for the hospitality to U.S. forces and congratulations to General Khalid and the others in the Saudi armed forces. This is a moment of triumph and U.S.-Saudi relations are stronger than ever in history. (S)

King Fahd: I appreciate that. I feel the same way about the strength of our relations -- they have never been this high. All the Gulf states feel the same way. As for the hospitality to your forces, it was our duty. (S)

The President: Thank you, goodbye. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you, goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --