Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet  
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<table>
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<th>Document No. and Type</th>
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<td>21. Telcon</td>
<td>Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Moroccan King Hassan (4 pp.)</td>
<td>2/12/91</td>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
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Collection:

- **Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records
- **Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files
- **Series:** Presidential Correspondence Files
- **Subseries:** Presidential Telcon Files
- **WHORM Cat.:**
- **File Location:** Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Coversations 1/30/91 - 2/22/91

**Date Closed:** 2/4/2009  
**OA/ID Number:** 91112-005

**FOIA/SYS Case #:** 2009-0275-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**  
**AR Case #:** 2000-0429-F(792)  
**AR Disposition:** Released in Part  
**AR Disposition Date:** 8/21/2009

**RESTRICITON CODES**

- **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**
  - P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
  - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- **C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

- **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**
  - (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(6) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(7) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(8) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

**Document Partially Declassified**  
(Copy of Document Follows)  
By (NLGB) on 10/8/10

- **File Location:** Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/30/91 - 2/22/91
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with Moroccan King Hassan (ț)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
               King Hassan
               Interpreter: Alec Toumayan
               Notetaker: John W. Montgomery

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 12, 1991; 3:50 - 4:26 p.m. EST
                      The White House

The President: Your Majesty, how are you? (U)

King Hassan: I'm fine Mr. President, and you? (U)

The President: I'm calling to express my appreciation for your friendship and support in the international effort to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. We haven't talked in a long time and I wanted to call up and ask how things are going on your end. But first a couple points I want to make. From our commanders I hear your troops are making an excellent contribution in Saudi Arabia; the others in the multinational coalition are grateful, and certainly I am, for Morocco's role. I also know this is not an easy time for you or your people. I know of the divisions and difficulties. I was thinking that it might be valuable if we could have a serious exchange of views so that you could hear first hand how I see the situation in the Gulf and where I think we are headed. If you think it would be useful, I ask that you receive Larry Eagleburger, my very trusted right hand man at State, he's the number two there who is close to me personally and a man whose advice and judgement I value greatly. What I have in mind is a private, unpublicized and quick visit in the next several days. He will come to see you and report back to me, so that we can exchange our views in confidence, out of the public eye. I have ask Mr. Eagleburger to bring highly classified intelligence to show you the effectiveness of what has happened so far. If the idea has merit from your end, I would like to ask you to share with him your ideas on other countries in the region. I ask that you make suggestions and give him ideas he can bring back directly to me. (¢)
King Hassan: Did you read Saddam Hussein's latest speech? (U)

The President: I'm not sure which one you are talking about. I think I saw a summary but not the whole speech. (U)

King Hassan: His message in it is that "I am ready to negotiate an Arab solution but with no prior conditions." What does it mean Mr. President? Perhaps it means I am ready for an Arab solution, but as to conditions, I am to fulfill prior to that, I would be able to grant this at the end of negotiations. That is how I understood his message. I met his deputy prime minister today and asked him that question. I ask him if that is how he would translate Saddam's speech and he said yes. I am giving this to you as an element for your own reflections. As I said earlier, the decisions have been made and the die is cast. (~)

The President: I hope you understand a couple points if I might reply here. (U)

King Hassan: Yes. (U)

The President: In the first place, the U.S. is not there to settle some past differences. They are there under the UN mandate, twelve resolutions having spoken loud and clear. Please let me assure you that I understand exactly what you are telling me about the role of Moroccan troops and I am glad you clarified that to me. (~)

Secondly, I am inclined to discount most offensive personal rhetoric coming from Baghdad but I'm more determined that ever to fulfill the UN mandate and I think most of the other countries with whom we are allied in this cause feel the same way. In other words, I listened to the speech without an Arab insight but I heard nothing about withdrawal from Kuwait. Therefore, there can be no conditions and no pause until that time. (~)

King Hassan: Basically, Mr. President, we are exchanging impressions, right? (U)

The President: Right. (U)

King Hassan: I believe we are pretty much in the same position as we found ourselves near the end of World War II when, having declared that nothing short of an unconditional surrender would suffice, the war lasted 6 - 7 months longer. We are discussing history. This could very well be a discussion between two professors of history. In any event, be that as it may, Iraq must get out of Kuwait. I have said it and it is my public stand. (~)

The President: Yes. (U)
King Hassan: My only problem is not the Iraq-Kuwait problem but an Arab-Israeli conflict that still needs to be settled. That is the real issue, it must be settled or otherwise it will be very serious. I believe, Mr. President, in historical terms this is the number one issue that awaits you and only your true friends can tell you. We have been friends for a long time. We were friends long before you became president.

The President: Exactly. (U)

King Hassan: And when we began this friendship, I personally had nothing to gain. We became friends because you believe in what you are doing. You are a man of rectitude. And then of course there is Mrs Bush, a great lady, full of charm and a wonder person. So I feel I can speak in all personal candor.

The President: We recognize our special role in what comes after Iraq withdraws from Kuwait. I have mentioned that the only difference, and I feel strongly about it, the only problem is I don’t think Saddam Hussein can justify taking Kuwait with the Israel-Palestinian problem; they are not related. Let me say, I appreciate your willingness to see Larry Eagleburger and I hope you will share your thoughts on the post Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with him. We already are looking at that. Larry Eagleburger is familiar with my thinking on it. I am anxious to hear your thinking. This war won’t go on much longer. I say that not with machismo but because I am confident that our forces will prevail quickly when and if we move to a ground campaign.

It is essential to make clear to our Arab friends we don’t want a ground presence of U.S. troops in the area as Iran thinks and Saddam Hussein accuses us of wanting to do. In any event, Larry Eagleburger will be prepared not only to share intelligence with you but also to discuss this most important phase you raised with me. That is my responsibility and I will face up to it.

Lastly your majesty, I can’t tell you how much I appreciate what you said about our friendship. It is very important to me personally and we shall never forget your kindness to us and to my family before I became president.

King Hassan: Mr. President, this is only so natural because friendship is not like temperature. Temperature goes up and down. Friendship remains constant.

The President: Frankly, I regret very much the pressures with Jordan. I also have a friendship with King Hussein, but it is regrettably being strained by his recent actions. I can empathize with him, there are tough strains on him but I understand. I will not let this interfere with our relations after the war.
King Hassan: Mr. President, I was very happy to talk to you. I want to ask you extend my kind greetings to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: I will tell her. She's out seeing the families of some of our troops this afternoon. I will convey your regards and I am sure she will be touched by your kind words. (U)

King Hassan: I will wait to be contacted by your ambassador to make arrangements for the arrival of your envoy. (U)

The President: Thank you very much and I can't tell you how much I appreciate our having this conversation. (U)

King Hassan: I appreciated it as much as you. (U)

Good byes.

-- End of Conversation --