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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister

Felipe Gonzalez of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez

Adrian Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Barbara Phillips (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME January 11, 1991 11:07-11:21 a.m.

PLACE: Camp David

The President: Felipe, can you hear me all right? (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, very well. (U)

The President: I am out in the woods here at Camp David. I had a couple of things I had in mind I wanted to tell you. I wanted to give you an update on the Middle East, but let me begin by thanking you for your wonderful cooperation. (3)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thank you. (U)

The President: I just spoke with Jim Baker a couple of hours ago en route to Damascus. His talks with Mubarak, King Fahd, the Amir of Kuwait and the other Gulf Coordination Council leaders have gone well. That part of the coalition is holding together strongly. On the Baker/Aziz meeting, I want you to know that there was no hidden agenda. There was no progress and no flexibility on their part. In terms of the UN Secretary General's mission to Baghdad, he was here at Camp David last weekend and we had two further talks by phone after the failure of the Baker/Aziz meeting. He is carrying no new secret plan with him. He is just telling Saddam Hussein -- trying to convince him -- that he should fully comply with the 12 UN resolutions. (8)

Jim Baker appreciated his conversations with your Foreign Minister in the EC context. (\mathscr{S})

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: I expect that one and maybe both Houses of the U.S. Congress will vote to back my resolution on the Gulf during the next few hours. My opinion is that Saddam Hussein is still misreading the intentions of the President of the United States that he must leave Kuwait. I think that he still thinks that we

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will not use force and that, even if we did, he could postpone a withdrawal. (\mathcal{S})

My last point is that I am still somewhat hopeful that he will get the word and decide to withdraw from Kuwait rapidly. But I am not optimistic that he will start a rapid withdrawal. If he does not, I feel obliged, as a fundamental part of the coalition, to force him to leave Kuwait. (%)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Obviously. I would like to know if any measures are being taken to convoke a meeting of the UN Security Council if Iraq moves to begin withdrawal. (%)

The President: There is no plan for such a meeting, but I guess that, if he started to move, then there would be grounds for a meeting. (3)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: But the UN Secretary General will have to inform the Security Council once he returns from Baghdad. (8)

The President: Exactly, but I don't know if he plans to do so in a meeting. When Resolution 678 was approved, it was understood that this would be the last meeting unless Saddam Hussein starts to withdraw. (5)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I understand. Are there any plans for any mission after he returns from his trip to Baghdad, which I don't think will be successful? Are the French undertaking a mission? (\$\mathbeloa\$)

The President: I know of no definite plans for a mission. I have been in close contact with Francois Mitterrand and he has no specific plans. I know the EC has been talking about one. Gorbachev called yesterday, and he is considering one if the Secretary General's mission fails. But there is nothing definite, nothing that I am sure of. (3)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I want you to know that, as my Foreign Minister said, you can count on our cooperation. We must ensure that the coalition has sufficient cooperation. (%)

The President: You are very nice to say so. Thank you very much. Many thanks, my friend! (3)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: If you will excuse me for adding one point, I believe it is true that Saddam Hussein harbors a hope that he won't be attacked. But we should not dismiss the possibility that at the last minute he will make a statement of withdrawal, probably with conditions in order to permit him to save face. If so, I want to ask that we maintain an open line of communication and consult in order to coordinate our response.

(5)

The President: I think that is fine. I think we should do that. Goodbye, and thanks for the conversation. (8)

-- End of Conversation --

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