## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

Telcon with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey

(U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Turgut Ozal, President

Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME

December 28, 1990, 10:45 - 10:56 a.m.

AND PLACE:

Camp David

The President: Hello! How are you? (U)

President Ozal: Fine, thank you, George. How are you? (U)

The President: I am fine, Turgut. I am just calling to wish you a very happy new year. I hope you are able to get a little rest. I have no real news out of the Gulf -- nothing on the diplomatic front that you don't know about. I keep reading in the press that Saddam will make some concession, but so far I see no change. Do you? (())

<u>President Ozal</u>: No. If we keep the faith, that is the best course. If you look at their faces -- of their Minister of Information, for example -- you can see they are worried. (?)

The President: Please don't be disturbed about U.S. press reports concerning readiness. Don't worry. We will be ready for what we have to do. There are no plans to delay. (2)

<u>President Ozal</u>: I am not worried about it. I keep taking a hard line on Saddam Hussein. That's why I am getting criticized in our papers. (2)


The President: Because of your decisiveness and vision, Turkey is emerging as a leading player, commanding wide respect and wielding great influence. I know you have concerns about NATO's deliberations concerning ACE Mobile Force deployment. (2)

President Ozal: Yes. Germany's delay will harm our Government's
position. (2)

The President: If Kohl had not been surprised, the matter would be settled already. We are in touch with the Germans at the highest level. I am monitoring the situation closely. If you need my intervention to produce a positive decision, I will be glad to do it. We will do what we can to ensure that outcome.

## SECRET.

Declassify on: OADR



DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED BU 0/29/2009 SECRET 2

<u>President Ozal</u>: I already talked to Kohl. I said, look, we wanted the AMF not for military reasons but to show solidarity to Iraq, together with the U.S. and NATO.  $(\mathscr{E})$ 

The President: What did he say? (2)

<u>President Ozal</u>: He said it was because the news came before there was a decision in NATO. It leaked to the papers. I don't know how -- perhaps in Brussels.  $(\mathcal{L})$ 

<u>The President</u>: I think it will work out. I just wanted you to know that I have been briefed personally on this. I know this would send a strong signal to Iraq.  $(\mathcal{L})$ 

<u>President Ozal</u>: We are sending more troops to the border area.  $(\cancel{\mathcal{E}})$ 

The President: I am grateful for that. Also, on the question of your military and financing requests, we will share some initial thoughts with you after the first of the year, in the first week of January. I want to see common ground before our meeting.  $(\mathscr{E})$ 

President Ozal: Are you coming in February? (£)

The President: I don't know. They still want a summit, and we want to go forward. We are thinking of a February 11-13 time frame. We told your Ambassador here that we would like to wait until mid-January before announcing the visit publicly since there are a number of events which might delay a trip to Moscow. I'll be back in touch on this. (2)

<u>President Ozal</u>: Another point: I talked to Kohl and learned they are trying some contact to Saddam Hussein. (%)

The President: What kind? (2)

<u>President Ozal</u>: He told me that Saddam Hussein will pull out. I think there are some special channels. (3)

The President: That's interesting. I didn't know about that. He thinks Saddam Hussein will pull out? (%)

President Ozal: He thinks there is a quite a big possibility. I am not so sure. (%)

The President: I'm not, either. (2)

President Ozal: Maybe he believes that because public opinion in Germany doesn't want a war. But in recent days I saw some changes in their faces in Iraq. They are starting to get the message. We will know by early January. (8)

The President: The worst would be a partial withdrawal. (8)

<u>President Ozal</u>: They could divide it into two parts: the Basra part -- the islands and oil fields -- and Kuwait. They may say

SECRET



we will pull out of Kuwait but keep Basra, which is historically ours. (5)

The President: I don't like that. It would fray the coalition. We will see. It will be a very interesting time period. Let's stay in close touch. For now, let me wish you a very happy new year.  $(\mathscr{C})$ 

<u>President Ozal</u>: Same to you and your wife. The very best for 1991! (U)

The President: The same to you, my friend. I can't say how much
I appreciate your support and determination. (U)

-- End of Conversation --