Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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<th>Document No. and Type</th>
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<td>10b. Telcon</td>
<td>Telephone Conversation with PM John Major of Great Britain, December 21, 1990</td>
<td>12/21/90</td>
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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Haass, Richard N., Files
Subseries: Working Files
WHORM Cat.: File Location: Iraq - December 1990 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows),
By ______ on 9/26/13

Date Closed: 11/8/2007

FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0099-F
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #: AR Case #: 1998-0099-F/3(236.01)
AR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date: 7/28/2003

MR Case #: 2005-1150-MR(236.01)
MR Disposition: Released in Part
MR Disposition Date: 9/13/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
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(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister John Major
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Brent Scowcroft, NSC, (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME: December 21, 1990;
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The Prime Minister: I want to make clear there will be no change in British policy in the Gulf. Margaret Thatcher's views were those of the Cabinet. Saddam Hussein has to go. If he doesn't there will be no realignment of power in the Middle East, and the price that we will pay in the future will be terrible. (S)

The President: How does your public review this? (S)

The Prime Minister: The public support is good now. But they are worried about a long campaign. It will soften then. The Parliament's position is strong and will remain so. (S)

I wish we knew what the prospects were for a good campaign. Will Baker go see Saddam Hussein? (S)

The President: Right now I would say no. (U)

The Prime Minister: If Saddam Hussein withdraws, that is not the end of it; that might be the worst-case scenario. There are a few of what we consider the major points for discussion. (S)
The President: Let me respond. I totally agree with your last point. I am convinced that the best option is a prompt, quick campaign. All of our Arab friends say that Saddam Hussein is a pushover. But we must not assume that that is the case. If we must join in pulling the trigger, it should be quick and might end and without a single soldier crossing the line. The air strike would be devastating. He has never fought without control of the air. On your question about environmental damage from attacks on his chemical and biological capabilities, we will target our attack so as to incinerate them and we will avoid civilian targets. (Ø)

I am not worried about General Waller’s comment. We should send Saddam Hussein a confused message. (Ø)

My own sense is that we should go sooner rather than later. Maybe we should discuss that. U.S. public opinion is divided. We are not in too good a shape; the action that I take will not be predicated on consent of Congress. I know my neck is on the block. I will not wait to see which way the political breeze is blowing. I want you to know that I am solid and will do whatever we have to in January and February. If he hits Israel, I told Shamir to let us respond. If we see Saddam fueling his rockets in the Western desert, we will treat this as a provocation. Our Arabs have said they will stay with us if this happens. If Israel attacks, I still think we will be okay. (Ø)

The Prime Minister: What would you do if he said he was withdrawing. We fear this is likely. Then after saying he would withdraw he would drag it out, maybe even reverse it; but he would get a lot of public sympathy. (Ø)

The President: This is why I am worried about a Baker trip. Saddam Hussein has not gotten the signal. (Ø)

The Prime Minister: If we get our people out, maybe that will give him a signal. (Ø)

The President: Another problem is all the Soviets still in Iraq. Another, how do we trigger an attack? We need 72 hours notice. We need a way to communicate between us. This involves Mitterrand also. I haven’t completely thought this through. I was thinking as far as Mitterrand is concerned, I could call him or send someone to talk to him. I think he will be with us if we approach him correctly. (Ø)

The Prime Minister: (Ø)

The President: I have not sensed an unwillingness to use force on Mitterrand’s part. (Ø)

The Prime Minister: (At this point the President and the
Prime Minister discussed various possibilities for a consultation and talks either involving Baker or the EC or both. (☞)

The President: What if we moved on 0300 hours on 16 January? That would avoid all of his efforts to obfuscate. (☞)

The Prime Minister: (To Charles Powell) Do we have to declare war? (☞)

Charles Powell: No. (☞)

The President: Let me tell you where we are on that question in the United States. I would like to get a Congressional resolution supporting the UN resolution -- if I was sure I could get it but I am not sure. (☞)

The Prime Minister: We need to anticipate what needs to be done and when. Do I need Cabinet approval? (☞)

Charles Powell: No, not in advance. (☞)

The Prime Minister: We will probably clear out the Embassy during the 6-10 of January. (☞)

-- End of Conversation)