# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

**George Bush Library**

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<td>06b. Memcon</td>
<td>Meeting With President Mubarak of Egypt, November 23, 1990 [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (8 pp.)</td>
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**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Haass, Richard N., Files  
**Subseries:** Working Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** Iraq - January 1991 [12]

**Date Closed:** 6/15/2006  
**OA/ID Number:** CF01584-021

| FOIA/SYS Case # | 1998-0099-F | Appeal Case #: |  
| Re-review Case #: |  | Appeal Disposition: |  
| P-2/P-5 Review Case #: |  | Disposition Date: |  
| AR Case #: | 1998-0099-F/4(33.01) | MR Case #: |  
| AR Disposition: | Released in Part | MR Disposition: |  
| AR Disposition Date: | 9/13/2011 | MR Disposition Date: |  

**Restriction Codes**

- (b)(1) National security classified information ([(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency ([(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute ([(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information ([(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(5) Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ([(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM...Removed as a personal record misfile.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mohammed Hosni MUBARAK, President
Osama el-Baza, Political Adviser

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 23, 1990
Kubbeh Palace, Cairo

President Mubarak: Osama is reporting that Iraq seeks peace but only with Saudi Arabia and without pre-condition. (Ø)

The President: Gorbachev told me Saddam Hussein said he would get out completely but needed access to the Gulf. Iraq said that was a condition, but Gorbachev said no. (Ø)

Mubarak: Saudis will never agree to situation and negotiations with Saddam Hussein. (Ø)

The President: Maybe with UN resolution will make him see reason. (Described our UN strategy.) (Press comes in.)

Mubarak:

The President: It can't go on. We will go through the UN bit but we are moving more forces in. We will have over 400,000 well trained troops in there. (Ø)

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Mubarak: I warned the Iraqi Ambassador about this. Primakov told me he has no idea what he’s facing. (☐)

The President: I asked you what Assad meant when he said no forces would move out of Saudi Arabia. Let me speak frankly. When we did the Egypt debt, there were questions why do this when we don’t forgive farmers’ loans. Same with the Gulf. Why should Americans carry the whole burden. I was asked yesterday and said this is the price of leadership. But every time something like Assad statement happens, it makes my job tougher. (☐)

Mubarak: (☐)

The President: We will have to go into Iraq to get the Republican Guards. (☐)

Mubarak: (☐)

The President: Can you tell us what King Hussein is up to? I told you of our cancellation of our meeting. Can he survive? Do we want him to? (☐)

Mubarak: (☐)
The President: Do you think he (Saddam) had talked to Jordan and Yemen about attacking Kuwait? (C)

Mubarak:

The President: Where do we go from here with King Hussein? If he goes, I fear radicals will come in. (C)

Mubarak: 

The President: You think it is good that we didn't meet with him. (C)

Mubarak: 

The President: Is he under big pressure at home? (C)

Mubarak: Not so much. (U)

The President: Can you influence Salih on the UN resolution? (C)

Mubarak: 

The President: The hostage issue can be very important -- and the Embassy could be a provocation. I am worried about that and the King doesn't speak up about either the embassy or hostages. (C)

Mubarak: 

SECRET/SENSITIVE
The President: What is the chance Saddam Hussein will be knocked off? (C)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: What would happen? (U)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: Almost like Ceaucescu. (C)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: How are the Palestinians coming? The PLO? (U)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: Is Arafat coopted by Saddam Hussein? (C)

Mubarak: Not in his pocket. He is getting back on the fence. An invasion of Iraq would take at best two weeks. They would all see they are losing. They counted on a blitzkrieg. (C)

The President: How about you calling Iraqi Ambassador in to say I have never seen George Bush like this. This President is serious, his troops are ready, he will take any steps necessary to get him out. (C)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: Troops are good. Trained and ready. (C)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: Why when Iraq controlled the air couldn’t they punch out Kharq Island? (C)

Mubarak: (C)
The President: What do you want to ask me? (U)

Mubarak: I was in Libya. (U)

The President: My man Qaddafi. I still think you’re wrong. (U)

Mubarak: [redacted]

The President: Jallud is #2? (U)

Mubarak: [redacted] (U)

The President: Does he believe you? (U)

Mubarak: I was with him a week ago. Gave him some background. (U)

The President: I don’t want to doubt you, but it is tough. We still worry about Rabta. (U)

Mubarak: [redacted]

The President: Do you think he will? Assad we think is getting better. Are he and Qaddafi close? (U)

Mubarak: [redacted] (U)

Brent Scowcroft: [redacted] (U)

Mubarak: [redacted] (U)

The President: [redacted] (U)
Mubarak: I want to see Mengistu.

The President: We're down on him. (U)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: Want to talk about Israel? Shamir is a difficult man. Peres is much broader. (F)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: Shamir has been pretty good regarding the Gulf. But he's afraid he'll be left out of new world order. They are not provocative on the Gulf. But if Saddam Hussein gets desperate and uses the missiles against Israel, what would be the reaction of the Arabs? (F)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: I agree if we hit first. What I mean is if he tried to provoke. (C)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: If a rocket went into Tel Aviv, wouldn't it be better if US responded? (C)

Scowcroft: (Described his talk with Arens) (C)

Mubarak:

Scowcroft: (C)

Mubarak: (C)

The President: (C)

Mubarak: (C)

SECRET/SENSITIVE
The President: We have little faith in Primakov. (C)

El-Baz:          

The President:  

Mubarak:        

The President: Kohl made a different statement -- two of them. We think France is OK. (C)

Mubarak:        

The President: I had dinner with Mitterrand. He indicated he would support a resolution. We don’t know about Command and Control. With Great Britain it is great. We need to have common procedures. What is status of Egypt’s forces? (C)

Mubarak:        

The President: How about Command and Control? (C)

Mubarak:        

The President: What about Lebanon? (U)

Mubarak:        

The President: The French are upset that Aoun can’t leave. (C)

Mubarak:        

The President: Back to Qaddafi. I have great faith in you but I am worried. (C)

Mubarak:        

The President: What will he do if we attack Iraq? (C)
Scowcroft: We have another problem with Qaddafi. Pan Am 103 (Discussed) (S)

Mubarak: (S)

The President: It is very sensitive but will see what we can give you. (U)

Mubarak: (S)