Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No. and Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>10. Memcon</td>
<td>Re: Bilateral Meeting with King Fahd (6 pp.)</td>
<td>11/21/90</td>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 11/13/90 - 12/21/90

Date Closed: 1/27/2009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #: 
P-2/P-5 Review Case #: 
AR Case #: 2000-0429-F(279)
AR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date: 8/21/2009

OA/ID Number: 91108-003
Appeal Case #: 
Appeal Disposition: 
Disposition Date: 
MR Case #: 
MR Disposition: 
MR Disposition Date: 

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor’s deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
Bilateral Meeting with King Fahd

DATE: November 21, 1990
LOCATION: Meeting Room, Royal Palace
TIME: 11:05 p.m. - 12:57 a.m.

SUBJECT: Minutes of Bilateral Meeting with King Fahd (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. Participants
THE PRESIDENT Baker
Secretary Freeman
Ambassador Freeman
Governor Sununu
General Scowcroft
Marlin Fitzwater
Paul Wolfowitz
John Kelly
Richard Haass

Saudi Participants
King Fahd
Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud;
Deputy Prime Minister
Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz
Al-Saud, Sec. Dep. PM and Min. of Def. and Avn.
Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz
Al-Saud, Minister of Interior
Prince Saud Al-Faisal,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
His Excellency Hisham Nizir,
Minister of Petroleum
Prince Bandar bin Sultan
bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud,
Ambassador to the United States

King Fahd: Mr. President, saying "welcome" is not enough to show our gratitude in welcoming a friend like you with our other friends. Our feelings are so strong, starting back to when FDR and Abdul Aziz established relations. The relationship has improved in strength and quality over the years. Of course, now we are facing an extraordinary situation and this extraordinary aggression is the most astonishing thing that has happened since World War II. Just in our wildest dream it never occurred to us that Iraq would betray Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, acting in the night despite its pledges. The astonishing thing is that this began normally and then built up fast. I dispatched (Foreign Minister) Saud, who was told by the Iraqis this was just an exercise. It all seemed so believable, so reasonable. We have discussed the matter with President Mubarak, and he was told the same thing we were; he received the same assurances we had.

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
2000 - 0929 - F
PR 8/21/09
Prior to the invasion, all Kuwait-Iraq dialogue ceased to exist. And when President Mubarak was there, he encouraged everyone to restrain dialogue. Saddam agreed to do so; ironically, he said he’d only accept Saudi Arabia as a venue. I was also very surprised over his choice of Saudi Arabia to have a dialogue with Kuwait. At the time, I was trying to figure out why; later on I learned. Since Mubarak was in the middle of it, we spoke, and I agreed to host the dialogue. They arrived here within an hour of one another. Crown Prince Abdullah received both of them. It was amazing; the ambiance - after five minutes, the atmosphere seemed to be improving. Then they went for negotiations, which they wanted to have without anyone else present. Then the delegation heads, the Crown Prince of Kuwait and Vice President of Iraq, decided to meet one on one. After two hours alone, they were joined by their delegations. It looked to us like things were going well; after, they dined with me. So I asked the Crown Prince of Kuwait, "have you come to an agreement?". He told me he was ready to discuss all the details. He informed me that the Iraqi Vice President told him that he lacked the authority to discuss everything, but that they could resume in Baghdad in three days (Saturday) and then again three days later in Kuwait. I, as their host, did not want to second guess; I said we’d support whatever they agreed to.

Both delegations left Saudi Arabia with fairly encouraging signs. By 1:00 a.m. we’d all been alerted to the invasion of Kuwait. It was very shocking to us. This makes us ask why several months ago Saddam Hussein requested a non-aggression treaty with the US. I am very surprised that Saddam insisted I sign a non-aggression pact. I told him it was unnecessary but he insisted. He told me he wanted a Saudi Arabia-Iraq pact to set a precedent in the Arab world. This did make me a little suspicious. I could not at that time believe this was simply something to calm us and set the stage for the invasion of Kuwait. All this raises the question of why Saddam insisted to Mubarak that the Iraq-Kuwait dialogue take place in Saudi Arabia. We thought it was just because he trusted us. Since the invasion, I am convinced that everything that happened before August was a deliberate plan to tranquilize us. He achieved this, but by so doing, he broke any confidence between us. He obviously miscalculated grossly; that once he invaded Kuwait he would create a new reality the world would live with. The international response proves this. He had made a mockery of the law; he is paying for his grave miscalculation. No doubt in my mind the swiftness and massiveness of your response shocked him totally. He found himself in a situation that is not only embarrassing for him but also very delicate. One sign that he is off-balance is that in a few hours, he returned to the 1975 agreement with Iran and gave up everything he’d fought for for eight years. I don’t want to
Otherwise, how can you explain things? I have no doubt that the next target would have been Saudi Arabia. We watched Saddam Hussein on TV insisting on meeting with you or me. That is strange. To have a dialogue on what? Naked aggression requires no dialogue. He must leave without preconditions. He deserves no other dialogue. In conclusion, I want to welcome you one more time, and leave the floor to you. One more word, I want you to know that I’ve been watching your schedule of travel; please forgive us, we’ve gotten used to a late night schedule. This is why we’ll understand your need for a early night.

President Bush: Thank you for your understanding. May I first express our appreciation to everyone on the Saudi side and especially you for this welcome and hospitality. I am confident we’re solid in terms of being on the same wavelength and strategy to attain our mutual objectives. We totally agree that there can be no compromise or partial solutions. It wouldn’t surprise me for Saddam to seek these. I’m convinced support for our policy in the U.S. is essentially strong despite stories to the contrary. Reservations expressed to date are to military action, not to UN resolutions. The objection we have is we don’t want another Vietnam; there are no comparisons in my view. But I must make this more clear. Also, most Congressmen understand preserving a military option is needed. I understand you’ve graciously agreed to receive four Congressional leaders who will be visiting here. Of those, both Foley and Mitchell are of the opinion we should stick with sanctions for as long as it takes for them alone to get Saddam out of Kuwait. But it is important they know time does not run on forever. I am concerned over the difficulty of holding this coalition together over time.

As you know, we’ll be going to the UN before the end of the month hoping to get a resolution using all means necessary to get Saddam to comply. This will be an important move for us to get international support. I can assure you both Gorbachev and Mitterrand will be on board. We’re having talks with people we don’t have cordial relations with. We feel as enthusiastic about Cuba as you do about Yemen; both have votes. We must talk to them, but we’ll send no wrong signals to either. Our Cuban-American community will be up in arms over any talks, but we need strong support for this UN resolution. If the UN effort fails, and we don’t think it will, we’re still prepared to proceed on Article 51 basis, which may require a new request from the Amir,
something I mentioned to him tonight. We're not getting hurt for
time; we're showing a substantial amount of progress here, as
time is not hurting us now. The more support there is visible
from other countries, the better it is for the world and American
support. I am told were having fine cooperation between Saudi
officials and General Schwarzkopf. This is critical, especially
if force is used. I raised this with the Amir of Kuwait, that
the more Kuwaiti forces available, sends a good signal to others.
As your Foreign Minister knows, there are voices in the United
States that say we've done enough and others should do more now.
To which I say, world leadership requires we do more than anyone
else. This is a responsibility that goes with being a world
leader, a world leader prepared to stand up and do what is right.
Last, I want to thank you for the financial assistance you've
provided to other countries and to the U.S., and to encourage you
to discuss with us future requirements as we head into 1991.

I want to conclude by saying that we've never been more
determined. We will prevail. There's an awful lot at stake here
and around the world. We're going to stand with you and get this
man out of Kuwait. One additional point. The status quo ante is
not satisfactory, because as we've seen, Saddam's, chemical,
biological and nuclear efforts make it clear that the status quo
ante is not good enough. We need safeguards for the future.

King Fahd: This is exactly the logic that is the correct and
ought to be done. We believe strongly that if Saddam is left
unchecked, his threat will spread. We totally concur with your
views and support you. I totally agree with you; if we accept
status quo ante, there is no guarantee in two years he won't
repeat his aggression at a time he will have much greater
weapons. We must not enter this with the rationale of cleaning
up Kuwait, but use the opportunity to clean up his unconventional
weapons.

President Bush: We must also avoid giving Saddam the opportunity
to save face. You don't give face saving to a kidnapper or
rapist or murderer. I worry that others in their desire to have
a peaceful outcome might compromise.

King Fahd: We agree one hundred percent; we call those who come
with such suggestions as the agents or apologists of Saddam. It
makes no sense for someone to suggest giving him a face saver.
There is no justification. Anyone who favors it is either
brainless or an agent.
President Bush: If Saddam gets the message he may be attacked and needs to act, we’ll hear a lot more about face-savers and would-be face savers from Jimmy Carter to Primakov.

King Fahd: I’m convinced that as long as the US and Saudi Arabia stay together, others will stay on track. If anyone tries such maneuvers, they will only succeed if we are wavering. We should send all such people to Baghdad. I get very upset over such people. The bottom line is that as long as we stick together, all will fall into place.

Secretary Baker: Someone asked whether the lawsuit filed by Congressmen is a problem. We don’t think it will be; it is a political issue and we hope the courts will not present us with a problem. But all of this is related to congressional concerns. The UN resolution we are seeking will help us manage domestic politics. Then we can argue that the world community is supporting, and the President and Congress should as well. But as Bandar knows, they will then argue we are bearing a disproportionate share of the burden. But we can win this argument if we can point to a number of Arab forces that will be committed to any conflict. Having a large number of Arab ground forces will make a big difference. They have to be willing to be involved in all phases of a military operation, including against Iraq.

King Fahd: We have requests we are now accepting. We can get more people on the ground. We can increase Arab and non-Arab.

President Bush: We can talk to the CINC about that. But forces that are willing and able to fight would be helpful.

King Fahd: This is the point. We just don’t want people to show their flag.

President Bush: Assad’s comments that his forces were unwilling to go on the offensive created problems for us.

King Fahd: I agree. (U)

President Bush: Mubarak said such statements are just for local consumption.

King Fahd: Possible, because I’m convinced Syria is looking for an opportunity to finish off the Iraqis.

President Bush: All I’m saying is that the more non-US forces that are willing and able to fight, the better.
King Fahd: I agree. It is too late to start re-thinking. Whatever we say must be tailored to help us with public opinion — or keep quiet.

End of expanded meeting. One-on-one commenced.