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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Ozal of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
James A. Baker, Secretary of State  
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
David C. Gompert, Special Assistant to the  
President for European and Soviet Affairs  
(Notetaker)  
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State  
for European and Canadian Affairs

Turgut Ozal, President  
Yildirim Akbulut, Prime Minister  
Ahmet Alptemocin, Minister of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME November 20, 1990, 1:45-2:45 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Kleber Center, Paris, France

The President: Turkey and the United States stand side by side. No one else could be closer than you have been. No ally has been stronger in support of the United Nations. We are grateful for Turkish leadership and support for the steadfast principles that we believe in together. Jim Baker told me about the details of his conversation with you when he was in Ankara. The floor is yours. (S)

President Ozal: I talked to Vice President Quayle about Iran. They want better relations with the United States. They are also afraid of the radicals in Iran. They would like to talk about the frozen assets bilaterally instead of at The Hague. I am talking now about Rafsanjani. (S)

As far as the hostages in Lebanon are concerned, Iran is prepared to move only if there is movement on the three Shi'ites who are in the hands of the Israelis. (S)

Iran is firm on the embargo. There is some smuggling taking place along their very long border, but this is not a matter of Iranian policy. (At this point, the President left to take a call from Egyptian President Mubarak.) (S)

Secretary Baker: As far as the Security Council is concerned, notwithstanding the press play you've seen recently, we are actually pleased. We don't know where the Chinese are going to

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come out, but we think that that's the only major country in the Security Council that is still an unknown. The Soviets want further talks but we are reasonably comfortable that they will come out all right. All other countries that we have contacted have said that they will vote "yes". At a minimum, we have 9 votes, but we don't want any of the major Security Council members abstaining. (S)

President Ozal: Don't exclude Yemen. They may come along. (S)

Secretary Baker: The problem with Yemen is that the Saudis are trying to resolve all their disputes with Yemen instead of just focusing on the Gulf. Do you have any influence with Yemen? (S)

President Ozal: We have talked to a former Prime Minister of Yemen with whom we are close. Yemen is going along with the embargo. They say they were misunderstood at the beginning of this crisis and they are also unhappy with the Saudis in part because the Saudis have pushed 1 1/2 million Yemenis out of Saudi Arabia. (S)

Secretary Baker: Our position is that we all ought to focus on solving the Gulf problem now. We should bear in mind that the Yemenis are the only Arab country on the Security Council now, so their vote could be helpful. (S)

President Ozal: What about the Chinese? (S)

Secretary Baker: They will probably abstain. We think that they will not veto. (S)

President Ozal: Do you think the Chinese would come along if they knew that there was a timetable involved in the implementation of the Security Council resolution? (S)

Secretary Baker: They and the Soviets are interested in a timetable approach. We are still planning to try to have a resolution by the end of this month. (S)

President Ozal: I spoke with Mitterrand today. I said it is important for us to send a strong message. This idea of people going to Baghdad -- European parliamentarians and the like -- it sends a very bad message. The problem is that Saddam Hussein's own people won't tell him that he has made a mistake. (S)

(The President returned to the meeting.)

The President: Mubarak wants me to see Assad on my way back to the United States from the Middle East. Maybe I'll meet him in Geneva. I didn't like a recent statement by Assad in which he said that Syrian forces will only act to defend Saudi Arabia and nothing more. Of course, Mubarak told me to discount that; that the Syrians will attack. (S)

President Ozal: Rafsanjani said that Iraq will collapse when the war begins and that chaos will result. The Syrians may attack in

the northern part of Iraq. This is a possibility. Iraq will be destabilized with the Shi'ites Iran planted in the south and serious instabilities in the north. Rafsanjani has no objection to military intervention, though they might say otherwise in public. Rafsanjani says that Iran won't attack Iraq, but I have my doubts about this. Iran claims that Iraq owes it \$300 billion in war reparations. I think Iran wants the oil islands in the Gulf instead of the \$300 billion. I therefore think they will go after these islands if there is a war. (S)

With regard to the three questions that Secretary Baker raised with me when he was in Ankara: (S)

First, it is OK to use Turkish airfields consistent with the following conditions. Turkey can be used only as a staging area. I am talking about Incirlik in particular. If a war breaks out, you can use Incirlik for support. You should talk to us through military-to-military channels about this. We can use a Turkish NATO Ace Mobile Force Exercise as a cover for moving 50 or 60 planes into Incirlik. (S)

Second, at the same time as that NATO exercise, Turkey might make further troop movements to the Iraqi border. We would want to know in advance if you expected hostilities to begin. We would then decide whether you could use Incirlik not only for support but for offensive operations within one or two days after hostilities begin. Saddam Hussein must go. (S)

Third, as for sending Turkish troops to Saudi Arabia, I have doubts. I'm concerned that it will give Saddam Hussein reason to doubt whether Turkey will attack from the north. My other reason for having doubts is that Turkey is an ex-power in the Arab world because of its Ottoman history. It may not be wise for us to be in an Arab country preparing for conflict with another Arab nation. (S)

This is my response to your three questions. (S)

The President: This sounds very good. (U)

Secretary Baker: Yes, it's very supportive. The most important thing is for you to move substantial forces in the north. (S)

The President: Does Saddam Hussein really think that we will act? Does he think we will use our air power? He needs to understand that we will use force. (S)

President Ozal: Perhaps in February you should see how the sanctions are working. You have the option of staying on the defensive after that knowing that eventually the sanctions will work. (S)

The President: We cannot leave our troops out there forever. (S)

President Ozal: This war will be a very short war. Your air

power can do it. I think it is possible for you to minimize your losses. (S)

You should know that prices in Baghdad are so high that they can't take this forever. Everything is too expensive. There is a 30-fold price increase. The big problem is going to be military spares. Saddam Hussein has no money because he has no oil revenues. (S)

The President: Is Iran enforcing the sanctions? (S)

President Ozal: Yes, they are, but it is hard to stop smuggling along such a long border. But, the little bit of smuggling that is occurring won't make a big difference for Iraq. (S)

The President: We will need to persevere. I don't sense that there is any real erosion in Europe yet. (S)

President Ozal: It is important to keep firm. My impression is that Mitterrand is still firm. (S)

The President: I still think that there is strong support in the United States. There is opposition in the United States, but it is divided. Half thinks we are not doing enough and half thinks we are doing too much. But we're not going to let our policy be decided by a public opinion poll. (S)

The press says that the Soviets are not with us, but I think that we will be OK with the Soviets. (S)

President Ozal: The Soviets have many relations with Iraq. This is not an easy problem for them. They will want to give Saddam Hussein another push before there is a war. (S)

The President: We think we'll be all right with the Soviets. (S)

President Ozal: It would be very helpful for us if in Egypt you supported our sale of F-16s. (S)

We just started getting relief from the Saudis for our oil. We are getting relief on 175 thousand barrels per day. It is going to be free until we get to over a billion dollars. They just stopped billing us yesterday. (S)

The President: The Saudis are a bit slow. We have come to realize this. But we won't hesitate to lean on them. (S)

Secretary Baker: We don't have 1991 contributions to the front line states nailed down yet. The first tranche of commitments is set: \$10 billion overall -- \$2 1/2 from Saudi Arabia, \$2 1/2 from Kuwait, \$1 1/2 from the UAE, and \$4 billion from Europe and Japan. (S)

President Ozal: We are thankful for this and we are also thankful for the progress on textiles. (S)

Secretary Baker: We will remember to raise with Mitsotakis when we see him tomorrow the question of the fourth EC protocol. (S)

The President: Should I meet Assad in Cyprus, perhaps at the UK base? (S)

President Ozal: It's better that you do not do that -- not in Cyprus. (S)

Incidentally, Assad is a good friend of mine. (S)

The President: Could we meet Assad at an airport in Turkey? We've got some real problems with Assad. He says he is not supporting terrorism but we are not sure. (S)

President Ozal: Assad is much more clever than Saddam Hussein. He has friends. He gets resources from the Gulf Arabs and others. He has been in power a very, very long time. He is very bright, and he is the arch enemy of Saddam Hussein. (S)

Secretary Baker: Do you know the Malaysian Prime Minister? (S)

President Ozal: I've met him. (U)

Secretary Baker: He is the only Moslem on the Security Council other than Yemen and therefore we need Malaysia. (S)

General Scowcroft: With whom should we follow up on what we've discussed today? (S)

Foreign Minister Alptemocin: I'm responsible for foreign relations so you can follow up with me. (S)

President Ozal: On military-to-military matters, you should follow up with the Turkish Chief of Staff. (S)

-- End of Meeting --