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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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2000-0429-F
SCS 6/6/13

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
of the United Kingdom on October 12, 1990 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of UK
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow

DATE, TIME October 12, 1990, 7:06 - 7:15pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Fine. Have you had a difficult week?
(U)

The President: A little bit. Sorry to bother you. I'm calling about the UN resolution. Yesterday I called Francois and he agreed to change the French position so it would be the same as the US, UK, and Soviets. We felt they had been holding up the resolution, the British draft. He agreed to change their view. Now the nonaligned countries are stalling. They want to put forward a different resolution. I was hoping you could encourage your representative in New York to use the power of President of the Security Council to move this forward procedurally. (ϕ)

What worries me, and I talked to Mubarak about this today, is that the Arab nonaligned and Saddam and the PLO want the Security Council to go mix up Israel with the Gulf. If the nonaligned motion goes in, it will keep the Israeli matter on the same level of concentration as the Gulf. What we think should happen is this: Get a resolution -- it does use the word condemn, a big step for us -- and get it over with. My appeal, if your comfortable, is to get your representative to do everything he can procedurally to get the nonaligned to vote on the US, British, and Soviet agreed text. (ϕ)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Is it our text? (ϕ)

The President: Yes ma'am. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I understand that David Hannay thinks he can get our text, which is not perfect, as a compromise. The worst outcome would be for you to veto a resolution. Just before

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you telephoned, I was informed that Hannay thinks he can get the UK resolution taken first. (Ø)

The President: That's what we want. I heard from Jim Baker that the US and the UK are on the same wavelength. We need to have that resolution taken up first. We should not be reluctant to push hard and bowl over the nonaligned text. It needs a shove now. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Hannay should be willing to do that. He would be the first to appreciate the supreme difficulty of your position and that the vital thing is to get ours taken first. Once it gets through, then the nonaligned one won't come up. I heard there were still differences with you over our text. But if it's ok, then fine. (Ø)

The President: Hannay thinks we disagree? (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I thought it had to do with working on the Secretary General's terms of reference. Some strange argument that may not have reached your ears. (Ø)

The President: It certainly has not reached my ears. Jim told me -- and, by the way, he wanted to call Hurd, so that I wouldn't have to bother you, but Hurd was on his way to Egypt -- that the UK and the US were together. The nonaligned had a different vision for the Secretary General's mission. Their text would have the Secretary General stay involved in a way to keep the issue on the active agenda of the Security Council and mix it up with the Gulf. That would be bad for us. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: The nonaligned approach is difficult indeed. We'll get on to Hannay. You accept the UK resolution and you want that one to be put forward procedurally because we're chairman and can probably do that. (Ø)

The President: If Hannay thinks we have a difficulty then I should go back to Baker. I told Mitterrand yesterday, with Baker standing next to me, that there were no differences between the US and the UK. (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I heard it is so persnickety and so tiny as not to bother about it. I understand there is still some argument about the Secretary General's mission, whether it should report conclusions or its recommendations. My instinct is, it doesn't matter which it is, we can rely on the Secretary General to do the right thing. (Ø)

The President: If you feel comfortable calling him again, the main thing is to get moving on the UK text. If there are differences, he and Pickering should work it out. The main reason I was calling was to get the nonaligned (Ø)

Prime Minister Thatcher: There are no differences between us at all. (Ø)

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The President: If it goes to a vote, we've got enough working now with Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Yemen, and now France to make it pass. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'll get to Hannay. We shouldn't bother about these tiny things. It sounds like a typical UN argument. I'll get Hannay to use our procedural advantage to take the UK resolution first. (S)

The President: Next week maybe I'll call and give you the overall picture on where we stand. I sent you information on the weather thing. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Certainly. I'll get on to Hannay. (U)

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