**Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet**  
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**Date Closed:** 1/27/2009  
**OA/ID Number:** 91108-002

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**RESTRICTION CODES**

- **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**
  - P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
  - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**
  - (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
  - (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(6) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(7) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Raymond G. H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff
Sim Smiley, Interpreter
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.
Vieri Traxler, Ambassador to the U.N.
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Advisor to the Prime Minister
Pio Mastrobuoni, Head of the Press Office, Office of the Prime Minister
Carla Lonigro, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 1, 1990, 4:30-5:00 p.m.
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City

Prime Minister Andreotti: Congratulations on your speech this morning. (U)

The President: Let me thank you for the support of the EC in the Gulf crisis. I told a group in Detroit the other day that Italy and the U.S. have never had better relations. So welcome. I have one or two points to mention and hope you will feel free to comment. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I would like to say we have been very firm and have strong support from parliament concerning Iraq. I welcome the emphasis that you placed on the importance of the U.N. All of this helps us support your policy. I also would
like to say that the attention that you gave to the Arab people is very important, also from the psychological point of view. Some countries have difficulties because of fundamentalist propaganda. But we must keep our principles in mind. He who occupies must not remain unpunished. On this point we will always have support.

The President: Do you know this man personally?

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, I spent three days with him after Camp David in 1978, trying to soften his reaction against Camp David. I have the impression that he is a very tough man. I don't like him very much. This morning the Saudi Foreign Minister thanked me because we did not do everything asked of us during the war in favor of Iraq. Eight years ago they bought ships from us and paid in part, but we never sent them. They are still in Italy. With Iran this is a time for a warm relationship. I will propose to the Community that our visits start again.

The President: We made it clear to Iran through a couple of different channels that we are ready, but we have the stumbling block of the hostages, and on their side the frozen assets. They don't feel the time is right to move with the U.S., because Rafsanjani can't defeat his radical left and needs more time. I think they are complying with the embargo despite some rhetoric. They made it clear they will interdict shipping bound for Iraq, though we are not sure they have done so. So I think you are right; it is important to develop relations with Iran.

Prime Minister Andreotti: If they have certainty that the West is dealing seriously and that in the end Saddam Hussein will be defeated, they will adhere strictly to the embargo. At the same time, they do not trust Saddam Hussein at all.

The President: One reason I put in my speech that all soldiers should come home as soon as possible was to reassure Iran. Some elements are alleging that we are trying to get a foothold in the Gulf. Let me bring up one area where we might have a nuance of difference. I worry that Saddam Hussein will try to play the Israel card and attack Israel, as he has already done rhetorically. He is trying to make it the Arabs against Israel and the U.S. That has failed because so many Arabs are against him. I was asked a question at Helsinki concerning Palestine. I pointed out that we have no problem with an international conference but a big problem if we link an international conference on Palestine with this crisis in the Gulf.
right into Saddam Hussein's hand. We have a clear position against naked aggression: they have got to get out. I know there is a Palestinian problem that needs to be solved, but we shouldn't lump these two together. I know your longstanding interest in seeing that problem solved and respect it. Jim Baker is working very hard. I have great respect for your knowledge and efforts.

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you for raising this question. There is no doubt that simultaneously linking would be wrong. Nothing would be solved. The Helsinki communique language was good language in that it referred to other problems. This morning you were even more specific. This was a good idea. The question was posed with exactness this morning. You said the problem with Israel exists and will be solved in time, but this doesn't mean we will not solve the immediate problem with Kuwait. The important thing is to give faith to the Palestinians and prevent them from thinking Saddam Hussein will solve their problems. The expression you used this morning expressed my exact position.

The President: Thank you. The Soviets may have a different idea -- of calling for a conference almost merged into the other question.

Prime Minister Andreotti: Keep in mind the Soviets have their own problems. They have two Islamic republics.

The President: Let me put you on the spot. Suppose someone called you and said that Saddam Hussein had launched four SCUDS into downtown Jerusalem. What should be the proper response of those of us with forces in Saudi Arabia? And what of Israel?

Prime Minister Andreotti: I would like to make a distinction. The important thing on our side is to keep the UN very strong. If there were hostile acts like this, my impression is that Israel should not respond but western forces in Saudi Arabia should respond.

The President: That is sound advice, but it may be hard to convince the Israelis.

Prime Minister Andreotti: It is clear that Israel would also participate; but we would have to make a great effort so that it does not become Israel versus the Arab states, but rather the allies of Saudi Arabia versus Saddam Hussein. Last Sunday I went
to visit the Algerian president, who is a great admirer of yours. He is determined that Saddam Hussein's population understands fully that we are defending principle in an Arab country -- Saudi Arabia. What you said today was very good -- that all countries must become democratic.

The President: Saddam Hussein is thrilled about an Arab plan for elections in Kuwait. What about free elections in Iraq?

Prime Minister Andreotti: Saddam Hussein is a pure and simple dictator.

Secretary Baker: I can see it in Saudi Arabia now. King Fahd, the people's candidate.

The President: Maybe he will run as a Christian Democrat.

Prime Minister Andreotti: One day we may see that, even in Saudi Arabia.

The President: I feel sorry for my friend King Hussein. At this meeting in Amman, he had cabinet officials addressing Habash. I feel sorry for him but don't know what to do. Mubarak is livid with him.

Prime Minister Andreotti: We must keep in mind that he is in a most difficult situation. It is not only a poor country, but half the population is Palestinian. So he knows one day a solution of the Palestinian question can change the Hashemite reign and turn Jordan into a Palestinian state. He is a man who has known moments of great courage: during Black September he personally rode in one of his tanks. Saudi Arabia probably will be able to recover to some extent with King Hussein.

The President: They were mad at the piece Prince Bandar wrote. They considered it a breach of royal courtesy.

Prime Minister Andreotti: One thing: the pilgrimages are far away. That will be a difficult time, with one and a half million Muslims going to Mecca.

The President: It is true of our troops as well. It is very hard for me as President to condone Saudis taking Bibles out of packages going to American soldiers. I think that is worked out now; they have tried to be helpful.
Prime Minister Andreotti: May I raise one more thing -- the Baraldini case. We hope that she can be returned to Italy under treaty provisions and serve her sentence in Italy.

The President: Let us look into it. (To Brent Scowcroft:) Tell Justice that the Prime Minister raised the matter and needs an answer. We need all the jail space we can get.

-- End of Conversation --