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<th>Document No. and Type</th>
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<td>14. Memcon</td>
<td>Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 4, 1990, 4:39 - 5:05 pm [SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL] (4 pp.)</td>
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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Haass, Richard N., Files
Subseries: Working Files

Date Closed: 10/22/2007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0099-F
Re-review Case #: 
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AR Case #: 1998-0099-F/3(10)
AR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date: 12/1/2010

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Appeal Case #: 
Appeal Disposition: 
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President 
Turgut Ozal, President
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 4, 1990, 4:39 - 5:05 p.m.
Camp David (U)

The President: How are you? I’m doing alright, although we’re nervous about the situation in the Gulf.

President Ozal: I talked this morning to Rafsanjani, President Asad, and President Mubarak. I also spoke with the Amir of Kuwait.

The President: You’ve accomplished a lot. What did you learn?

President Ozal: I found the same opinion with all of them.

The President: That would help Saddam Hussein.

President Ozal: Saddam made a mistake. To pay, he should withdraw. There is no compromise solution in my opinion, I tell you.

The President: What did the Amir say? I’m going to be talking to him again soon.

President Ozal: He got your letter, assuring him that the Iraqis should go back.

The President: They’ve got to do that. Do you have anything more for me?

President Ozal: On the points I made, all were in agreement except Jordan.

The President: That’s encouraging. Only you, with your relationships, could have talked to both Asad and Rafsanjani.
I have talked to Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterrand, and Helmut Kohl. All agree with us that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait and that the Amir should go back.

I also talked with King Fahd. We had a long discussion. I told him we're moving some forces, and the British and French are moving some ships too. We're very concerned about a possible Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia. We had a meeting here at Camp David today with my experts. With Saddam having lied already about Kuwait, there is no reason yet for him to stop. The deployment of the Iraqi forces worries us. Every Western country, and Japan too -- I talked with Kaifu, agrees with us.

I told the King, he knows we'll support him militarily to keep Iraq from occupying the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia and the oilfields. We need further economic action. We should use chapter 7 sanctions in the UN to deny Iraq access to markets. That is very important.

Sanctions have failed in the past because countries did not stand together in enforcing them. I have a hopeful feeling that, if we can deny Saddam access to money, he'll crumble faster. He does need the money; economically they are not 20,000 feet tall.

There must be an immediate, complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government there. Anything less is unacceptable. It took Saddam's army only five hours to invade Kuwait; it should take them five hours to get the heck out.

Other NATO countries feel the same way. We're trying to get to Secretary General Woerner because Turkey is in a special position. I feel NATO will back you.

We have been talking to the Saudis. We are preparing military options. We have moved a carrier battle group close to the area and I am encouraged about the British and French steps. We must stand together on the economic front. When we go through with the plan, we must close the pipeline and get the Saudis to close their pipeline. This may mean guaranteeing forces if Saddam tries to retaliate.

I have read the statement issued by your foreign ministry that Turkey does not support shutting down the pipeline at present and that it wishes to remain neutral. That is a little different from what we talked about yesterday. I cannot emphasize enough my view that there can be no neutrality in these circumstances and my hope that we can get the plan, for the Saudis and you to be prepared to shut down the pipeline if Iraq fails to withdraw from Kuwait as virtually the entire world is calling for them to do.

That is my appeal. What is your view?

President Ozal: Tomorrow Saddam Hussein is sending his right-hand man to Turkey. He's bringing some message, which I believe
will be about the pipeline. I'll talk to them. I will tell them, if they do not pull out of Kuwait as soon as possible -- and I advise you to do it -- if you don't it will be much worse against you.

The President: That's good. You're their neighbor. I know funds are involved. They can be made up if the pipeline closure is needed. Others have called Saddam another Hitler. You have to decide how to handle this, of course, but I hope you would tell the Iraqi envoy, tell him we'll close the pipeline -- and NATO will back us up.

President Ozal: I feel strongly about Saddam. But once they go out...

The President: He would be bringing hardship on his people as an international outlaw, and we would be denying him warmaking potential. I'm pleased, by the way, with the news from Moscow. You've heard my appeal on the pipeline. We can't tell our other Allies to crack down while the oil continues to flow.

President Ozal: The UN can put sanctions on oil?

The President: Yes, as part of chapter 7 sanctions.

President Ozal: If they can do that, it would be easier for us to do something.

The President: Most everyone seems to like chapter 7 sanctions. We'll push for that.

President Ozal: Or there could be a blockade of shipments from the mouths of both pipelines. We'll need a blockade from Kuwait too.

The President: That's true. We can't do this halfway. We'll be in position to interdict oil from Iraq and Kuwait. We need a collective decision for all to act together, backed up by chapter 7 sanctions.

President Ozal: The UN, chapter 7, should be announced and apply to Iraq.

The President: It should work soon. I know this is a difficult situation for you. But what the man has done has been so condemned, I know the West would applaud Turkey and there would be no argument from any country -- including most of the Middle East. I may be wrong, but I think they'd salute you. If we interdict the oil too, that would be economic action to make them behave.

President Ozal: If the blockade is successful, then they go out of Kuwait. Is the problem solved?

The President: The Amir would go back, but Kuwait would be scared. I don't know how to be sure he would not do it again. I'd like to worry about that problem. I worry some Arab
countries will agree to a puppet government. If we get the Kuwait rulers back in, as legally they should be, and Iraq out, then we can talk about the defense of Kuwait.

I worry now that they might not get out and even go to Saudi Arabia. That would be very, very serious. We should stay in touch.

President Ozal: How do other NATO leaders feel?

The President: I've talked to Kohl, Thatcher, and Mitterrand. I'll speak to Mulroney tonight. I know they agree we should do what we can on economic sanctions to stop trade with Iraq.

You're entitled to know what the result would be if you go forward. I'd like to get you a good answer. I'm trying to find Manfred Woerner, who is off fishing.

The reactions of Rafsanjani and Asad are interesting. I am disappointed with Jordan and with seven Arab League countries abstaining on that resolution. They're scared. You need to see strong support from NATO.

I told the King we will do what needs to be done. This is not another Lebanon. Every Western country has fundamental economic interests at stake. Call me anytime. Please give prayerful consideration to what I've asked. If you want to call me and tell me what's on the Iraqi emissary's mind, that would be OK, but remember how much they have lied.

President Ozal: If I need to call, I will call. We should keep in close touch.

-- End of Conversation --