MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary General Manfred Woerner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
William Taft, IV, U.S. Ambassador to NATO
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Notetaker)
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General
Amedeo deFranchis, Deputy Secretary General
James Cunningham, Private Office Director

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 5, 1990, 9:15 - 9:45 am
Lancaster House, England

The President: We have a big meeting coming up. You know what our proposals are. How should we proceed? I have a short intervention that will last about ten minutes. (U)

Secretary General Woerner: That is less time than we thought. (U)

The President: We want to hear the views of others. But how do you manage the mechanics? (U)

Secretary General Woerner: There is clear agreement that the U.S. draft is the base draft for our work. I stopped representatives at NATO from drafting. The protocol is to start with the heads of government. That means Mitterrand. I have to respect that. We'll see if he wishes to begin. (E)

Then we will spend the morning with Francois Mitterrand, Thatcher, then Kohl, and so on, for six or seven speakers. Then there will be lunch. Then the Foreign Ministers would meet after lunch to work on the Declaration. Heads of government will continue with their interventions far into the afternoon. I want Van den Broek to chair that meeting of Foreign Ministers. It will be tough. There are lots of possible amendments. (E)
What will you wish to discuss in the free discussion, late this afternoon? Some have suggested economic aid to the Soviet Union. Kohl may introduce this topic, or perhaps Mitterrand.

Tomorrow morning we will begin with the Declaration. There is a high level of expectation among the press and our publics. So I think we will entirely succeed. We have to.

The President: My gut instinct is that aid to the Soviet Union, which will be discussed in Houston, may be premature to talk about here. I don’t want to complicate the Soviet Party Congress. We will not be able to accommodate Gorbachev here, so the headlines could be unhelpful. Unless we come out with a ringing endorsement of aid to the USSR, it could set Gorbachev back.

Secretary General Woerner: I entirely agree.

Governor Sununu: Will Mitterrand, if he goes first, raise the issue?

Secretary General Woerner: I don’t know, but I don’t think he will concentrate on that. What else could we discuss?

General Scowcroft: Can the Foreign Ministers finish the Declaration?

Secretary General Woerner: They must.

The President: What about discussing NATO’s future political role?

Secretary Baker: I think we will have bracketed language on one or two issues.

Secretary General Woerner: Please don’t make it more than one or two. We cannot have a failure at this Summit.

One other point. There is still the idea of a global review of NATO’s purpose floating around. It was originally a French idea. You have in your draft a review of NATO for a meeting of heads of government next year. But this Summit must be a Summit of answers not questions, don’t you agree?

The President: Can’t we just stick to a review of military strategy?

Secretary General Woerner: I hope so, but others may want a more open study. That would be a mistake. That’s why I like your Declaration so much.

The President: I agree. We should hold the line on the type of NATO review we want.
Secretary General Woerner: I am glad you did what you did, but you ruffled some feathers. We can't do this very often. But I thought your draft was terrific. There are some disagreements: on 'last resort;' and on the next phase of CFE. (7)

The President: I called Lubbers, Martens, and Schlueter. They were all enthusiastic about the Declaration. (7)

Secretary General Woerner: It's an old dilemma. Everybody wants U.S. leadership, but they do not want to admit it. (7)

-- End of meeting --