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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4500
Add-On



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chatichai Chunhawan of Thailand
(C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Daniel O'Donohue, Ambassador to Thailand
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs, NSC staff (Notetaker)

Chatichai Chunhawan, Prime Minister
Sitthi Sawetsila, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Boon Pinkhayan, Minister of Commerce
Prachuap Chaiyasan, Minister of Science,
Technology, and Energy
Kon Thappharangsi, Minister Attached to the
Office of the Prime Minister
Phatchara Isarasena, Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Commerce
Witthaya Wetchachiwa, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sathianthai Surakait, International Law Advisor
to the Prime Minister
Sunthon Grates (Admiral), Deputy Supreme
Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

CU 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

DATE, TIME: June 14, 1990, 12:15 - 1:15pm, Luncheon Meeting
AND PLACE: Old Family Dining Room

The President: We had just started talking about trade matters. The protection of intellectual property rights is a tough issue, but it is very important that it be done and the problem solved. You mentioned the 1992 APEC meeting. We will be in Singapore for the APEC meeting after the Post Ministerial meeting of ASEAN. Perhaps Thailand could host the 1992 meeting. (C)

In ASEAN is there a belief that we are not devoting enough attention to Asia. We have talked about the Philippines. If the Philippine Foreign Minister continues to go after us and to

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create anti-American rhetoric, this will make it difficult for us. We want to stay in the Philippines. I have told our chief negotiator we will not leave the Pacific, even if we leave the Philippines. I am annoyed with the posturing of the Foreign Minister although I am sympathetic with problems of Mrs. Aquino. We will remain in Asia. Do you pick up the idea that the U.S. might lose interest in the Pacific because of Eastern Europe? (e)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We worry that Western Europe will lose interest, leaving us to be dominated by the Japanese. Thailand has close cooperation with ASEAN. The Philippines is in bad shape. (e)

The President: Will Mrs. Aquino survive? (e)

Prime Minister Chatichai: You should help the Philippines. I believe that the Muslims will try to take advantage. We will give full support to Mrs. Aquino. Whether or not she will survive is the \$32 question. (e)

Secretary Baker: We went out last year, at a time of budget constraint, but we obtained \$160 million from Congress for the Multilateral Assistance Initiative. (e)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The last time I was there, at the Manila Hotel, in 3 hours only one container vessel moved. (e)

The President: We are trying very hard. We would like to keep the bases. They are marvelous installations. We will try to support democratic aspirations. But we will not be held up on the bases. If it does not work out, we will leave the Philippines but we will find a way to remain very active in the area. (e)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The South China Sea is very important to us. If you leave the Philippines, this would be very bad for us. (e)

Secretary Baker: We are hearing more debate and criticism of our Cambodia policy that we pursue with ASEAN. It centers on the Khmer Rouge element, in spite of our opposition to the Khmer Rouge. This is becoming more and more of a political issue. We hope you will reconsider the degree of your support and contact with Khmer Rouge. (e)

The President: We are being attacked for being soft on Khmer Rouge -- when, in fact, we are not. If you could discuss this with Secretary Baker it would be helpful. (e)

Prime Minister Chatichai: [REDACTED]

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The President: As I mentioned in our chat, there is a need to cut off supplies from the PRC to the Khmer Rouge. (c)

Foreign Minister Sitthi: We need to talk to the PRC. (c)

The President: I wish we had a little more credibility with China but they blame us for Tienanmen Square. I want to preserve that relationship. I want to keep commercial ties to support economic reform in China which will lead to more openness. But I would mislead you if I told you we had great influence. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I think you are absolutely correct about China. It took twenty years to open the relationship. (c)

I returned to China after Tiananmen and learned that they had no riot control training course. They had neither tear gas nor gas masks. They need training, rubber bullets, etc. (c)

There has been a meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China with Vietnam. The official has left to return to Beijing now. Now it is difficult to talk to the Chinese leaders. There is no real center of power; that is the difference between Mao, Chou, and Deng and these leaders now. (c)

The President: The Prime Minister commented on Kaifu being a good man. We hope he will stay on. Is there still a fear of the Japanese in Thailand? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We are lucky. If Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would have become dominant. I worry about Japan now. That's why I have asked for increased U.S. trade and investment. (c)

The President: U.S. trade and investment is up now? (c)

Minister Korn: We consult with the American Chamber of Commerce all the time. We hope you will consider the American presence in Thailand when formulating your policies. (c)

Minister Subin: Because the rate of interest, with the exception of Japan, is declining, we are concerned. (c)

The President: We should talk frankly while you are here. One problem is IPR. I will tell you one that worries me, textiles. (c)

We are under great pressure and it is important that you level with us. With elections in the Fall we will face more and more protectionist pressure. The less the protectionists can point to, the better. We need to be frank with one another. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We are going to build a land bridge across Isthmus to link the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. This

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would save four days for big ships, two weeks for fishing boats. We would like to invite American business people. There will be a port at each end as well as a railway, road and a pipeline. Because you control pollution, we want to do the refining in Thailand for export to the West Coast? (c)

In the field of telecommunication, we need three million lines. I have close contacts with AT&T, Triton Oil (a subsidiary of Seagram), Cal Tex, and Texas Pacific. (c)

Ambassador O'Donohue: Unical offshore gas provides 25% of Thailand's energy needs. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We need the Seventh Fleet because, although it is called the Gulf of Thailand, there are many owners, e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. (c)

The President: Do you see a big change in Vietnam? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: There are big changes but they will take time. (c)

Secretary Baker: Who has more influence on Hun Sen, the Vietnamese or the Soviets? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Hun Sen is young and easy to talk to. Khieu Samphan is very difficult; he just smiles. (c)

The President: Who can influence Hun Sen? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The Minister of Defense is a Thai and speaks Thai. Sihanouk is one of the few kings in the world; this is a sad story - Franz Joseph and Sihanouk. I knew Sihanouk when he fled from the French. (c)

The President: Sihanouk is a very nervous little man but he still has a respectful following inside the country. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Sihanouk should be a King with a four party coalition government, but Monique said no and Sihanouk must be the President. Why not use the Thai constitution? (c)

General Scowcroft: What will the result be in Cambodia? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I agree with the comprehensive solution but we must start with a step-by-step process. Cambodia has not had an election for 30 years. We need an International control mechanism to determine the situation. We need a cease-fire, elections, and then a coalition government under Sihanouk but we should establish a cease fire first. I did this in 1954 with General Donovan in Burma. (c)

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5

General Scowcroft: But what about the Khmer Rouge? (C)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The Khmer Rouge will agree to a ceasefire but they only listen to China. (C)

Secretary Baker: What needs to be done to get Vietnam to exercise its influence on the PRK? One way is to offer them normalization if they use their influence in advance. We need to do some thinking about how they might do something in advance to exercise their influence affirmatively. (C)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Hun Sen is amenable to persuasion. If we could get the Chinese to eliminate the Khmer Rouge threat, then Hun Sen would fall into place. (C)

Secretary Baker: But, if we could go to China and offer to have Hun Sen step down before an election, wouldn't this be better? (C)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I do not recognize Hun Sen. (C)

Secretary Baker: The French say we should support economic reconstruction in Vietnam, but the one card we have is the economic one for convincing the Vietnamese. (C)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Perhaps Japan can influence both China and Vietnam. The only people who can talk to the PRC are the Japanese. Only Japan will be able to stand up to the PRC over Hong Kong. (C)

The President: The problem is that the Japanese are much less interested in human rights than we are. They are more interested in markets. (C)

Ambassador Vittiva: That is what the Chinese and the Vietnamese really want. (C)

The President: Maybe you have a good point about working with Kaifu. We can talk to him prior to the Houston Summit. The President thanked the Thai Prime Minister for coming and concluded the meeting. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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