MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President’s Meeting with President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
Sergei Akhromeyev, Advisor to President Gorbachev

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 2, 1990, 11:15 a.m. - 12:59 p.m.
Camp David

President Gorbachev: In this setting, maybe we can think of some good things to do. But first let me take one step back. Yesterday was an important day. My main thought is that it is good to make good statements and declarations but yesterday, in addition to philosophizing, the right decisions were made. I am pleased with the way we are working on the right actions. Without this, nothing is possible. I promise you my constructive efforts. Naturally, we will not always agree. Optimum solutions are difficult. (§)

I would like Camp David to be a place where we repeat what we said yesterday and reaffirm the kind of relationship we want. We should reaffirm that relationship from Camp David, including regular meetings, and a regular secure phone link so that we can exchange views frequently. (§)

The President: Do you want to say all this at our press conference? (§)

President Gorbachev: Yes. (§)

The President: I agree. So far, I think our meeting is being portrayed this way. (§)

President Gorbachev: Yes, even the pictures now are showing the closeness -- ourselves, the Ministers, the two ladies, all
The President: We will keep it going. We will take some hits on trade and arms control from the Right, but I think we can manage it. We talked last night about trying for meetings without all the trappings.

President Gorbachev: I have been told the Supreme Soviet has three pages of questions for me. I said I will answer more than that when I get back. I included two Committee Chairmen in my delegation for this reason. One represents our military-industrial complex, and I also brought the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Now they are not on the sidelines and it is important that they see how these things work. Soon I will have a Warsaw Pact meeting, and it will be a new Warsaw Pact. Only Shevardnadze and myself and Jaruzelski are old members -- all the others are new. I will report the results to you.

The President: Just a technical point. We will have a secure line in a year and a direct line this fall. (Description of secure line.)

President Gorbachev: Shall we go through our points?

The President: Fine. There are points I must raise: human rights, refuseniks, immigration, and human rights in general. You want us to take more Jews. We are taking more -- about all we can.

There are many vestiges of anti-Semitism. We have skinheads and you have a problem too, and to the degree you could speak out publicly: that would help. It helps me. We would encourage direct flights to Israel. You should know that I am in a big fight with Shamir over settling immigrants in the occupied territories. My administration is seen as anti-Israel. It stems from my saying no settlements in the occupied territories and East Jerusalem. This caused a firestorm here and on the Right in Israel. (Described what Netanyahu had said.) We are a true friend of Israel. In our new relationship I hope that you can take account of anti-Semitism, direct flights to Israel, refuseniks, and keep up human rights progress. It would help me a lot. If we can separate anti-Semitism from policy it would help.

President Gorbachev: Let me respond. We will seek to cooperate on the full spectrum of human rights. On immigration, here is information on refuseniks. There are twenty on the list. We have given exit visas for five, a temporary departure for one, a temporary visit for one to Great Britain (probably with relatives), one is dead, and there is nothing on the other eleven. We will have more movement but that is my report for now. I agree that we do have to take a stand against anti-Semitism. I have spoken out in general and I will find a way to speak out specifically.
The President: That would help. It is a world-wide problem and if we are seen cooperating on it that would help. (§)

President Gorbachev: We do have a problem between the Russian and Jewish intelligentsia. We will speak out but I don’t want to take sides; here we have to find a way. There are many organizations, some even Fascist which say ugly things. Israel, in letting that settlement go on in Jerusalem has caused an outcry in the Arab press. Even Mubarak said he would have to protest in our press that we are settling the West Bank and replenishing the Israeli army. They are trying to put us against each other. Maybe Israel should be told that if they settle in the occupied territories I will have to stop immigration. (§)

The President: It sounds easy, but it is complicated. Individual settlers make it hard to be clear on it. (§)

President Gorbachev: Our Ministers could consult on the language. We must try to figure out a solution. (§)

The President: Saying no more than this to Israel would get world Jewry up in arms. We could not sign up to that. (§)

President Gorbachev: Maybe Baker and Shevardnadze can work something out. (§)

The President: It is a risky issue for a joint statement. (§)

President Gorbachev: I am not thinking of a joint statement but just getting our policies coordinated. (§)

Secretary Baker: I just wanted to say that in 1988 we started a dialogue that let us talk to both parties and move forward on a peace process. It would be helpful if you could let Arafat know that our dialogue can continue only if he speaks out on Abu Abbas. Otherwise, we cannot continue the dialogue. (§)

President Gorbachev: He has disassociated himself, but not condemned the attack. (§)

Secretary Baker: That is right, but the basis for our dialogue is that there must be no terrorism. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: We got a telegram from Arafat which says: "Violence is getting out of control. Close to explosion. Exacerbated by US veto." I don’t know why you had to do that -- it (the UN resolution) would have pacified the situation. (§)

Secretary Baker: (Describes U.S. actions.) (§)

President Gorbachev: Let’s think about this. There is a lot of truth to what Arafat says. If there is an explosion, he will be totally isolated. We have worked hard to get Assad and Arafat to work together. Mubarak is easier and so is Benjeddid. Qadhafi is a problem. But maybe we can work on sending Goulding. We will work on Arafat to clam things down. (§)
The President: I am having lunch with Perez de Cuellar on Monday. I will tell him this. We will do it even against Israel if necessary. (§)

Secretary Baker: And remember, we cannot continue the dialogue if he is tied to terrorism. (§)

President Gorbachev: But Arafat thinks this is patriotic resistance. It is tough for him to speak out. (§)

Secretary Baker: But he disassociated himself from it. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: Shamir is more difficult. (§)

The President: (Describes U.S. problems with Shamir over settlements.) (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: Maybe this is a time to mention the idea of an international conference. We support your idea of a dialogue but we should think of a conference also. (§)

President Gorbachev: Everyone but Shamir supports a conference. If we started preparations for a conference we could recognize Israel immediately.

Secretary Baker: As Eduard knows, we don’t reject a conference but for now I would not appear at a conference. Under the right circumstances we could go along with one, however. Right now the circumstances are not right. Back to Arafat. The timing of that attack was terrible. We want to keep the pressure on for the dialogue, and this gives Israel a way out. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: Israel would go along with a conference? (§)

Secretary Baker: No. (Describes situation). (§)

President Gorbachev: Let’s have Eduard and Jim talk about it. Maybe we can get Israel to take the first step towards a conference. We could jointly guarantee Israel’s existence as a state. We could establish immediate diplomatic relations; then we could be helpful. The bigger Arab nations could make statements recognizing the realities and the Israeli situation. We have contact with Jewish organizations. Eduard has met Peres and Shamir. We could establish consulates.

The President: You have gained much by your immigration policy. (Talks about Max Fisher comment.) (§)

Secretary Baker: One thing you said is interesting. Israel complains that among the Arabs no one but Egypt recognizes Israeli’s right to exist. That could help. (§)

President Gorbachev: We have worked with Arafat to bring him around. (§)
Secretary Baker: We will talk. (f)

President Gorbachev: When Mubarak came to Moscow he spoke of a free zone without nuclear or chemical weapons (jokes, toes curling up). Maybe we could look at it and support Mubarak. There are too many weapons there. They are different from the Europeans; they get all fired up. We really should think about it, because the region is so heavily armed. (f)

The President: Israel would resist that. (f)

President Gorbachev: Let Eduard and Jim think about it. (f)

The President: Let’s move to other regional issues, starting with India and Pakistan. We are concerned about a war. Bob Gates came back with negative assessment. We should stay in touch. Everyone would be a loser in such a war. In the 1970’s we tilted toward Pakistan and you tilted toward India. The situation is different now. We won’t try to take advantage of you. We don’t have a dog in that fight, even though we like Bhutto. We would encourage an immediate cease fire. We are open to suggestions. If the situation heats up I hope we can work together. Maybe not, but I don’t want it to disrupt us. (f)

President Gorbachev: I had a call from Singh -- the morning I was coming here. He wanted me to know that he would do his best to calm things down. I responded that I would welcome a solution to this old problem. I want good relations with both India and Pakistan. We never broke with Pakistan, even in the worst days of Afghanistan. It is therefore in our interest that the situation not become more acute. Let’s keep in touch. (f)

The President: I understand that you have a problem with making a joint statement, but maybe we could deal with this at the press conference. (f)

President Gorbachev: It might be sensitive for India and Pakistan if we were concerting on them, but at the press conference would be a good way to do it. (Discussion on what is going on.) Let’s stay in close touch, and let’s do the press conference thing (i.e., deal with the issue by responding to press questions). (f)

The President: My other regional items include Africa, Ethiopia, etc., but I need to register a point on Cuba. Jim and Eduard have talked about Afghanistan. On Cuba, we think Castro is swimming against the tide; he is unreconstructed. Many think we are picking on him, but he is an outcast. If you changed your economic relationship with Cuba, that would push him. He won’t take the Ortega route. (f)

President Gorbachev: Castro supported the Nicaragua solution. (f)

The President: That was because he thought that Ortega would win the election. But maybe we could use that as a model. (f)
SECRET/SENSITIVE

Secretary Baker: As in the case of Nicaragua, if Castro were to change we would change our policy. (§)

President Gorbachev: Let me say a few words on this. I agree that there can be no peace in Central America if Cuba is isolated. We are not doing that, but we see that you have that syndrome. I spoke about it to the Vice President. He said he had gone to the Caribbean six times, and I said "you did not stop in Cuba." (§)

We should analyze Castro. He is criticizing us more than you. In the Cuban missile crisis, he kept Mikoyan running around the island for a week. Teaching lessons to Castro is useless. When I was there, I could see they were tense. I told him I was not trying to change the way he does things, but let me do things my way as well. Then they relaxed and it went alright. If you got in touch with him I think he would respond, but trying to force him to change would be useless. He has told me, "I will not take U.S. dictation, but if they will sit and talk ...." Maybe we could set something up that is not bilateral. He is ready to hear you out -- to talk at any level. It is better if he hears from you rather than from us. A change in our economic relations is coming. It will be based on buying the things we need, although I realize it will not be at market prices. It can be sold for dollars on the world market. Also, we buy citrus and nonferrous metals. We are beginning to put our economic relations on a realistic relations. Before, no one even thought about the economic aspects of our relations. The Latin Americans show more understanding of the role of Cuba, so it is not that simple. (§)

There is a remaining problem to discuss: the Contras. (§)

The President: I think that is back on track. (§)

General Akhромеев: I have a personal relationship with Castro, and he says he is prepared to go very far. He understands the problem. (§)

The President: Let me tell you about the U.S.-Cuban problem. (He describes the Cuban-American patriotic community.) Therefore there is a lot of emotion in this issue for the Americans. (Hands him a Congressional letter on Cuba). I hear what you have said on Castro and I hope you understand our feelings on the issue. Let's keep it on the table. (§)

Secretary Baker: We haven't asked Castro to give us something before we sit down to talk, only that he cease subversion in El Salvador and Latin America -- that is all. (§)

President Gorbachev: Do you want us to convey this to him? (§)

The President: It would be helpful. (§)

President Gorbachev: If El Salvador improved visibly there would
be a change by you? (§)

The President: Yes, but I won’t give him a State Dinner! (§)

Secretary Baker: El Salvador has a freely elected government, and he is subverting it. (§)

The President: I don’t like seeing Umberto Ortega as head of the army in Nicaragua because the armed forces were a Party. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: Just a word on Cuba. We are having some discussions with the US on Cuba in quest of some imaginative solutions. If the U.S. treats Cuba as an equal, things might work -- as in the case of Angola, where we made it work after they got treated like equal partners. On El Salvador, I think that Castro may undertake a serious discussion. (§)

President Gorbachev: What do you want us to do? (§)

Secretary Baker: Here is a wild suggestion: that you tell him the President said that there will be an improvement in relations and a dialogue, if he will firmly sign on to and support Esquipulas, which bans the export of insurgency to Central America. (§)

The President: That only deals with a small part of the problem. For the establishment of full relations with Cuba the people must be able to have free elections, and must enjoy human rights, like letting people out of jail, etc. For normal relations, Castro cannot be the only one out of step in the hemisphere. (§)

President Gorbachev: For now we will convey to him suggestions that will permit the dialogue to begin. Then it can progress. (§)

The President: I must tell you that the Soviet relationship to Cuba sours the US view of you. (§)

Secretary Baker: The MIG-29 is a big issue for us psychologically. (§)

The President: Why don’t we break for lunch then we can rest and get back together at 3 p.m. (U)

(Lunch break)

President Gorbachev: (Begins with a discussion of the differences between the Soviet and US federations, emphasizing the nationalities aspect of the Soviet federation. Describes the fight between Stalin and Lenin on the nature of the federation, saying that after Lenin died Stalin left the law the same but ruthlessly created a military state. Then Stalin said that the nationalities problem no longer existed; there was a "Soviet" nationality. So once the dam burst, the nationalities issues burst out into the open. The Byelorussian language had almost died out.) (§)
The President: Shall we return to our agenda? I dominated the
discussion with my subjects this morning, although we didn’t
raise Afghanistan. (§)

President Gorbachev: I would be happy to discuss Afghanistan.
(§)

The President: On Afghanistan, we would really like to be
disengaged. We would like to cut loose, and we have no interest
in a radical, and Muslim administration. We are also worried
about the radicals, and we are not trying to install and anti-
Soviet fundamentalist regime. (Described the political
arrangements that the U.S. seeks.) If they got underway, we
would stop our aid to the Mujahedin. If we could both state that
no party would be able to subvert the process and state that a
neutral body would arrange the elections, we would have a good
outcome. Najibullah could participate but not as head of
government. Hezbayt is an undesirable conservative. I asked
whether you can live with a short supervised period where
Najibullah could participate but step aside from government.
(§)

President Gorbachev: There is mutual understanding for a neutral
period plus a mechanism for conducting an election leading to a
broad-based government; also, for a UN role for a transition
period and in the conduct of elections. Do we understand that
neither the government nor the opposition would transfer the
government to a neutral authority. So the only hope is elections
on the basis of the status quo. Let them conduct their elections
in their own way. We can’t remove Najibullah or Hezbayt from
the scene. Najibullah is beginning to put more strings on us.
(§)

The President: He thinks he is getting stronger. (§)

President Gorbachev: He thinks he is getting more support. Some
former opposition members are managing local government under the
general supervision of government forces. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: We need a new approach, because neither
side has the leverage to achieve a solution. (§)

The President: How does Najilbah feel about elections? (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: I have talked to him. He favors a
Nicaragua-type solution, with a group charged with developing
elections. (§)

President Gorbachev: Would Najibullah be willing to step aside as
part of a normal process, but not be kicked out? (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: Yes, but not as a withdrawal. Then a
conference could set up an election process. Our differences are
not great. We can’t get Najibullah out. Actually, this process
is getting under way. He is inviting Zahir Shah to take the
highest position. (§)
President Gorbachev: We would like a neutral regime, not one hostile to the U.S. (§)

**The President:** We can't argue against Najibullah staying in power, a la Nicaragua, but the problem is how to get the Resistance plugged in. (§)

President Gorbachev: Neither the Mujahedin nor Najibullah will conduct the elections. The UN or the OIC will do it. Najibullah does not want to be kicked out. That is his minimum condition. (§)

Secretary Baker: It is difficult for us to argue against the Nicaraguan model. Our problem is with the Resistance. We need something for them to show that elections would be fair, that supervision would be neutral, and that the outcome would be observed. What about Najibullah taking a head of state role during this period to demonstrate that a transition authority would conduct the election and provide security. (§)

President Gorbachev: Najibullah would be a kind of interim acting president during the election? (§)

Secretary Baker: Yes, but with something less than full authority. (§)

President Gorbachev: We must think about it. (§)

The President: Let's have Jim and Eduard talk some more about this. (§)

President Gorbachev: Yes, let's, because there are lots of areas of agreement. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: We could try to formulate three or four points on which the Afghans could agree: on the transition period for elections and the conduct thereof, on the role of the UN, etc. We would agree that Afghanistan would be unified, neutral, and demilitarized. (§)

President Gorbachev: And the only solution to Afghanistan is a political solution. The two sides should recognize each other. There would be four or five principles on which we could agree. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: This would be similar to Nicaragua and to what we are trying to do in Angola, etc. It is a tested process. (§)

The President: How about Ethiopia? (§)

President Gorbachev: We have an appeal from Mengistu. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: The essence of his letter is that he would agree to the UN as observers in his talks with Eritrea.
They were opposed to any outside body until now. One other element: they agree to Massawa for humanitarian relief, subject to the sovereignty of Ethiopia. The Eritreans must agree. The US and the Soviet Union should suggest an international conference for an overall settlement in the horn of Africa. That should come from us, not them. Our two groups have been working on language. Another issue was our cargo planes for relief -- we agree, on condition that the Eritreans don’t shoot them down. (§)

Secretary Baker: How about a joint appeal that the Eritreans should not shoot, on the basis that people will starve if they do. (§)

The President: This is about all we can do today. (§)

President Gorbachev: If we can issue a joint appeal, let’s conclude and let our experts work on it. (Dennis brings a paper that is given to Obukov and it is read to Gorbachev.) (§)

Secretary Baker: I think that a joint statement on aid involving Soviet planes and US food would look good. (§)

President Gorbachev: On Southern Africa, we don’t have a big disagreement on what is happening in South Africa. In Southern Africa we are already working together. We will be flexible toward changes in South Africa, supporting those people who are working peacefully to abolish apartheid. We would encourage a joint statement here. (§)

The President: Mandela is a hopeful person to conduct a dialogue with de Klerk. Both of them are coming here. The Europeans may ease sanctions, but we will not do that. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: A unique situation may be emerging with both sides urging a peaceful solution. We should stimulate this process. (§)

Secretary Baker: On Angola, we would like to pursue the election route. You say that Dos Santos is not quite ready. But we should push in that direction. The two sides are talking and we have offered talks under our joint sponsorship. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: One new element: Savimbi offered to meet with us. Dos Santos does not object and we will do it privately. (§)

The President: What shall we discuss next? (§)

President Gorbachev: Korea -- a lot of things worry us on the peninsula. I think we agree the two sides should engage in dialogue. A small step was taken in the release of U.S. troops. Politically, that is an important gesture. We are worried there is no agreement between North Korea and the IAEA, and they are very touchy about any contacts we have with South Korea. Those contacts are economic, and they are good. South Korea would like Siberian resources, and we are willing. Roh asked for a contract
and we agreed, thinking it would be kept quiet. I am worried about the reaction of the North. We have told Kim there is no change in our policy, no recognition. We have said we are just meeting with the South Koreans to make their acquaintance and to promote Korean dialogue. We don’t know what will come of it. Once again, we may be accused of betrayal. (§)

The President: We think it is a good thing you are seeing Roh. Our concern is Kim and his blocking of the IAEA agreement and the lack of moderating behavior. South Korea’s reaching out is good. If Kim could accept safeguards, it would help. We are worried about instability on the peninsula. Earlier, we would have been upset about your talking to the South Koreans. This is no longer the case.

President Gorbachev: We will try to explain ourselves. (§)

The President: North Korea made one positive move: their return of the remains of five US soldiers. (§)

President Gorbachev: We did our bit on that. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: The Koreans asked if the US would provide them with non-nuclear guarantees. Then maybe they will sign on with the IAEA. (§)

The President: Will there be a more moderate government in Korea? We don’t know much about it. (§)

President Gorbachev: These Eastern systems are hard to figure out. The way is being paved to transfer power to the son. They have swallowed Hungary’s establishment of relations with South Korea, but it will be different when we make contact. Think about nuclear guarantees. (§)

General Scowcroft: If they would guarantee not to attack South Korea. (§)

President Gorbachev: Why not? (§)

General Scowcroft: We have tried formulations before but we can look at it again. (§)

The President: Let’s talk about Japan. It can be helpful; they can help with economic assistance, as they have in Eastern Europe. Kaifu is stronger now, and we are working pragmatically on trade. Many feel Japan is buying up the U.S., but I don’t worry about that. Japan might be helpful if you could deal with the Territories. It is your business, but I think you would find it beneficial. I commend Kaifu to you — and hope he is still in power when you go there. (§)

President Gorbachev: We decided it was worthwhile for me to visit next year. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and Yeltsin will visit this fall. The Japanese know in principle that the Territories issue is clear, but their involvement in our Eastern
Territories has been unsatisfactory thus far. For a long time they resisted any economic discussions, and they still think the economic relationship benefits us more than them. Their Foreign Ministry is conservative through and through. There is people contact, but no real business being conducted. When we move to a market system and open up to foreign firms, I think they will change. But 97% of the Soviet people oppose any movement on the Islands. (§)

The President: Let’s move on to Cambodia. (§)

President Gorbachev: I think there is some hope there. I am slightly optimistic. Our common task is to solidify the agreements that the four sides made, and to help set up the supervisory organization. I have statements from Sihanouk and from Hun Sen which are very similar. There is some convergence emerging. (§)

The President: We have little influence, but we will urge cooperation. We will talk to the PRC even though we are without much influence with them. We hope that you will also do so. (§)

President Gorbachev: My impression is that the Chinese are acting more positively. Shevardnadze discussed the issue with Li Peng and they are now normalizing relations with Vietnam. The fact that China and Vietnam are talking is sending a signal to Phnom Penh. (There was a humorous discussion of Cuba, sugar and moonshine. The President described the US sugar problem and Central American sales of coffee and sugar to the US.) (§)

Secretary Baker: (Renews our proposal for the Soviet Union to join the G-24 in helping Central America.) (§)

President Gorbachev: Our cooperation with Nicaragua in the past will continue. We are considering it (the proposal regarding the G-24). (§)

The President: What is next? (§)

President Gorbachev: Cyprus. Vassiliou has written to both of us. He wants us to support a UN mission to Cyprus to break the deadlock. (§)

Minister Shevardnadze: In order not to antagonize Greece or Turkey, the best way is for each side to support UN efforts. (§)

The President: What is left? (§)

General Scowcroft: We need to discuss coordination for the press conference on Germany and Lithuanian. (§)

President Gorbachev: We could say we had a good exchange, that both sides presented their arguments and made their case, and that it is not just a question between the two of us. As a result we decided that these consultations should continue. That is the shortest formula. (§)
The President: They will press me on trade, that I said Lithuania complicated the situation. I will say that the trade agreement is in the best interest of both sides. The next step is emigration legislation and that is where it stands. They will ask how about Lithuania. I will say I expressed myself fully on Lithuania but the next step is emigration legislation. (§)

Secretary Baker: They will ask whether there is a side deal. When I was asked, I said I could not talk about private conversations. The President said it will be difficult to get trade legislation through Congress and that is true, but that issue does not arise now because the next step is Soviet emigration legislation. (§)

President Gorbachev: The rest of it I will say. We have to bear in mind that rigid linkage should be avoided. We had a direct discussion of Lithuania. I discussed the situation and the prospects. We are looking for, and I expect I will find a solution within the framework of our Federation. Each Republic can withdraw or change the form of its relationship, but this must be in the established framework. (§)

The President: The more you can explain that to the US, the better. I will just stay away from linkage. (§)

President Gorbachev: And we will point out that it is not just one agreement, we have agreements on grain, aviation, etc. I will say that we cannot take away the right of self-determination, but since it is a constitutional right it must be done constitutionally. (§)

The President: The press is now more positive. Time and Newsweek said you were in trouble. That created a tough environment, but you have shown yourself completely in charge. (§)

President Gorbachev: It is a complex period, but we have to accept a pluralism of views. Not every one will agree with us, or we wouldn't have pluralism. (§)

Secretary Baker: (AFL and Donets Conference) (§)