

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Follow-up Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Christopher Perzanowski, Interpreter

Poland
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime
Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 22, 1990, 10:00 - 10:30 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

As agreed in their March 21 Oval Office meeting, the President and Prime Minister Mazowiecki held a follow-up meeting, which began at 10:00 a.m. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Thank you for a magnificent evening. (U)

The President: I worried that it was late for you. But I liked the spirit of the dinner. It was palpable. You stayed awake during the piano recital. That was heroic. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I love Gershwin and Chopin. I thought during the recital that we politicians do many things, but Chopin goes on. (U)

The President: What would you like to finish up on -- overall security arrangements, the border? How do you see longer term security arrangements, following a settlement [of the issue of German unification]. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yesterday we discussed a Council for European Cooperation -- an expanded CSCE. History moves so fast that some institution like this is needed. We should not leave Helsinki II without something like this, providing collective

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security in Europe for the longer term. To us an essential point is as follows: we are between a unifying Germany and a Soviet Union having a variety of unpredictable processes. I want to ensure that U.S. policy envisages a strong Poland -- not on a German or a Soviet scale, but as a big, stable factor between Germany and the Soviet Union. Poland could serve as a basic factor for a new democratic order in Europe. With American support, this role could grow. (Ø)

The President: I could say something to the press about this, I would be delighted to say Poland has this useful and unique role. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I would really appreciate that. (Ø)

The President: I want to assure you that I will handle the Soviets in a way which doesn't complicate life for Poland. I want to reduce tensions and solve problems with the Soviet Union, not create problems which would add to German tensions and thus affect Poland. I think Gorbachev realizes this as well. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Thank you. We want to get both those relationships free of associations with the past. I want to get Soviet forces out of Poland. With a reduction to 195,000, I would hope to have them out. (S)

The President: We aren't saying everyone must leave now. I just want to delink after the 195. We are there to stabilize. But I can't go out and say we think Soviet troops should stay. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: No, of course not. (U)

The President: U.S. forces wouldn't remain to threaten anyone. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: We have made clear that we plan to talk about it with Gorbachev. We just don't want to be ostentatious about it.. (S)

The President: (Side conversation about broccoli.) (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: The press tries to get differences between us on the German issue. I told them the differences were minimal. We will continue to press for a treaty before unification, because we fear afterwards it would slow down. We would like your support with Kohl. I think his worries are excessive. (Ø)

The President: If he would agree, that would be final. But I am not sure we are in total agreement. If there is content to a

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treaty, isn't that better than two treaties by states which won't exist? You have pulled Kohl a long way. I just can't go out and put public pressure on him. I trust Kohl. A contented unified Germany -- frankly, under Kohl -- is easier to deal with on a number of issues. I will tell Kohl your position. I am just not as concerned on this point as you. I think resolutions followed by an early treaty -- which we would press for -- would be okay. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I understand. But this concern is across Europe, not just with us. (S)

The President: Yes, I know -- especially in France, though Mitterrand is very close to Kohl. I know your concerns are broadly shared. A philosophical question: how long does Germany have to do penance? (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: It is not a question of penance. It is a credibility that Germany has changed. I told Kohl: don't let yourself be overtaken by the SPD. It sounds different to Poles when you say, "I can speak for the FRG and will support that in a unified Germany" than if he says "I speak for the FRG and what comes after has to be decided then." (S)

The President: But you got him off that. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: But it came hard. (S)

The President: I think Kohl is for real. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: West Germany has undergone a deep democratization process. East Germany has not. It moved from one totalitarian system directly to another. What kind of influence will they exert? (S)

The President: Do you worry more about East Germany or the Republikaner? (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I don't think there is a current threat. It is leaving something that in the future could be returned to -- that is our fear. (S)

The President: One short point: on Two Plus Four, we have a narrow view of it as dealing with Four Power legal and other responsibilities, not with Europe as a whole. We don't see it as an exclusionary body with a broad mandate. The Soviets were anxious to get it going, but Britain and France like it also. (S)

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What is the rest of your schedule? (Discussion of remainder of visit.) (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I thank you for a very warm and magnificent reception. (U)

The President: We have only respect and friendship for you and your people. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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