MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
- The President
- Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Poland
- Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
- Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime Minister's Office
- Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 21, 1990, 10:30 - 11:20 a.m.
The Oval Office

Following the arrival ceremony, the President and Prime Minister Mazowiecki began their one-on-one meeting at 10:30 a.m. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: There is one problem I have not been able to clear up. (U)

The President: What? (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Smoking. (U)

The President: (Describes Mrs. Bush.) First, let me welcome you. After our meeting and the expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room, I will be introducing you to the U.S. members of the Polish-American Enterprise Board and then we will sign the U.S.-Polish Business and Economic Agreement. If you have any private subject, this is a good time to discuss it. Then we can join our colleagues. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I want to thank you for an open, warm, friendly welcome. I value it. I believe there has been an enormous acceleration of history in Europe. Its speed is surprising us all. (U)

The President: Absolutely. No one here has predicted the pace. We thought Poland would be first, but no one predicted the pace of change. (U)
Prime Minister Mazowiecki: My first topic is German unification. Reconciliation with Germany is an historic task for us. We must take it on because soon we will be neighbors of such a Germany. We must be forward-looking, not concentrate on our traumas. We also must reconcile with the Russians. I must convince them that a non-Communist government could still be a friendly government with normal relations. So we have two reconciliations.

But concerning the border: thank you for your statement with Kohl and for including us in the Two Plus Four talks. The Polish people are paranoid about agreements being made over their heads.

The President: There is similar thinking in this country on Yalta.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: It is crucial to us to insure that our western territories are not just a gift from Stalin -- that they are guaranteed by all the powers, not just in a unilateral act by one. That is why we want to be in the meeting and want a recognition of that border by treaty. We welcome progress in that direction, but declarations are just declarations, and we need a treaty. We need a treaty worked out prior to unification and signed afterwards. Why before? Because after, we fear a sense of strength of a new Germany. I believe Kohl sincerely, but I worry about subsequent statements.

The President: We may have a slight difference -- not on substance, but about Kohl. I am convinced he is not stalling because he thinks a unified Germany would be less willing to cooperate. He is not trying to find a way out of adequate guarantees. He has big political problems, though less severe after the GDR elections. That is why he is dragging his feet. He has taken steps: the Bundestag resolution renouncing territorial claims "now and in the future" and calling for a treaty.

I see your concerns. Confidentially, what if I could get Kohl to agree with you on a text of a treaty now? Don’t answer now, and please keep it confidential. If that would help move the process, I would try it. I don’t think I am naive about Kohl. I am convinced he has no secret agenda.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Basically, I am convinced it is not a game, but I worry about excessive references to his right wing. I, too, have a right wing. I cannot accept all his arguments about not doing what is necessary.

The President: But he has moved.
Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yes. (U)

The President: Do the GDR elections make Kohl’s problem easier or harder? (ḍ)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: They should make it easier. It was a big victory, but I would fear that a big victory would make unification by Article 23 more likely. We all should insure that a unified Germany should not have that in its Constitution. (ḍ)

The President: Doesn’t that have to come from a unified Germany? (ḍ)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yes. Going back to your words, my first reaction is positive, but I must study the idea. But I think a treaty should be initialed before unification. Why not? (ḍ)

The President: Because neither is a legal entity. (ḍ)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: But they could initial it. (ḍ)

The President: Kohl has proposed that the two German parliaments pass common resolutions and that an all-German Government conclude a treaty with Poland. Your idea is to write and initial the treaty before unification and sign afterwards. But think about my proposal. Be assured we are playing no games. We are solid on things. You know of our good relations with Germany and Kohl. We trust Kohl, but I realize you can’t make policy on individuals. But we have no reason to be suspicious. Kohl is sensitive about having to do continued penance for Nazi sins. But I also recognize Polish concerns about the past and sympathize with their emotions. (ḍ)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Regarding unification itself, we do not share the view that Germany should be neutral. We believe Germany should be incorporated into a European framework. (ḍ)

The President: We think Germany should stay in NATO. I have a selling job with Gorbachev -- I like him -- to convince him to have Germany in an expanded role for NATO. We don’t want to withdraw from Europe and come home. We see the U.S. playing a positive role. We see the U.S. as a stabilizer. If we aren’t wanted in Europe, I will have our troops out the next day. But I think that is not the wise way to proceed. (ḍ)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: We don’t believe in a neutral Germany. But we have to do something in a way that Gorbachev can survive. I feel a NATO solution is not acceptable to Gorbachev.
SECRET

I may be wrong. Maybe forces of both could remain in Germany. (C)

The President: You may be right about that. I can't see with
great clarity future events in the Soviet Union. We see
irreversibility in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but not in the
Soviet Union. While there is a mood for pulling back, we should
take advantage of it. It might not always be so. I want him to
accept the idea there need not be a parity of forces. (C)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: 195,000? (C)

The President: For now, but I don't think we should reduce
equally, because we think we are a stabilizing force. But if
Europeans don't think so, we will be out of there. (C)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I understand. (U)

The President: We mustn't impose on our colleagues in the other
room. We can talk again this evening briefly, and perhaps we
could have another private meeting tomorrow. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I would like to continue. We have
much to discuss. (Gives plaque to the President.) (U)

-- End of Conversation --