### Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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<td>10. Memcon</td>
<td>Re: Luncheon Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (10 pp.)</td>
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**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files

**Series:** Presidential Correspondence

**Subseries:** Presidential Memcons

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/90 - 4/11/90

**Date Closed:** 1/26/2009

**FOIA/SYS Case #:** 2009-0275-S

**Re-review Case #:**

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**Appeal Case #:**

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**Disposition Date:**

**MR Case #:**

**MR Disposition:**

**MR Disposition Date:**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
John Robson, Deputy Secretary of Treasury
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Melissa Wells, U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique
John M. Ordway, Director, African Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)

President Joaquim Chissano
Pascoal Mocumbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jacinto Veloso, Minister of Cooperation
Abdul Osman, Minister of Finance
Francisco Madeira, Presidential Advisor
Florencio Infante, Presidential Advisor
Felisberto Lukanga, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs
Valeriano Ferrao, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 13, 1990, 12:30 p.m. - 1:10 p.m.
Old Family Dining Room

The President: Tell me about de Klerk. I know you have met him. Our impression is that he is very different. I have invited him here, and Mr. Mandela as well. I would be interested in your view.

President Chissano: I met him even before he became State President, as leader of the National Party. I reported on my meeting to my colleagues in the Front Line States. I said he was a man who knows how to listen, and with whom we can discuss.

The President: When was that?

President Chissano: Before he became President. It was September 1989. [COMMENT: Chissano's first meeting with de Klerk, before his election, was in July 1989. He had a second...]

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
CBI 8/31/2009
2000-0429-F
meeting in Maputo with the new State President, in December 1989. END COMMENT] De Klerk told me about his program. I said I trusted him. He was so frank and open. He listened to my suggestions. And on his second visit, we had a very private lunch, just myself and two others. We spoke freely. He told me he would release Nelson Mandela, and end the State of Emergency. He hinted he would unban the parties that had been banned. And he did it. \(\text{LET}\)

As Nelson Mandela said in Lusaka, he has the same views. They trust him. But he has to move. \(\text{LET}\)

The President: Can he deliver? There are problems on the political right in South Africa. Is he strong enough to do the things necessary to end apartheid? \(\text{LET}\)

President Chissano: I think so. There is a lot of fear among the whites, especially the Afrikaners. There is a fear of being the minority. But I think they can come to a solution. I recently read a book by South African whites, linked to the Government, who say guarantees, freedoms and rights should be extended to all, not just a group. They should not apply just exclusively to a minority. \(\text{LET}\)

Secretary Baker: When do you think negotiations, beyond talks about talks, between the black majority and the government might start? \(\text{LET}\)

President Chissano: The ANC needs some time, not long, to organize themselves. Their leaders have just been released from jail. Mandela was a member of the National Executive Committee, without a title, when he was arrested. \(\text{LET}\)

The President: So long ago. \(\text{LET}\)

President Chissano: Now, he has been elected Vice President [COMMENT: Deputy President], and can act with some power. He had not even met with the ANC President, only now in Sweden. \(\text{LET}\)

Secretary Baker: Is his health -- Tambo's -- such that he will not come back? \(\text{LET}\)

President Chissano: Not soon. \(\text{LET}\)

The President: Before Mandela went into prison, was Tambo a leader over Mandela? \(\text{LET}\)

President Chissano: Yes. \(\text{LET}\)
The President: Mandela, as a result of his many years in prison, has a standing in the outside world that Tambo does not have.

President Chissano: They were friends, two lawyers who opened up the same office. They were very close friends. Tambo built up Mandela after he went into prison. He would have proposed Mandela as president, but Mandela would not have accepted.

The President: I am very hopeful both will come. We don't have a date for Mandela. But I believe that de Klerk has accepted?

Ambassador Cohen: We don't have a date for him yet.

The President: I hope we can help. We don't have a colonial background, so perhaps we could help where others couldn't.

We are operating under sanctions. I'd like to ask your opinion, although maybe we will disagree, here. I have never been very impressed with sanctions, although we do enforce them. What is your impression? Should we keep them on?

President Chissano: Now, sanctions may be playing a positive role supporting de Klerk. He can say to his right wing, we have to change. If we don't change, sanctions will prevail. We will have to keep sanctions for some time.

After talks with him, you could move to relieve some sanctions, but coordinate this with the anti-apartheid forces. In terms of the UN, I would wait until July, when the Secretary-General will give his report on the implementation of the resolution on South Africa. We in Mozambique will have to be in touch with de Klerk to see what we can do. We don't apply sanctions. We can't.

We and Angola are talking to them to prepare for the future. We are trying to bring in our other colleagues in the region, but it is difficult. We, South Africa and Angola will start talks in Cape Verde. But we won't do anything spectacular that would harm the process.

The President: There's a delicate balance.

President Chissano: A question of timing. Also, the pressure is not against de Klerk and Pik Botha. The pressure is against other forces.

The President: This is what worries me. De Klerk is different. And if he is freeing Nelson Mandela and taking other steps which show he is doing different things, how do we give him help with his right wing, so he can show progress? How to combine this
with keeping up the pressure. We want to give something that can help.

President Chissano: I am not sure that things will work that way. We may get the reverse. They may say, the U.S. is satisfied, we don't have to do anything. I was to visit South Africa, but I am now taking my time. I talked to the anti-apartheid movement, and to the FLS, about my invitation to visit South Africa. I found out this would not be welcomed. And when it comes to a visit, they say no, it will relax pressure. Wait until July. It is possible that something could happen in the meantime but otherwise we will wait until July.

The President: Jim, do you or Hank want to comment?

Secretary Baker: For us, sanctions is a legal issue. There are certain conditions written into the law that have to be satisfied first.

If I could get back to the peace process. Did you say that talks will start in Malawi shortly after Namibian independence?

President Chissano: Any time after that. It will depend on RENAMO.

Ambassador Cohen: Are there any preconditions?

President Chissano: They didn't spell any out, but up to now they have asked that we recognize them as a party. We could not start by accepting them as a party.

Secretary Baker: Regarding investment, there should be great potential for investment in Mozambique, once people know the war is ended. We will have to have that also before we can get Congressional action on military assistance. It would not carry the day unless discussions were going on with some prospect of success.

I know Hank Cohen will meet with you later today, and he will discuss the specifics of what you asked for in the Cabinet Room. Incidentally, I wanted you to know that the $100 million in assistance we are providing this year is the largest assistance budget in sub-Saharan Africa.
Ambassador Cohen: May I raise a new issue? {E}

The President: Please, go right ahead. {E}

Ambassador Cohen: We have just learned this morning that South Africa will sign the NPT. And, they want you to sign, also. {E}

President Chissano: I know. They want to condition their signature. You know, the decision to adhere was taken three years ago, when I was foreign minister. But then there were procedural problems, and it got all stuck up. But it will be ratified by the government, even before we go back. I have
instructed the permanent commission to adopt it. Yesterday, the Council of Ministers was supposed to act, but their agenda was too full to do so. 

Ambassador Cohen: South Africa will be the first nuclear capable country to sign.

The President: Why is that so important?

Ambassador Cohen: Because they accept safeguards. It's like Pakistan and Israel.

The President: I had an interesting discussion in the Oval Office with the President on multiple parties, on how the constitution was being drawn up, figuring out the best way to proceed. I was wondering how you plan to proceed.

President Chissano: We are putting this in a separate track. This is being discussed as a special point. We see some advantages to a multi-party system. But also some inconveniences related to the specific situation of Mozambique. So we are taking into consideration both. We want the people to understand and accept and work within it. There are some dangers: many different languages and ethnic groups, poverty.

You in America can talk about democracy and rights. The Brazilian Ambassador in Maputo was astonished after visiting Zambezi Province recently. He said that in Brazil, the people say "we want rights." But you, as President of Mozambique, have to tell people in the village, that they have rights.

We have to educate our people on democratic rights. I am afraid that some may abuse this opening against the interests of the people themselves. And the people might not participate if they don't understand it. Today they are accustomed to obeying the traditional chief. They are used to saying, FRELIMO must decide. These are some considerations we have to take into account.

Secretary Baker: The U.S. has a multi-party democracy. But we have only two parties. Some say that is our strength, since there can be no coalitions. In Romania, where I was recently, they are encouraging multiple parties to the point that three people and a mimeograph machine results in a new party. They have 40 parties. They will coalesce, and the number will be reduced.

Maybe I shouldn't ask, and you don't have to answer, but if you were negotiating with RENAMO, and they said they were prepared to have a ceasefire, but wanted to organize as a party and compete, what would you say?
President Chissano: We will accept it if the national consultation accepts that the country is ready for a multi-party system. (C)

Secretary Baker: Consultation? (C)

The President: He explained that the decision can't be taken just by FRELIMO. It must be the people. (C)

President Chissano: Everybody is expressing themselves in favor or against this. The process will end up in the National Assembly, and the decision taken. Then, the prerequisites for a group to claim to be a party will be established in law. Only then can we say that RENAMO is a party. (C)

Secretary Baker: Maybe it will be like here, where anybody can form a party, but to get on the ballot you need evidence of support. Will FRELIMO take the position that you want a multi-party system? (C)

President Chissano: We may not have support for this in FRELIMO. So we won't have party discipline on this issue. Members must take individual positions. For example, a group of lawyers will meet soon, with foreign visitors present, to discuss freely their position. We don't want to influence their views, since we did this in the past and it was wrong. (C)

Ambassador Cohen: The Nigerians have done some useful work here. For example, they require that a party have a minimum level of support in each district. (C)

President Chissano: In the constitution, it will have to say that each candidate will have to have 200 signatures in each province, and 5,000 total. (C)

The President: That is most understandable. But you still don't have what is required for a party. (C)

President Chissano: It depends on what the people want. Even if we don't adopt a multi-party system now, it could happen within five years. (This is because the constitution cannot be changed for at least five years.) The discussion will continue, and a decision can be taken when the people are ready. (C)

The President: Faster is better in terms of the way the people of the world look on it. The trend is that way in the Soviet Union, in Central America. The trend is toward participation, multi-party structures, and the more you can do, the better. (C)
President Chissano: There are those in our leadership who can argue that very well.

The President: Who is the head of RENAMO, and does he have power, or is it diffused? (C)

President Chissano: Dhlakama ... (C)

The President: Does he impose himself? (C)

President Chissano: Many are participating out of fear. I had information that some of them wanted to quit, thought that our principles were sound, and were tired of war. But they did not dare tell him that, since he can kill them. (C)

The President: Who is perfect among us. Take Nicaragua. If you had said two months ago, George, Nicaragua will have an election, and Ortega will lose and accept defeat gracefully and turn over power to the opposition. If you had said that two months ago Jim, I would have said you needed psychiatric help. (C)

The jury is still out, but he's behaving extraordinarily well. He went over the night of the election and, in the democratic tradition, congratulated the winner. There have been some flurries, but for the most part, including his conversation with the Vice President yesterday, he has done the right thing. This is a good lesson. Maybe the parallel in Mozambique is that it is not just the extreme in control, and the spirit of democracy can prevail. (C)

Nicaragua is very interesting to us. It looks like he will participate in the minority, respecting the people's right to change. It has been a good lesson for me, sitting up here to the north. (C)

(b)(1)

The President: That is very interesting about South Africa. We know you stuck your neck out, when you reached your agreement with South Africa. We know you found violations of the deal. But I am glad you are now encouraged by developments in South Africa. (C)
President Chissano: In Nicaragua, Ortega and the Sandanistas had some power -- at least 41 percent. They could retain 41 percent. This might happen with FRELIMO. Other people could say, "we will give you food" and get elected. People are hungry and struggling. (C)

The President: I would not worry about going head to head with RENAMO. You have a record, you have improved the situation, the reputation and standing of the country. If someone says you screwed up, you can stand on your record. (C)

President Chissano: The problem with FRELIMO is that we did not fight for power, and don't fight for power. If I want to replace someone, they say, "let's negotiate." We all want to retire [indicating some of his colleagues.] (C)

The President: I was very glad you came the 19-1/2 hours to get here. The press is waiting downstairs for us to make our statements. But I want to let you know how much I appreciate your coming here, and to let you know that there are channels to communicate, if you have to. (C)

President Chissano: You have a trusted man in Maputo. (U) (laughter)

The President: One of our best men. [laughter, as Ambassador Wells waves her hand.] (U)

We want to keep good, two-way lines of communication. We have great respect for you. When I heard your story about the destruction of schools and infrastructure ... I hope we can respond. (C)

I always feel funny telling others that we have problems. But we do. I don't ask for anything but understanding that what we want to do is circumscribed by our enormous deficit, and Congressional restraints. But sometimes we need positive results to get Congress to change. I am sorry to say that, but we want to support what you are doing. Stay in touch with the Ambassador, who reports to the Secretary. We want to stay in touch, especially given the situation in South Africa. (C)

The President: I don't know him, don't recognize the name. I know many businessmen, who were involved in going into China while I was there, when things were just starting up. But he is
not a personal friend. If he represented himself as a close personal friend, he's not. But I will check it out. (C)