MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Sim Smiley, Interpreter

Italy
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Advisor to the Prime Minister (notetaker)
Carla Lonigro, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 6, 1990, 10:30 a.m. - 10:48 a.m.
The Oval Office

Following the arrival ceremony and photo opportunity in the Oval Office, the President and Prime Minister Andreotti began their one-on-one meeting at 10:30 a.m. (U)

The President: The press asked you a question on Two Plus Four. We are sensitive to it. Your answer was good. There will be no condoning of the exclusion of any ally on German unification. I tried to impress on Kohl our views on this. There was an unfortunate comment at Ottawa. I will insist on full consultation within the Alliance. It is not the role of the US to sit around and divide up the world. (B)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you. The Alliance needs to be more united, even more than in the past. The problem of Germany, of course, concerns the two Germanies, but also NATO and the CSCE process. If we fall into the temptation of dealing with problems bilaterally -- including Germany -- it will be disastrous. We told Kohl he shouldn't start talking about a monetary union without talking to us, because that affects all of us. He said there had been no time. If this happened in the military sector, it would be a disaster. It's not a matter of prestige to say that Two Plus Four is not a device to deal with overall problems, except maybe in Berlin. The three-circle approach is right: EC-NATO-CSCE. (B)
The President: No solution should come about without full agreement. I worry about the border issue, but there have been encouraging words from the two parties in Germany on that issue. Soviet troops remaining in Poland are part of this. If Kohl would consult with all the rest of us as well, we could deal with these concerns. (☞)

The press asks me who is the enemy. I say it is instability and unpredictability. Events have moved in the right direction, but will that continue? I wanted you to know my feelings, because you are such a good and close friend. (☞)

Prime Minister Andreotti: We cannot thoroughly discuss the Alliance, because the enemy has changed. Everything must be done gradually. In the early stage there may be troops on the other side, but this must be transitory. In the meantime, we cannot build the new Alliance and Helsinki model. These two must be a strong basis for US in Europe. Should several "Euro-theories" get stronger, we would have a real crisis. We have two nuclear powers, and the rest are not. We could absorb this within NATO; but without it, all will want nuclear weapons or a European nuclear deterrent. This would be a step back. (☞)

The President: If this became seen here as a predominant view, the US would come home and be isolationist. I will fight for defense and the Alliance, but if this happened, it would overwhelm all other views. (☞)

Prime Minister Andreotti: It would create a crisis within the Alliance. We must move fast to upgrade the philosophy of NATO. (☞)

The President: I agree. We had good talks with Woerner, and we should consult closely. This is our unifying force. I was pleased when Kohl came out strongly in favor of a continuing strong NATO. (☞)

Prime Minister Andreotti: This, along with CSCE, doesn't create problems for Gorbachev. (☞)

The President: In his heart, I think Gorbachev accepts this idea, though maybe his generals do not. (☞)

Prime Minister Andreotti: A strong, unified Germany inside Europe without the US would be a danger. Mrs. Thatcher is very strong on this point, and she is right. You called me about troop reductions. It is not the number that matters, but the US commitment to remain in Europe. (☞)

The President: Of course, but there are pressures in Congress -- right and left -- to bring our troops home and deliver a "peace dividend," putting money into Chicago, etc. But this is not the world role the US should play. (☞)

-- End of Conversation --