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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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1782

March 7, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with French President
Mitterrand, February 26, 1990

At Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for the President's telephone call to French President Mitterrand on February 26. The memorandum at Tab I transmits the Telcon to State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I which transmits the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to State.

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve *Val*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Hughes Memorandum for Roy

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation with Mitterrand

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *CP* NARA, Date *7/29/10*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with French President
Mitterrand (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
Cornelius O'Leary, Notetaker

DATE, TIME February 26, 1990, 3:53 - 4:48 pm
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: The 28 hours Helmut Kohl spent with me at Camp David were very successful. Helmut believes that unification will accelerate after the March 18 election. Both the U.S. and the FRG want an orderly process of unification, but Helmut is worried about a possible mass exodus from the GDR or that the GDR will simply declare itself part of the FRG after the election. We were very clear about the FRG remaining in NATO. Helmut also wants to accelerate EC integration. We agreed that U.S. forces can stay in the FRG if everybody wants them to stay. (S)

I also explained U.S. nuclear weapons policy to Helmut and said that our policy of keeping nuclear weapons on FRG soil is the underpinning of U.S. and NATO security policy. The security of our own forces is a primary consideration. (S)

We talked about the SFN issue since he knew it would be part of his election campaign this Fall. The 2 + 4 arrangement should work out, leading to our giving up four power rights sometime after the 18 March elections. A 1 + 3 meeting is on the schedule at this time. We agreed that NATO must be fully involved in these security talks; we need to insure that the smaller allies are not left out. They must be consulted, and we must insure that we do not project an image of the large countries cutting up the world. The Helsinki Act recognizes, and we recognize, the current borders of the FRG and the GDR. (S)

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No agreement on the Polish borders can be done without Polish involvement. However, Poland will not be part of the 2 + 4 discussions. Helmut's concern with public opinion is obviously driven by politics and by the upcoming elections. (S)

These were the key points we discussed, although we discussed several other problems as well. (S)

I am also very pleased with the Nicaraguan election. We view it as good news, and it is good for democracy. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is very important for democracy to have established itself in Latin America. (S)

The President: We believe Ortega will actually turn over control of the government and the military in April. He told President Perez of Venezuela this. It is very important that we stay in touch in this dynamic situation. I value your thoughts and your judgment; please stay in touch. (S)

President Mitterrand: I have two points to make: one is about the Oder-Neisse border, the other is on French forces in the FRG. On the border issue, I believe Kohl's silence is a mistake. There are only two legal arguments for a reunited Germany. One is Article Seven of the 1954 agreement which is not as strong, and the other is Helsinki, which could be used as a basis. Helmut Kohl must be responsible for his actions and he should use diplomacy. He must recognize the Oder-Neisse border. However, for election reasons, I do not believe he will do it. (S)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Mitterrand: I think that Helmut Kohl is looking towards Bavaria and he sees a resurgence of neo-Nazism there. I have told Kohl that he is making a serious mistake. It is a fact of life that Europeans will always be suspicious of Germany because of the War, although the Europeans may be vague in articulating this suspicion. The SPD could well win the March GDR elections. If so, it will be hard for Helmut Kohl to regain momentum, and it is in his best interest to be open. (S)

The President: Poland, in fact, wants Soviet troops to remain in Poland to show it has an ally. (S)

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President Mitterrand: The Poles want to be full partners in an agreement. Kohl is mistaken when he says the declaration on the border should wait until after the FRG and GDR are united. Kohl misses the point that it is not up to Germany to verify the borders. The victors should have a say, presumably the World War II victors. There must be absolute clarity on this position among the UK, France and the United States. (S)

Regarding the French Army in the FRG, I don't want my soldiers to be a point of mockery for the Germans to say as they march "what are you doing here?" I instructed the French Ambassador in Berlin to organize a parade and the Berliners asked that the parade be cancelled. (S)

The President: I didn't know that. (U)

President Mitterrand: The statement must be clear. We are in Germany for the Western world, and for the protection of Germany. If we were just a conqueror and did not need to be in Germany, we wouldn't want to be like the Soviets in the GDR hiding from the people. When we speak of German unity, it is 2 + 4. When we speak of the borders, it is 4 + 2. I want you to know my thoughts. I also want you to keep my position in mind with the FRG. (S)

The President: I don't blame you. I would not want to see insults to our forces or yours. I don't want that. We will keep in touch and I will tell Helmut Kohl we talked about the Polish border. (S)

President Mitterrand: I need to have you to understand my reactions. We must not subjugate our national strategic concerns for Helmut Kohl's domestic political concerns. (S)

The President: Helmut Kohl supports you and your opinion. (S)

President Mitterrand: All of this will go very fast. Let's not believe the USSR has vanished from the scene. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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