**Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet**

*(George Bush Library)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No. and Type</th>
<th>Subject/Title of Document</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Restriction</th>
<th>Class.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18. Telcon</td>
<td>Re: Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, of United Kingdom (8 pp.)</td>
<td>2/24/90</td>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Collection:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Record Group:</th>
<th>Bush Presidential Records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office:</td>
<td>Scowcroft, Brent, Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series:</td>
<td>Presidential Correspondence Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subseries:</td>
<td>Presidential Telcon Files</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**File Location:** Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/90 - 3/15/90

**Date Closed:** 2/2/2009

**FOIA/SYS Case #:** 2009-0275-S

**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

**AR Case #:** 2000-0429-F(570)

**AR Disposition:** Released in Part

**AR Disposition Date:** 2/25/2009

**OA/ID Number:** 91111-005

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
  - P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
  - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
  - C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
  - (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(6) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(7) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(8) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

**Document Partially Declassified**

(Copy of Document Follows)

By [Signature] (NLGB) on 1/6/10
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, of United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 24, 1990, 8:01 - 8:42am EST
The Oval Office

The President: I would like to talk about my upcoming visit with Helmut, among other things. (6)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
The President: This is very helpful, timely, and interesting. I’ll take a look at these questions. I agree that unification is a given now. When I talk to Helmut, I will seek a clear statement from him about full membership in NATO for a united Germany. This is very, very important. That would include continued integration of German forces in the NATO command and the continued presence of U.S. troops.

Prime Minister Thatcher: 

The President: I’m concerned about the Soviets...

Prime Minister Thatcher: 

The President: A lot of people here don’t understand the need to keep a strong defense. Look, I know you saw the Genscher-Stoltenberg statement which calls for demilitarizing the former territory of the GDR. Did you discuss with the Germans the troubling questions this raises about NATO’s defense responsibility for this portion of a united Germany?

Prime Minister Thatcher: 

The President: I had an interesting discussion with Havel. He came here talking about getting all Soviet and US troops out of Europe. I told him we thought the US situation was different from the Soviets. When he left, he had modified his statements on this issue. I was very pleased.

Prime Minister Thatcher: 

The President: With Mazowiecki -- I can’t pronounce that name, I know he wants the Soviets to stay. But I don’t think that will be popular for long with the Polish people, in spite of worries about the border. I am concerned about his position. Did he discuss this with you?

Prime Minister Thatcher: 

SECRET/SENSITIVE
The President: Yes. He's coming here. I'm not comfortable with Soviet troops staying there. (3)

I really want to seek a clear commitment from Helmut to full membership for Germany in NATO. (b) (1)

We have been thinking about what the Two Plus Four should be prepared to discuss, and at what stage they should begin their work. I do not want to give Moscow a forum in Germany that it will use to exploit German domestic politics to pressure Kohl to somehow accept a loose arrangement between Germany and NATO that would spell the end of the Alliance. (3)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b) (1)

The President: In this forum we can be very frank ... (3)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b) (1)

The President: (b) (1)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b) (1)

The President: (b) (1)

On Poland, I want you to know we consider the current borders between the GDR and Poland to be permanent and inviolable. The
Helsinki accord speaks to that. (§)

Prime Minister Thatcher: |

(b) (1)

The President: Did you tell the Poles we recognize the border as inviolable and settled? (§)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes. | (b) (1)

The President: On Two Plus Four, we think whenever it meets, the focus should be to work out the details of giving up Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin as a whole. There can be a discussion with the Soviets and have them come to a common position that membership in NATO will prevail. It has to. How do you think Mitterrand feels about this? (§)

Prime Minister Thatcher: | (b) (1)
The President: I have another question on France. I talk to Mitterrand and I am concerned that he may be less enthusiastic on the NATO view. [5]

Prime Minister Thatcher: [5]

The President: We’re for keeping our nuclear weapons in Europe. I hope Francois will help on NATO. He should see NATO fundamentals as more important than ever. [6]

I saw the Norwegian Prime Minister yesterday. He was very helpful, with some concerns about naval forces. He pleaded for us to keep our commitment. We should not overlook these smaller countries. [6]

Prime Minister Thatcher: [6]

The President: The trouble is, he’s rocking along at ... [6]

Prime Minister Thatcher: [6]

The President: When I am asked who our enemy is now, I tell them apathy, complacency... [6]

Prime Minister Thatcher: [6]
The President: I'm increasingly concerned about that chemical plant in Libya. (☐)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

The President: No one seems to care. No one is anxious. We haven't done our job as well as we could. I'll be sure to raise this with Helmut. (☐)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

The President: This has been very helpful. We're very close on the key questions. (b)(1)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

The President: I'm not close enough to Europe. I was thinking that you and Francois and I should get together at some point, just for half a day. With Helmut having just been here, I don't think they will feel excluded. I just think it would be useful to have a triumvirate there to review things at some point. (☐)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

The President: It would be useful to do. (☐)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

The President: Me neither. (☐)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

The President: We want Gorbachev and perestroika to succeed. He seems out of the woods now, rebounding, landing on his feet. (☐)

The economy there is worse than I thought. (☐)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

The President: Have the Soviets asked you for food aid? (☐)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

The President: They have not asked us either. They also have...
terrible distribution problems. (b)(1)

Are you at Chequers? (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, I'm coming to Aspen, I believe on the 3rd and 4th of August. (F)

The President: You must come by. I'll see you before then. (F)

Prime Minister Thatcher: (b)(1)

(After a brief discussion of the First Lady and her health, the call concluded.) (U)

Pres was at Camp David