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<td>07. Memcon</td>
<td>Re: Meeting with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (7 pp.)</td>
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information...
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative
James F. Dobbins, Jr., Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Canadian Affairs
Morton Abramowitz, Ambassador to Turkey
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European
Political Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Turgut Ozal, President
Gunes Taner, State Minister for the Economy
Nuzhet Kandemir, Ambassador
Nabi Sensoy, Diplomatic Adviser to the
President
Kaya Toperi, Presidential Press Spokesman
Can Pulak, Adviser to the President

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 18, 1990, 12:45 - 1:45 pm EST
Old Family Dining Room

After their Oval Office meeting, the President and President Ozal
continued their discussion over lunch in the Old Family Dining
Room. (U)

The President: We were talking about the Middle East. We can't
seem to move the talks forward, though Jim Baker is working hard.
The Israelis are somewhat suspicious; so are the Palestinians.
But we have a formula that we hope will work. (CR

President Ozal: How did the talks with [Egyptian Foreign
Minister] Meguid go? (CR

Secretary Baker: We had some talks on the peace process. I am
couraged by what the Egyptians had to say on that. I met Rabin
this morning. He was encouraged, but not yet ready for the next
step of a foreign ministers’ conference. I believe we can get
them together if the parties concentrate on substance rather than
symbols. I believe maybe the Egyptians can agree. I was
pessimistic two weeks ago. Now I don't know, but I hope we can
move forward. (CR

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The President: We are continuing to work. If we get Palestinians and Israelis sitting down together, that's half the battle.

President Ozal: Are there problems with the composition of the Palestinian delegation?

Secretary Baker: It's a matter of symbols. The PLO says it must choose the delegation; Israel says no. Issues concerning the agenda can be solved.

The President: You mentioned Gadhafi. You have insights into Libyan thinking. Has he moderated? Or is he just laying low?

President Ozal: It is difficult to establish. We look at his deeds, not his words. His main problem is to create a nation from a tribal community. It is not easy. After the bombing, he is very much afraid. He also has troubles because of the embargo. He wants to solve the situation.

The President: We had a long talk with Mubarak, who has had a rather visible renewal of his dialogue with Gadhafi. We're still wary.

President Ozal: I agree. We're trying. Remember the chemical plant?

President Ozal: You should worry more about Iraq -- not only its chemical but also its nuclear weapons.

The President: How are your relations with Iraq? Saddam Hussein is an arrogant man, but he gets more humble when he needs GCC help.

Ambassador Kandemir: I lived with him for four years. He cooperates when he is in difficulty, but once he is strong he reverts to his old ways.

The President: Didn't his son get into some trouble?

General Scowcroft: He killed a security man.

The President: We haven't talked about the common defense, about NATO.

President Ozal: We continue with you on CFE. One thing: we have older equipment than Europe. Instead of destroying this equipment, send it to us, and we'll destroy ours. Then we could have M-60 tanks instead of M-48s. This is needed, because our area is really in trouble.
Secretary Cheney: This is the cascading arrangement, whereby we can pass on this equipment. We will have a meeting with General Galvin, SACEUR, on February 9 to begin specifying equipment. Then a DoD delegation will go Turkey in early March to talk about what can be provided under the Southern Region Amendment.

The President: CFE I envisions going down to 275,000. But everyone evaluates political change in Eastern Europe leading to a cascade of movement to reduce their own forces and disinvite the Soviets. We have said that the U.S. presence is important. What do you think? What is the spirit and mood in Turkey regarding U.S. forces, and the level of U.S. forces? How will the Germans and others respond?

President Ozal: As I said in Tokyo, the Soviet Union wants money for its economy. NATO's strength brought the Soviet Union to this point. NATO should remain. Let's wait and not take chances. Your presence in Europe should continue. Eastern Europe in one year will have a different shape. The Bulgarians may go together with the Soviet Union or separately. I'm not sure.

Secretary Baker: What do you mean? Wasn't the Bulgarian Government trying to deal with the problem of the Turkish minority?

President Ozal: Mladenov and company are all Communists. It's not like Poland or Hungary. They are hard-liners.

Secretary Baker: But they were forced to abolish the Communist Party's monopoly of power.

President Ozal: They will probably have free elections. The Turkish Moslem minority will be an important factor.

Secretary Baker: What is the most effective opposition group in Bulgaria?

President Ozal: I don't know. It is not like Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary. They have had a big [Roundtable] meeting, but it requires time.

Ambassador Kandemir: The Turkish minority is 2 million strong.

The President: Will the East Europeans insist that Soviet troops rapidly withdraw? Will it be unilaterally or with the U.S.?

President Ozal: The Soviets will want reciprocity.

The President: Yes. The East Europeans are indicating they want the troops out.

President Ozal: It could happen. I don't know.
The President: We would not be surprised at a Soviet offer below 275,000. (S)

President Ozal: Maybe so. But they want to see your presence continue. There is no more talk about NATO and the Warsaw Pact disbanding. (C)

The President: They didn't raise that at Malta. (S)

General Scowcroft: No. They said both should evolve toward political-military organizations. (S)

The President: Could the Armenian-Azerbaijan situation get out of control? Would the Soviets interfere to try to stabilize the situation? (S)

President Ozal: They will be able to do so. (C)

The Vice President: Will they use the maximum that is needed? (S)

President Ozal: I think so. Otherwise, they will have problems in other republics. (S)

The President: How would you react? (S)

President Ozal: It is an internal matter. (S)

Secretary Cheney: Mr. President, there has been an influx of refugees from Armenia and Azerbaijan. (S)

President Ozal: It is a little problem. There is no bridge on the river between us and Azerbaijan. (C)

The President: The press asked us another question. On Cyprus, we have backed the UN Secretary General's efforts. What about getting Denktash to go to the talks [in February] and staying? (C)

President Ozal: Let me give you my candid opinion. After Berlin, people asked me why there is still a wall in Cyprus. This is an illusion. It is not the same situation. They are not the same people. There is no common language, no common religion. And there is also distrust. Let me mention some history. During the British occupation, Greeks were second-class citizens, but Turks were third-class. Then in 1974 Turkey intervened. There was lots of killing on the island. There were two communities, 30 percent Turkish and 70 percent Greek. The President was Greek and the Vice President, Turkish. It did not work. It simply meant Greek supremacy. We proposed a solution, which the Greeks did not accept. Then the Turks moved to the north of the island, leaving the Greeks on the south. (C)

I think there is a solution -- a federation -- but it will be a difficult one. If it is not done right, there is a danger of war not only on Cyprus, but between Greece and Turkey. So there
should be a federation -- bizonal, bicommunal, with equal rights. Greeks would be on one side, and Turks on the other. There would be one federal government but two states. But if people recognize the only power in government as belonging to the Greeks, no one will care about the Turks. With the embargo imposed by the Greeks, all the benefits go to the Greek side. We help the Turkish population. But the Turkish Cypriots have become a nation, and our influence is diminishing. (C)

As to these talks, Cuellar announced the dates without consulting Denktash. We can consult with Denktash and urge him to meet in February, probably the last week in February, in New York. (C)

Secretary Baker: Will you tell the UN Secretary General that?

President Ozal: Yes. One other thing: the Greeks are well armed. If we pull out, the Greeks take over. We don't want the annexation of the island to Greece. We would like a federal state. That is our wish. If we don't do this carefully, there is a real danger. We support Denktash. He's the only man to convince his people. (C)

Secretary Baker: That's why I think it so important that he go to New York and stay for the length of time needed to get an agreement. Otherwise,.... (C)

President Ozal: I agree with you. But he has the feeling that things are done without consulting. Vassiliou considers himself the President of "all Cyprus," but he is not really. He must give some input to Denktash. He's the only man to convince his people. (C)

The President: Don't you find Vassiliou more reasonable than his predecessors? (C)

President Ozal: I met Vassiliou. He's a businessman. I didn't know him, but at the Emperor's funeral, he came to me. But he doesn't give an inch. He's a good salesman. (C)

I talked today with Senator Dole and explained to him how Turkey feels about his Armenian resolution. (C)

The President: Did you make progress? (C)

President Ozal: I don't know. (C)

General Scowcroft: He called me and said that President Ozal made his position very clear. (C)

The President: What about Dole's position? (C)

General Scowcroft: He said he explained it the President Ozal. (C)

President Ozal: He said he was a good friend of Turkey. (C)
The President: We're trying hard to get the situation ameliorated, but it is very difficult.

President Ozal: I told Senator Dole this is an issue on which Turks are single-minded and entirely united. Therefore it will have a very bad effect if the resolution passes. Second, I told him, "You are not from California." Third, I said that we have our own problem in Armenia. It's not the right time. Why put Turkey in the middle? During the Republican election, he asked that the Ottoman Archives be opened. I ordered them opened.

The President: You mentioned this to Dole?

General Scowcroft: Yes. He hadn't realized this.

The President: Someone told me Dole's life was saved by an Armenian and that they are very close.

The Vice President: Yes. An Armenian doctor saved his life. Let me just mention that "sense of the Congress" resolutions are passed all the time. I don't want to trivialize the issue, but these are very common.

President Ozal: The publicity has grown too big now.

The President: Let me understand why the Dole resolution would make the situation more difficult in Armenia itself and Azerbaijan. It is just a resolution of Congress.

President Ozal: We have no relations with Azerbaijan, except that we are from the same race.

Ambassador Abramowitz: Let me give a different answer, from the Soviet perspective. Given the hostility between the two republics, the resolution will be seen as a boon to independence for their own nationalities. It would have a major impact. It is not a simple resolution. It would have an extraordinary impact.

The President: The Soviet hierarchy would see it as interference?

Ambassador Abramowitz: Yes. We were informed by the Soviets that they would raise the issue at Malta.

The President: I don't think it came up.

General Scowcroft: No.

Ambassador Abramowitz: From the Soviet angle, there is this concern.

The President: This is a new ingredient, not part of the debate so far.

President Ozal: Television news shows fighting between Armenians
and Azeris. Now Armenians are likening Azeri actions to what the Turks did.

Ambassador Kandemir: They would take this resolution as justification for terrorism and territorial claims. They would use the Armenian resolution to claim the 1921 border is not valid. They will go to the European Parliament and introduce a resolution, which seems innocent but is not.

Minister Taner: It is a time bomb.

President Ozal: President Bush, I am your friend. If there is any way to solve this, I will tell you. There is no solution except defeat of the resolution. Ours is a proud nation and a good friend of the United States. But after the Johnson letter of 1964, it took twenty years to repair the damage. And it was a much simpler matter than the Dole resolution.

Secretary Baker: What is the source of financing for Armenian Turkish terrorism?

President Ozal: It comes from everywhere, like the IRA. A last item: helicopters, which could be provided under the Southern Region Amendment. These would be useful for our ground forces.

The President: Dick Cheney will look into that. (Ozal hands notes to Secretary Cheney.) We didn’t give our trade people a chance to talk.

President Ozal: We have our trade people coming. We would be very appreciative for your consideration. Turkey wants open trade, but we want help, especially with our textile exports.

-- End of Conversation --