<table>
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<th>Document No. and Type</th>
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Collection:

- **Collection:** Bush Presidential Records
- **Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records
- **Office:** Scowcroft, Brent, Files
- **Series:** Presidential Correspondence Files
- **Subseries:** Presidential Telecon Files
- **WHORM Cat.:**

File Location: Presidential Telephone Call - Memorandum of Conversations 10/24/89 - 12/26/89

**Date Closed:** 2/2/2009

OA/ID Number: 91111-004

- **FOIA/SYS Case #:** 2009-0275-S
- **Re-review Case #:**
- **P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**
- **AR Case #:** 1999-0273-F(132)
- **AR Disposition:** Released in Part
- **AR Disposition Date:** 5/13/2009

- **Appeal Case #:**
- **Appeal Disposition:**
- **Disposition Date:**
- **MR Case #:**
- **MR Disposition:**
- **MR Disposition Date:**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**
  - P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
  - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors and any private person, and any information derived from such advice [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
  - C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**
  - (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
  - (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

**Document Partially Declassified**

(Copy of Document Follows)

By [Signature] (NLGB) on 12/1/10

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 29, 1989, 8:27 - 9:02 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It is nice to hear your voice. I am well. Things are going well. The economy is going well. But the better things are, the more difficulties people make. (U)

The President: You're a star of American TV. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I would like to come back to my letter and discuss a few points, especially in preparation for your summit meeting with Gorbachev. Then I would like to know what our dinner would look like. Would Jim Baker be there? (C)

The President: Sure, he will be, if that's okay with you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I only need to know whether we should bring Genscher. (C)

The President: We're talking as personal friends, but I leave this to you. Normally I would invite Baker, Scowcroft, and Sununu; but if that's any problem for you, we can do it just as White House staff. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I propose first with the White House staff, with Baker coming in later. (C)

The President: That is agreeable, but Baker can go off. Why don't I suggested Sununu, Scowcroft, and me. And you bring two people. How does that sound? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think that's a great idea, but I have nothing against Jim Baker joining us at a later point. I have great
admiration for him. He is one of the outstanding figures of our time. (8)

The President: He understands. There will be no problem. Let's say we bring three and you bring three, then Baker comes for coffee. (8)

Chancellor Kohl: I'll bring Horst with me. (8)

The President: Good. I want to hear his views as well as yours. (8)

Chancellor Kohl: | (b)(1)

(b)(1)
The President: This was a very timely and full report. We have watched your statements with interest. I am very supportive of your general approach. I note your stress on stability. We feel the same way. Stability is the key word. We have tried to do nothing that would force a reaction by the USSR. We are not exhorting people. We are not conducting ourselves that way. We are on the same wavelength. I appreciated your ten points and your exposition on the future of Germany. I had our top analysts in talking about that last night. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for your good words. Germans East and West are listening very carefully. Every word of sympathy for self-determination and unity is very important now. (C)

The President: On my meeting with Gorbachev, there is hyper-interest in our country. Two to five thousand journalists will be going to Malta. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That will mean more journalists than inhabitants. (U)

The President: We will discuss arms control items. It will be an open meeting, but we have told our press not to expect bold proposals. We are part of an Alliance and will not surprise the Germans, British, French, and others. We are not unwilling to talk about arms control, but I will not be stampeded into a broad Reykjavik game that is unsettling to our Allies. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. That is completely in harmony with our intentions. One piece of information: this is very important to Gorbachev and the people around him who are not being treated very kindly at home. The meeting, psychologically speaking, is very important. (b)(1) (C)

The President: We recognize the Soviet Union as a sovereign nation that has great pride. Shevardnadze said recently that he didn’t want America to "bail us out." I will be sensitive, but will want to see what I can do to help. We want him to succeed. In the briefings I have had, it is apparent that the Soviet economy is much worse than I realized before in-depth study. I will help, but in a sensitive way. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is the right line. (b)(1)

The President: We will go forward cautiously, but will be forward-leaning on arms control and other issues -- as part of a strong Alliance. I’ve been criticized for being too cautious, but, first, things are going our way and, second, stability should be the by-word. We don’t want inadvertently to create instability. (C)
Chancellor Kohl: I look forward to seeing you soon. (U)

The President: Thank you. I will see you Sunday. Love to Hannelore. (U)

-- End of Conversation --