

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memcon	Memorandum of Conversation, Re: Meeting at Camp David. [redacted] (9 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	S

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


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- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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MEMCON~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Amb Henry Catto, US Amb to Great Britain

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Charles Powell,
Amb Antony Acland, Great Britain

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 24, 1989, 10:00 am - 2:30 pm EST
Camp David

The President and Prime Minister Thatcher met at Camp David.

The President: My meeting with Gorbachev has no agenda. People warn me he always has surprises. I'm not worried because I think he wants the meeting to be a success. Our summit next year will deal with the knotty problems of arms control.

I would love to turn the floor over to you. It is building to be quite a meeting. It was my idea -- in Paris after Poland and Hungary. They wanted me to meet with Gorbachev. We tried several different schemes to get it up.

PM Thatcher: |

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2009-1265-MR

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The President: What borders?

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: I raised the nationality question because we always asked what happens if Gorbachev has to crack down and asks us to show forbearance.

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: Leave out East Germany. What if East European countries want to leave Warsaw Pact. NATO must stay.

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: Can't give it to Soviet Union. Shevardnadze said we don't want aid. They may raise IFI participation. Things are going badly for him. But the elite around this country says do something.

PM Thatcher:

(b) (1)

The President: Story about Walesa and buying Polish farms. It is so naive. I am going to have to be frank with Gorbachev on economics. They don't understand incentives, access to materials, etc., for leasing, for example.

PM Thatcher:

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The President: About what we did in Tiananmen Square.

PM Thatcher:

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The President: I can't just stay quiet.

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: Leslie Stahl asked you "What about reunification." What do you say?

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: Good. How about Kohl? Are there differences?

PM Thatcher: |

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(b)(1)

The President: Let me ask about EC. If you were me, would you worry?

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: Are you catching hell at home --- by Labour.

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: Maybe I should start speaking out more.

PM Thatcher: |

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(b) (1)

The President: Let me tick off some issues. China -- appalled as we are about Tiananmen Square, we don't want to break relationships or turn China back or inward. We want to find ways to move forward. |

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The President: I only raise it because I don't want Gorbachev to think because we are estranged from China that we don't have big stake in China. |

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PM Thatcher: |

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PM Thatcher: |

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The President: On another regional subject -- Nicaraguan elections. |

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Ortega. Then I will go on to Cuba.

He is likely to want to trade for Afghanistan. On afghanistan, we generally thought Najibullah would collapse when Soviets left. Can't trade, but I would like to find a formula, unless we would drop Najibullah.

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: Gorbachev may want to trade Nicaragua for Afghanistan and we won't do that. We are sending signals to Iran (little ones) but so far no response.

PM Thatcher: |

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The President: |

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PM Thatcher: |

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The President: I was very impressed with Menem. He is about as reasonable as you're likely to get.

(LUNCH)

PM Thatcher: |

(b)(1)

The President: We have enormous budget problems (described Cheney's approach to dealing with the budget). I am upset it has

all been made public 10 days before Malta. If we must take hits, I want to get something for it.

(INSERT EAGLEBURGER NOTES HERE)

PM Thatcher: [redacted] (b)(1)

beyond voluntary return. So far they do not seem to be motivated, and we give money to their home village. We can't manage much longer. When the boat season begins again, we shall start with a small number to see how it goes.

The President: Extraordinarily difficult problem. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1)
PM Thatcher: [redacted]

The President: It is not the same.

PM Thatcher: [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(1)

The President: India-Pakistan.

PM Thatcher: [redacted] (b)(1)

The President: Will Bhutto make it.

PM Thatcher: [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(1)

The President: She is definitely a stabilizing factor, [redacted] (b)(1)

PM Thatcher: Sri Lanka. Indian troops are withdrawing, but they won't be out in time (discussion of Tamils and JVP). Burma is an enigma.

The President: How about the Japanese.

PM Thatcher: They listen to you, but they carry on as before.

Germany and Japan are similar. High savings rate, highly efficient and they're buying up half the world.

When they take over, they run things very efficiently, they tell people exactly what is expected, and our people like to work for them. But in general, there is anti-Japanese sentiment.

The President: New Zealand and Australia.

PM Thatcher: |

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

The President: Cristiani is a good man. But there is an emotional wing in this country which is violent on the issue.