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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Horst Teltschik, Chancellery Adviser on
Security Policy
Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 31, 1989, 9:10 a.m. - 10:05 a.m.
AND PLACE: Federal Chancellery, Bonn

Chancellor Kohl opened with a discussion of exchange programs. He emphasized the value of student exchanges and mentioned possibilities for a congressional exchange program, starting with the leadership in the U.S. Senate. They could spend four or five days in the FRG, including meetings with military units so they can see how a conscript army works. It would be good for the Senators to meet with these young people. A similar program could be followed for the U.S. House of Representatives during a second phase. Also, the Soviets were mounting a massive offensive in this area, with more and more visitors all the time. (S)

Chancellor Kohl also wanted the President to understand that, for him, there were two pillars in his foreign policy: the EC and NATO. (S)

The President suggested that the Chancellor not forget the importance of state officials as well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said that Mr. Weidenfeld would do more about this problem, and suggested that General Scowcroft could talk to him. The Chancellor also wanted to establish a scholarship for ten American students. Could the Chancellor and the President be joint patrons? (S)

The President said he would like that very much if there was no Congressional prohibition. (S)

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Chancellor Kohl admitted that it sounded crazy but said the U.S. and the FRG must get back to the year 1910. That was when the largest exchanges were taking place. The Chancellor joked that he was a nut on this issue. (Ø)

The President said he did not worry about American young people going to Moscow if they had something to compare it with. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl noted he had spoken to (Egyptian) President Mubarak about this. Mubarak had studied in Moscow and told the Chancellor not to worry. (Ø)

The President commented that Mubarak was a good man. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said he wished that (Israeli Prime Minister) Shamir would reach out more. He should know that any other leader in Egypt would be worse for him to deal with. (Ø)

The President said he was under pressure from the American Jewish community but would persist in his approach. The U.S. had a problem on the settlements issue and the President would do something publicly about it. (Ø)

The President said he was especially disturbed about the problems in Lebanon. It was hard to know what to do. The President would not send the Marines back in, but he was frustrated. He loved the Lebanese people. The crisis in Lebanon was a pressing concern in the U.S., especially in the Catholic community. The President had discussed Lebanon with the Holy Father. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said that, if he could be of help, the President should let him know. This was a critical area -- one where Christians, Jews, and Moslems come together. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl then asked the President for his views on the situation in Japan, noting his regret about Nakasone's problems. (Ø)

The President said it was a tough period for Japan. The U.S. knew that Uno, and Takeshita, were good men. The President said he had reluctantly taken a 301 decision. There is an anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and the President was worried about it. The U.S. needed a close relationship with Japan and the Japanese were buying U.S. bonds. The President described the FSX problem. There was an ugly undercurrent in U.S.-Japanese relations and it worried the President. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said he had encountered the same situation three or four years earlier. When the Chancellor came into office there was a depressing attitude toward Japan all over Europe. The Chancellor was in Japan and the Japanese said the Germans had lost out, could not keep up. The Chancellor promised the Germans

would be back later. The Japanese told the Chancellor last year that he was right; the Germans were back. Now, for example, BMW sells motorcycles in Japan. The U.S. and Germans could do it. The Japanese did not have more brain cells than the Americans or Germans did. Nor did the Chancellor think the Japanese could continue as they had in the past. The Chancellor said the Japanese will have a cultural crisis, and recounted a story about Japanese children identifying their home as being their kindergarten school. The absence of any home life was the reverse of the traditional Japanese lifestyle. The Japanese had gone from one extreme to the other. They were not better people; they were just organized better, and work harder. The SPD now had a program for a 30-hour work week. In 1988 the Germans were investing more in research and development and were up to the per capita level of investment of the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. and the FRG should do more joint research and development. The Chancellor wanted thousands of ties between the U.S. and Germany in every conceivable field. (S)

Chancellor Kohl cited another problem. The Germans had an inferiority complex. By the year 2000 there would be three main economic areas -- Japan, the U.S. and Canada, and Western Europe. Within this room, the Chancellor said he felt the FRG should stay within the second rank, not stick its neck out. That was why the Germans pushed France out in front. That was the problem with Prime Minister Thatcher. She got irritated with the FRG even though the Chancellor spoke last at the EC meetings. The Chancellor did not want to push her into a corner, but wanted to bring her in. That was also why he wanted to bring the U.S. in. (S)

The President said he wanted to be sure the U.S. did not appear to have exclusive friends in Europe. That was why he had taken Mitterrand to Kennebunkport. The U.S. would have problems with Mitterrand, but these were also because the French felt there was a U.S.-Great Britain special relationship. That was also a problem with Germany. (S)

Chancellor Kohl characterized France as a capricious lady that can always be wooed. The only Cardinal in France does not receive his hat from the Pope, but from the head of state -- ever since Louis XIV. One must accept these French idiosyncrasies and deal with them. (S)

The President said all countries had their special concerns. The U.S. would cater to them, but not grovel. (S)

Chancellor Kohl said it was fantastic that the President took Mitterrand to Kennebunkport. With President Reagan, the relationship just did not work. The President had dealt with him exactly right. Mitterrand used to say he did not take instructions from U.S. Presidents. He could not talk with

President Reagan. He talked with the President and he loved it. The Chancellor urged the President to please continue this approach with Mitterrand. There was no jealousy on the part of the Chancellor. (S)

The President recounted a story about former Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki. (S)

Chancellor Kohl asked the President when he would be going to Poland. (U)

The President said it would be just before the Economic Summit. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said the U.S. and the FRG should help Jaruzelski. The Poles were a bit too arrogant, but it was important to help them. (S)

The President said he would like to consult with the Chancellor about this subject before his trip. (S)