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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



4368

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the FRG

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Hans Klein, Minister for Economic Cooperation
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Horst Teltschik, Chancellery Adviser on Security Policy
Dieter Kastrup, Foreign Ministry Political Director
Walter Neuer, Head of Chancellor's Private Office
Uwe Kastner, Chancellery Director for USA and Europe

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 30, 1989, 5:30 p.m. - 6:20 p.m.
Federal Chancellery, Bonn

Chancellor Kohl said the day was a good one for the FRG after the joint labors of Brussels. The Summit outcome was a cornerstone in the U.S.-German relationship. As the Federal Republic celebrated its 40th anniversary, it was clear that the FRG's success would be inconceivable without the United States. Beyond the material help in the Marshall Plan, America's spiritual help was immeasurable. Without going into the details of the Summit, the Chancellor wanted the President to be sure that Germans understood that there could be no secure future for the FRG without NATO and without German friendship with the United States. (Ø)

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Chancellor Kohl wanted to raise U.S.-German relations and his hopes for improved cooperation in exchanging young people between the two countries. He also hoped the U.S. and Germany could tap the resource of the millions of Americans who had served as soldiers in the FRG. (U)

Chancellor Kohl also wanted to discuss burdensharing. Nine hundred thousand soldiers moved about in a small country, as wide as the length of Long Island. Chancellor Kohl and the President also needed to discuss low-level flights. In the months ahead, Chancellor Kohl hoped for an intensified discussion of burdensharing and, with a view to U.S. domestic politics, it might be good to come to reasonable agreements on this issue. (ϕ)

Chancellor Kohl, referring to an earlier discussion of the EC, said that, without any overestimation, the FRG was the real engine of the EC. The Federal Republic paid in the most money and drew the most benefits. In 1989, 55% of the FRG's exports would go to the EC. In heading to 1992, Bonn's policy was to avoid a 'fortress Europe' at all costs, and the FRG was not alone. There would not be a U.S.-EC trade war. An agreement was needed on goods and services. In 1948, West Germany had opted for a free market. From this lesson, it was clear that the FRG would never revert to protectionism. These were the points the Chancellor Kohl wanted to make. Later, perhaps the Chancellor and the President could talk about the Warsaw Pact, Poland and Hungary. (ϕ)

The President said he was pleased with the Brussels result. Reaction at home had been positive. With regard to NATO, the President would be misleading the Chancellor if he did not say that some in the U.S. wanted someone else to take on the NATO burden. But a majority of Americans, as the President made clear in Brussels, realized how important the U.S. relationship to NATO really was. This Summit meeting would help. (ϕ)

The President was thinking about how to push forward now quickly after the euphoria in Brussels. The HLTF needs to have the new proposal ready by September 7; then the Allies must move CFE forward. This would be an interesting test for Gorbachev. The President's general feeling was that Gorbachev would find positive elements in the NATO initiative, partly because of the cost of conventional forces to the Soviet economy. So the President was somewhat hopeful, and determined to try to make the CFE process work. (ϕ)

The President felt that German-American relations probably had never been better. There was a feeling of goodwill toward Germany in the U.S. There would be differences, but the relationship would endure and only get better and better. (John McCloy's funeral was a symbol of this. As for exchanges, the U.S. and the FRG should intensify efforts to exchange more young

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people, see what could be done about that. There would be budgetary constraints because of the U.S. budget deficit, but the U.S. would work on the problem. On burdensharing, exercises were needed to maintain readiness, but the U.S. and the FRG needed to explain their purpose better. On trade, both the U.S. and Europe needed to keep markets open, especially on agriculture, where all were guilty. The President hoped to talk about this issue at the Economic Summit. The U.S. would work with the EC as best it could. Consultation had gotten much better and the U.S. never wanted to "blindside" the FRG. There would be no surprises. Consultation was crucial. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher said that, on the subject of the European Community, he had followed the President's Boston speech with great attention. There was a great opportunity on both sides of the Atlantic because of 1992. The EC had a 340 million person market. The President saw in Brussels yesterday how members of the EC could talk -- and some men and women fight, especially as the night gets longer. In ten to fifteen years, there would be three major economic areas: Japan, the EC, and the U.S. and Canada. The Foreign Minister was not afraid of Japan. He had told Nakasone that, as MacArthur said, we in Europe shall return. On terrorism and drugs, the U.S. and the FRG must work even more closely together. (S)

The President asked about the UK role in the EC. What were Prime Minister Thatcher's concerns? Were they manageable? How would the EC accommodate neutrals like Austria or Switzerland? (S)

Chancellor Kohl said he held Prime Minister Thatcher in very high esteem. He had known her for 18 years. He respected her very much. She is intelligent (b)(1) For a long time, the English Channel was a border for the UK. Half the population of the UK has never crossed the Channel. That would change over time, but now the British were behind the views of the rest of Europe. (b)(1)

(b)(1) Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand were very close, as were their countries. When Chancellor Kohl was younger, France was Germany's sworn enemy. That had changed. (b)(1) (S)

Chancellor Kohl said that as time passed European national "competencies" would gradually shift to the EC. This was inevitable. Norway would vote for membership in the EC in three or four years. Sweden and Finland would also have to be accommodated. Chancellor Kohl wished the Germans would have pursued the thoughtful economic policies of Finland for the last forty years; Chancellor Kohl had great admiration for the Finns. As for Switzerland, Chancellor Kohl was not sure the Swiss would agree to join the EC. As for Austria, it had applied for membership but it was unclear what would happen when EC defense cooperation intensified, if there were neutrals within the EC. (S)

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