# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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<th>Document No. and Type</th>
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<td>02. Memcon</td>
<td>Memorandum of conversation between President George Bush and President Mubarak of Egypt [SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL] (3 pp.)</td>
<td>4/3/89</td>
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**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** Memcons, Presidential

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** April 1989

**Date Closed:** 12/5/2000

**OA/ID Number:** CF01729-004

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**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

**AR Case #:** 2000-0429-F(36)

**AR Disposition:** Released in Part

**AR Disposition Date:** 8/21/2009

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Plenary Session with President Mubarak of Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III
The Secretary of Treasury, Nicholas F. Brady
John Sununu, The Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, US Ambassador to Egypt
Paul Hare, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff, The Department of State
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director for Near East & South Asian Affairs, NSC

Egypt
President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak
Dr. Ahmed Esmet Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Kamal Ganzouri, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning
Dr. Boutrous Gali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Dr. Atef Ebeid, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Dr. Zakaria Azmy, Chief of President’s Cabinet
Dr. Osama El-Baz, Chief of Cabinet to the President for Political Affairs, 1st Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 3, 1989 - 11:30 p.m. - 12:00 Noon, The Cabinet Room

The President welcomed President Mubarak to the White House, saying that his invitation for the baseball game was intended as a symbol of the importance of our friendship. It continued to be our objective to achieve a comprehensive peace based on UN Resolution 242, territory for peace and Israel's security. There
would be no retreat from support for the rights of Palestinians, and there could be a role for an international conference if the timing were right and the prospects for achieving something looked good.

President Mubarak said that US-Egyptian relations were good and were based upon facts. He was thus shocked to hear accusations concerning Egypt's CW capabilities. Egypt had no CW capability and had no need for one.

The President said that the last thing we wanted to do was to place Egypt in the same box as Qadhafi's Libya.

President Mubarak said that a week before he had sent a message (through Algeria) to Qadhafi saying that he had no intention of attacking the Rabta facility, at the same time advising Qadhafi that he would regret it if he went ahead with the facility and that he should be careful. As for Egypt's own CW capability, Mubarak said his own Minister of Defense said Egypt had none. Turning next to Egypt's economy, President Mubarak noted that Egypt was taking unprecedented reforms. But what the IMF was asking Egypt to do would force Mubarak from office. Instability would result as the 1977 experience demonstrated. Reform must be gradual if it was to be successful. He had thus raised energy prices last week by 30%, but it was always necessary to choose a suitable time for such changes. (Student examinations provided a good occasion in this instance). The recent experience in Venezuela showed how things could go badly. Too much reform would risk losing the trust of the people. In this context, US aid policy was creating problems for Egypt and Mubarak. What made matters worse was Egypt's large debt servicing problem, something brought about by reduced revenues from oil and the Suez Canal, and a decrease in the repatriation of funds.

The President asked about the current price for Egyptian crude.

President Mubarak answered that it was about $15 or $16 per barrel. He wanted to take this opportunity to pass on his regards to the President from King Fahd who had just had a good visit to Egypt. He added that one thing Egypt needed from the US was wheat and the means to pay for it.

Secretary Baker said that the US was already providing $190M in this area and that they could discuss this matter more in their meeting the next day.

President Mubarak acknowledged this, adding only that Egypt was already undertaking the "maximum permissible reform."

The President asked for President Mubarak's views on the Middle East situation.

President Mubarak said that he had met recently with Israeli FM Arens and Ezer Weizman. He told them that an international conference was necessary as a psychological umbrella. There would be only one day for speeches followed by direct
negotiations. Arens expressed his fear of an imposed solution. Mubarak said there was no danger, for only the US had such influence and it was prepared to help. It was his (Mubarak's) view that the international conference remained the most practical next step, without which Hussein would not act. Mubarak added that Arens had asked for direct talks with Hussein, and that Hussein was willing to meet with Arens secretly.

The President asked about Palestinian representation at a conference.

President Mubarak said that the Palestinian delegation would consist of people from inside and outside the territories. It would be necessary to find people Israel could live with. A joint delegation [PLO and non-PLO] would create major problems with Shamir. Mubarak understood that an international conference promised to be a long, complicated effort. Elections to choose Palestinians representatives would be unacceptable under Israeli supervision.

The President asked about the possibility of non-Israeli supervision.

President Mubarak said that Arafat accepted UN supervision and that he would do what he could to promote flexibility with Arafat.

The President expressed his concern over the violence on the West Bank. He was also concerned over the incursions from outside Israel, and asked whether it would be possible to get the terrorists to back off.

President Mubarak said that Arafat was not in a position to stop such violence.

The President asked whether Arafat would be prepared to denounce it.

President Mubarak said that he might on some occasions, but that Arafat needed to appease his own people.

The President stated that if Arafat came out against violent incursions it would help.

President Mubarak said he would try to get Arafat to make some useful statements in this area.

The President stated his concern over the "bullets in the chest" comment by Arafat. He also wanted Mubarak to know that he supported what Secretary Baker had said about the PLO, that the US would not pull back from opposing new Israeli settlements or from its dialogue with the PLO. It would be a big help if Egypt could use its influence to get Arafat to moderate his comments on terror.

President Mubarak agreed, adding that he would tell Arafat to disassociate himself from such violence, but that we could not expect Arafat to stop the intifada.