

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)	2/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 1/24/89 - 2/25/89

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By CA1 (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed: 1/23/2009	OA/ID Number: 91107-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #: 2000-0429-F(6)	MR Case #:
AR Disposition: Released in Part	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.



E WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (S)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James A. Kelly, NSC, Notetaker

Egypt
President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak
Dr. Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Dr. Osama El-Baz, Director, President's Office for Foreign Affairs
Wahib Al-Minyawi, Ambassador to Tokyo
Dr. Mustafa Al-Figi, Presidential Secretary

DATE, TIME: February 23, 1989, 6:26 p.m. - 6:52 p.m.
AND PLACE: Ambassador's Residence, Tokyo, Japan

The meeting began with an exchange of warm greetings. (U)

President Mubarak stated that he had come to Tokyo from a visit to the United Arab Emirates and would be visiting Bangkok and Kuwait as he returned to Cairo. (U)

President Bush asked President Mubarak what ought to happen next in the Middle East. (U)

President Mubarak responded that he supported an international conference. (U)

The President asked about the Shevardnadze visit to Cairo which had just concluded. (S)

President Mubarak responded that the Shevardnadze visit had gone exceptionally well; that he thought there was progress toward an international conference; and that Shevardnadze had had a good meeting with Foreign Minister Arens of Israel the previous day. (S)

President Bush commented that although some view such a meeting as bad from the U.S. viewpoint, he did not feel that at all. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
2009-0429-F
8/21/2009

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

President Mubarak said that Shevardnadze had boasted of improved relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S., and had said nothing against the United States. (S)

The President asked President Mubarak for his general view of what is happening in the Middle East, including the prospects of persuading the Palestinians to go through with serious peace proposals. He thanked Mubarak for helping the American side with Arafat. The President asked how Mubarak saw Syria, and the difficulties it would pose for peace. (S)

President Mubarak responded that an international conference would take care of the problem of Syria because it would be important whether Syria joined or not. If Syria did not join the international conference there would be no further suspense about the matter. In his opinion, the Soviet Union will not agree to Syria's staying out, and he believes Syria would certainly join the conference. (S)

President Bush brought up the question of Libya and Qadhafi, which Mubarak continues to view as (b) (1). The President noted that Qadhafi had come out for Governor Dukakis the American election. (S)

President Mubarak responded that (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President asked (b) (1)

President Mubarak said (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President agreed that (b) (1) (S)

President Mubarak continued to discuss Qadhafi, (b) (1)

(b) (1)

President Bush asked President Mubarak about Arafat, whether his views on the PLO had recently changed, and to what extent Mubarak believes Arafat and the PLO are in trouble with the PLO's radical

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

side. (S)

President Mubarak answered firmly that Arafat was the best one, that 100% control of the PLO was impossible, but that just as he had told Secretary Shultz earlier, Arafat is the only figure in the PLO with stature, and if eliminated, would be a big loss. Mubarak said the Palestinians outside of the West Bank and Gaza need to be considered, and that they are a rich group. But they are also a group from which terrorists emerge, and that the interests of all would be best maintained by keeping Arafat in good shape. (S)

President Mubarak commented on PLO financing. He said that this could either come from those who use anti-U.S. rhetoric or it could come from those who seek only revenge. Arafat, he believes, is a most reasonable man and he is the best possible leader for the Palestinians. His loss would be a serious blow. (S)

President Bush said that there are many reports of the danger of losing him, to which Mubarak agreed. The President asked what Arafat wants from the U.S. (S)

President Mubarak answered that all need an international conference. Mubarak continued that he had told Arens there is nothing to fear from an international conference, but that Arens said that he needs an umbrella for Prime Minister Shamir. Arens had told him that the Soviet Union and China would impose a solution on the international conference, but said Mubarak had disagreed. He said direct negotiations should start immediately with participation by Israelis, Palestinians, Arab delegations, Egypt, and Syria. Those who refuse would have made their decision, with implications to be borne by themselves. (S)

President Mubarak continued. He said that Arens told him that there was a large debate about this in Israel, and that he was sorry about those who had been killed in the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza. Arens said both Palestinians or Israelis want a fair solution, but Arens had also said Israel would need a great deal of time. (S)

The President had asked Mubarak about Shamir, whether he envisioned new plans or ideas from the Prime Minister. (S)

President Mubarak responded that Shamir needed to be realistic. Best would be to go along with the idea of a conference. No one could impose a solution on this situation. Involving the Soviet Union would be essential to the conference and that process would be the best way to freeze the intifada. There was no organization outside the PLO that could speak authoritatively for

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

Palestinians. (S)

On the subject of elections in the West Bank, Mubarak said the PLO fears an election that would be influenced by the Israelis. There has to be some way other than only by the participation of candidates that are 100% pro-Israel. (S)

President Bush mentioned Israeli Defense Minister Rabin's plan for free and fair elections in the West Bank and Gaza, in which Israel would talk to whoever wins the election, even if the winner is a member of the PLO. (S)

President Mubarak said that might be acceptable if it did not neglect Palestinians outside the territories. (S)

President Bush offered that perhaps Shamir and Arens were starting to think like Rabin. (S)

President Mubarak responded that the PLO had many good people. He felt it had been a mistake when Peres refused to deal with one particularly good man only because he was a nominal member of the PLO. The Israelis should not refuse to be in contact with such people, even those who are outside of Israel or the territories. Mubarak noted that many such Palestinians have been successful, have businesses and will never return to the territories. (S)

President Bush asked if Mubarak was concerned about [redacted] radicals taking over the PLO. (S) (b)(1)

President Mubarak said he did not fear that. Mubarak said that he had discussed with Arens the importance of those who work for peace and those who cooperate with Jordan and Egypt. Arens had told him not to press Israel to act too quickly. (S)

President Bush mentioned that if Mubarak could convince Arens, Arens ought to be able to convince Shamir. (S)

Secretary Baker interjected on the matter of timing, asking whether he foresaw two months or a year to be needed for the Israelis. (S)

President Mubarak said a shorter time would not work against them. (U)

President Bush asked what the feeling was in Egypt for having made the deal with Israel? What was the feeling of the man on the street? Egypt had been saluted in many foreign countries, but he wondered how its people felt. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

President Mubarak said people accepted relations with Israel, but they would throw him out if he did not support the Palestinian cause. He told Arens that Israel has agricultural experts from whom Egypt has much to learn. Moreover, most Egyptians want to go to Israel sometime. He again said that an international conference will be important. (C)

President Bush asked, this year? (U)

President Mubarak said this year or next year. (U)

As the meeting ended the President expressed his great respect for what Mubarak had done. He noted that he can be proud of the way the Arab world looks to Mubarak. Egypt's strong leadership role over the years has turned out to be right. There were economic issues between Egypt and the U.S., he knew, and he would look forward to discussing those at a subsequent time, perhaps when Mubarak visits the United States. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~