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06. Memcon	Memorandum of conversation between President George Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney [SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL] (3 pp.)	2/10/89	(b)(1)	C

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
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Embassy of the United States of America

February 10, 1989

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: President's Luncheon Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney

Place: 24 Sussex, Ottawa

Participants: Canadian Side

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark
Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister Stanley Hartt
Ambassador Derek Burney
External Affairs Under Secretary James Taylor
External Affairs Assistant Deputy Minister (US Affairs)
Donald Campbell

U.S. Side

The President
Secretary James A. Baker, III
Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles
Chief of Staff to the President John Sununu
General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor
Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs

The Prime Minister asked President Bush how President Reagan was doing. The President said he had spoken several times with his predecessor, who was adjusting well to private life and seemed happy in California.

The Prime Minister asked what our reaction was to former Prime Minister Michael Manley's victory in the Jamaican election. The President said that he would obviously have to meet with Manley at some point, and he added that he hoped Manley was sincere in his statements that he did not plan to run an anti-American and strictly socialist government. The Prime Minister again raised the question of Cuba, to which the President said he had detected no signals of any change in Cuba. Castro had permitted the visit of a UN human rights team, but Cuba was way behind the Soviet Union in reform. Moreover, Cuba remained a strategic concern to the United States. Secretary Baker said that one good question might be where the 50,000 Cubans will go when they leave Angola.

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The President recalled that he had met Manley last year and had found him bright and engaging.

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-2-

(b)(1) and the President said that in general the Jamaicans had been helpful although the problem remained serious. Continuing, the Prime Minister asked about the role of the U.S. military in the anti-drug effort. The President said that this would be largely limited to surveillance. In one case, Bolivia, we had sent military forces to assist the local government in its anti-drug efforts, but this was very much an exception. We had to be very sensitive to sovereignty concerns, the President added.

Continuing on the drug issue, the President recalled a recent meeting with San Francisco 49er Coach Walsh, who had expressed his grave concern over the impact of the drug problem, particularly in the black community. The President said the problem was extremely severe. He noted that Johnson and Johnson CEO Jim Burke was undertaking a major program to quadruple (to over \$1 billion annually) the amount of pro bono anti-drug ads in the media. The President noted that he had had a very useful meeting prior to his inauguration with Mexican President Salinas de Gortari, at which the drug problem had been a major subject of discussion. Salinas had seemed willing to cooperate with us, but it was difficult to believe that he would help on matters such as prosecuting the murderers of DEA agent Camarena.

On the Free Trade Agreement, it was noted that Ambassador Hills and Minister Crosbie would be discussing the timing of the first formal meeting of the Joint Commission. Ambassador Niles noted that March 13 had been selected as the date for that meeting.

The conversation then turned to Europe and 1992, which the President said was a major issue. He noted that Mrs. Thatcher had concerns on this point and asked whether it was likely to be smooth sailing for the Europeans. Secretary Baker said that he was very worried about 1992 and suggested that the United States and Canada needed to find some way to get their views into the process. The President asked about the role and influence of the European Parliament. Ambassador Ridgway noted that strengthening the European Parliament had been part of the "single European act" adopted in 1985 that also established the goal of a single market in 1992. The Parliament was becoming more and more influential, and serious politicians, Giscard d'Estaing for example, were running for membership. Parliament would soon acquire the right to approve the EC budget.

Continuing, Ambassador Ridgway stressed that we need an improved dialogue with the EC. We have found that in new industries such as electronics, we have fewer problems in working out acceptable common standards. The problems arise, she said, in the more traditional industries such as heavy machinery. Governor Sununu asked whether the fact of creating a true common market of the 12 countries might be such a benefit as to outweigh the negative

(b)(1) (b)(1) Secretary Baker said that this would be a European decision to drive us out of the market, in a sense deciding to solve their problems at our expense.

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-3-

The Prime Minister said he had twice visited Brussels to see EC President Delors and planned to do so again. (b)(1)

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The President recalled that he and General Scrowcroft had recently met with the Swiss Ambassador to the United States who had expressed strong concern about the EC and 1992.

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The President asked whether there was any chance that the EC would fail in its 1992 program. (b)(1)

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Secretary Baker said he thought this could be very useful, provided it was at the very top level to the member countries. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

The Prime Minister asked Ambassador Ridgway what our assessment was of the outlook for 1992 in terms of the ambitious work program. Ambassador Ridgway said that we anticipate continued progress, although we did not believe the Europeans would succeed in agreeing on all 300 new regulations. She said that we need to be tough with our European Allies and to make clear our concerns about the impact of 1992 on the defense relationship. (b)(1)

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Thomas M. T. Niles
Ambassador

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